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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

NEW YORK TIMES
1 NOVEMBER 1974

The Value Of the C.I.A.

By Ray S. Cline

WASHINGTON—The surge of sentimental piety and outrage over the public disclosure that the Central Intelligence Agency had attempted to influence the course of political events in Chile in the nineteen-seventies has shed more heat than light.

All great countries attempt to influence events in other countries when these events affect their interests: Other nations try to influence our domestic politics; the Soviet Union and China have a well-defined and widely-known philosophy of attempting to promote violent social and political revolution in all non-Communist countries.

The C.I.A. did not invent covert political-action programs—that is, action to influence political events abroad without the Government's official hand showing. It was Soviet efforts to intervene through local Communist parties and large-scale infusion of money into Western Europe that first led to a C.I.A. counter-effort.

President Truman took this step on the advice of very competent and patriotic men, particularly Gen. George C. Marshall and Defense Secretary James V. Forrestal.

This happened in 1948, a crucial year, especially for the future of Europe. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade frightened most Americans then. Fear of Soviet domination of most of Europe led to the Marshall Plan and creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The same fear led to the decision in favor of secret efforts to assist moderate, center and center-left political leaders re-establish a multiparty parliamentary system in Italy and in other nations threatened by strong local Communist movements supported by Moscow.

Thus, American funds were made available to democratic political parties and the democratic press. Because the Europeans were determined to avoid one-party dictatorship and Soviet domination, they accepted this covert aid, using it to their advantage, and ours.

The C.I.A. did not act on its own. It has never initiated such covert programs without approval of appropriate authorities acting on the President's behalf or on direct instructions from the President himself.

The authority for such decision-making is the National Security Council, set up in 1947 to deal with military and political considerations in American strategic and foreign policies. The C.I.A. is purely an instrument of policy. To belabor it for carrying out covert-action programs is pointless.

The tendency to blame the C.I.A. for failed programs when they are publicized is dangerous because the effect on the public and on Congressmen who vote for C.I.A. funds is to discredit the country's whole intelligence organization.

The best term for this organization is "intelligence community" because it is a coordinated group of agencies in the State, Defense and other departments as well as in the C.I.A. Most of the agencies' work involves collection, evaluation, analysis and reporting of intelligence. The entire intelligence community's total effort devoted to covert political actions of any kind in recent years has been between one and 2 per cent of the total program.

This level is falling. There are no political-action programs under way now. It would be a shame if a furor over the Chilean operation caused the C.I.A. to be so damaged in public and Congressional esteem that it cannot carry on its absolutely indispensable work on behalf of our safety.

The Chilean program, whether well-advised or not, was focused on furnishing money needed to keep the opposition news media alive so that groups whose activities are considered compatible with United States interests would continue to be heard despite efforts to silence them. It also provided campaign funds to center parties, mainly the Christian Democrats. The money spent in Chile, and other places, was spent to keep op-

tions before the voters.

The principal supporters of President Salvador Allende Gossens' administration intended to establish a dictatorship of the revolutionary left, abolish Congress and neutralize or destroy the entire managerial and middle class. The administration received aid and credit from Communist countries, much of which it did not have time to use, totaling about \$600 million. The United States gave about \$8 million to the parties fighting to keep Congress and constitutional democratic guarantees alive until the 1976 election.

I hope the center groups still surviving will be able to restore parliamentary government. If so, it probably will be done without American help, in view of United States Congressional and public criticism.

Clearly, American covert aid should be given rarely, specifically when it will help stabilize a friendly nation's politics by keeping constitutional government alive.

Perhaps the effort in Chile was a mistake. It certainly did not succeed.

Everyone is entitled to his own view of whether Americans will ever again want, or be able, to conduct covert political action to support like-minded people abroad when our help would make a crucial difference in their survival. I suspect that in the troubled world situation ahead the responsible consensus will again favor it just as in 1948.

I think we should not be obsessed with piety but instead should think earnestly of every way possible short of total war to insure that our society and political structures and alliances with like-minded peoples will continue to flourish in the face of a threatening international economic and political environment.

Ray S. Cline, executive director of studies at The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, was from 1969 to 1973 director of the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research. He participated in department deliberations on issues involving Chile before the 40 Committee, the high-level intelligence board that reviews the Government's covert activities.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 October 1974

PRESS GROUP ASSAILS C.I.A. ROLE IN CHILE

CARACAS, Venezuela, Oct. 19 (UPI)—The Inter-American Press Association yesterday condemned the United States Central Intelligence Agency's financing of Chilean newspapers opposed to the leftist government of the late Salvador Allende Gossens and urged President Ford to identify the re-

cipients of the money.

The action on the final day of the association's 30th annual general assembly marked the first time it has criticized the United States in a report of its freedom of the press committee.

The five-day convention, attended by some 400 United States and Latin American publishers, also condemned the take-over by the Peruvian Government of six newspapers and what it called a lack of press freedom in Brazil and Argen-

tina.

The C.I.A. payments made during the administration of Dr. Allende, who died during a right-wing military coup 13 months ago, became known last month.

The press organization elected Julio de Mesquita Neto, publisher of O Estado de São Paulo of Brazil, as its president, succeeding Robert U. Brown of Editor and Publisher, a New York-based trade magazine.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 October 1974

Foreign Companies Aided Anti-Allende

By JONATHAN KANDELL

Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile — The widespread strikes that set the stage for the military coup that overthrew the late President Salvador Allende Gossens were partly financed by funds provided by companies based in Mexico, Venezuela and Peru, according to leading Chilean businessmen.

The businessmen, ranking members of the SOFOFA, the most important industrial association in Chile, said that they had personally channeled these funds—amounting to \$200,000—to striking truck owners, shopkeepers and professional groups in the weeks preceding the fall of the Allende Government on Sept. 11, 1973.

They said that a company called Protexa, based in Monterrey, Mexico, contributed \$100,000 to the anti-Allende campaign and Grupo Mendoza of Caracas, Venezuela, \$50,000.

Money From the C.I.A.

The businessmen said that a Peruvian concern, which they declined to identify, gave close to \$50,000 to help finance the Chilean strikes.

It was disclosed in September that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had secretly financed unions and trade groups for more than 18 months before President Allende was overthrown. More than half of the \$8-million authorized for clandestine C.I.A. activities in Chile was used to provide benefits for anti-Allende strikers in 1972 and 1973, according to United States Intelligence sources.

How the funds were channeled to Allende opponents was not disclosed. The Chilean business sources did not link the money they received to the C.I.A.

"I would have no way of knowing whether those funds were indirectly from the C.I.A. or whether those companies were merely sympathetic to our cause as they claimed they were," said one businessman.

"We did not ask any questions," he added. "We had a very tough time collecting funds both here and abroad because people were giving up hope that things could change in Chile."

"All these stories that money was pouring into Chile to fight Allende," said another businessman. "They were just not true. It was not that easy."

The sources described a half-dozen fruitless fund-raising trips through Latin America, Europe and the United States.

"Most of the time, we were promised money and it never came" said a former SOFOFA member. "The Europeans especially made fools of us."

The sources said that the money from the Mexican, Venezuelan and Peruvian companies suddenly started to arrive during the first half of 1973 in time to help finance the anti-Allende

strikes that began in July of that year.

Protexa, the Mexico-based concern, was founded in 1945 as a small manufacturer of waterproofing material for roofing. It has grown rapidly and now owns at least eight Mexican companies, and has eight affiliates abroad, including Asfaltos Chilenos Protexa, with offices in Santiago.

According to business sources, Protexa was not expropriated or seized by workers during the Allende years when hundreds of foreign and Chilean companies came under government control.

The Grupo Mendoza, one of the largest Venezuelan business groups, is involved in machinery imports, cement and paper production and other activities. Chilean sources said they did not know of any affiliate here of the concern.

SOFOFA officials said the money was distributed to strikers weekly in July, August and September of 1973. The dollars were converted on the black market at up to 500 per cent the official exchange rate.

"We were giving the truckers about \$2,000 a week," said one businessman, adding that he believed the truck owners also received support from other financial sources. León Vilarin, the president of the Truck Owners Association, has been traveling in Europe. Previously he has asserted that the truckers depended on their own financial resources during the strike. Other ranking members of the Truck Owners Association could not be reached for comment.

Firm Foes of Allende

The truck owners — about 40,000 controlling some 70,000 vehicles—were the staunch opponents of the Allende Government during its waning months. Their 50-day strike crippled this country's economy, which depends far more heavily on trucks than on the state-owned railways for the movement of goods.

The truck owners' hostility was due to the Marxist coalition Government's efforts to create a parallel, state-owned trucking group. Mr. Vilarin, a former Socialist party member, liked to surprise critics by pointing out that he was once an Allende supporter. Even after the coup, he kept a large photograph in his office showing the late President embracing him.

The opposition to Dr. Allende was broadly divided into those who sought a military coup with an end to civilian politics and those who wanted to temper the President's socialist policies and defeat his coalition through elections in 1976.

The C.I.A. helped finance both groups even when they were in bitter disagreement with each other. Although defenders of C.I.A. intervention in Chile, including President Ford, have asserted that the goal of the agency was to maintain de-

Strikers, Chileans Say

mocratic political parties and other institutions, its rule of thumb apparently was to throw its weight behind the strongest source of opposition to the Allende Government.

At times, this meant supporting strikers intent on overthrowing the Government and at other times it meant heavy financial contributions to anti-Allende candidates when legislative elections were considered the best method of overturning Dr. Allende.

Some Were Annoyed

In interviews, left-wing members of the Christian Democratic party, which received heavy financial support from the C.I.A., recalled with annoyance the agency's support of a 26-day work stoppage by truck owners, professionals and businessmen that failed to overthrow Dr. Allende in October, 1972.

At that time, a left-wing member, René Fuentealba, was the party's secretary general. He called a party meeting with Mr. Vilarin to try to get the truckers and other strikers to moderate their demands.

"We asked Vilarin who was funding the strike" said a ranking Christian Democrat who participated in the meeting. "All he said was that he wanted to bring down Allende. We told him that we were willing to back the strikers' legitimate economic grievances, but that we would not go along with a coup."

The October, 1972, strike ended when Dr. Allende, backed by moderate Christian Democrats, persuaded military leaders to join his Cabinet. Allende opponents thought the military officers would put a brake on the Government's socialist program while both sides geared up for the March, 1973, legislative elections.

The C.I.A. contributed \$1.5-million to opposition candidates who banked heavily on gaining a two-thirds legislative majority that would have enabled them to remove Dr. Allende by impeachment.

Although the opposition parties maintained solid majorities in Congress, the Marxist coalition received a surprising 43.4 per cent of the popular vote, compared with 36 per cent received when Dr. Allende was voted into office in 1970, and picked up two Senate seats and six seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

According to informed sources, the C.I.A., which had correctly predicted an Allende victory in 1970, underestimated Allende support in the 1973 legislative elections, predicting less than a 40 per cent vote for the Marxist coalition.

The disclosure of C.I.A. aid to anti-Allende groups has caused relatively little impact in Chile. Few Chileans, even leftists, believe that the C.I.A. itself could have provoked the coup or ac-

counted for the widespread discontent with the Allende Government.

Most Chileans assumed all along that the agency was involved in the country's politics along with intelligence groups from Communist countries.

"As long as we could maintain our political independence, we would have taken money from the C.I.A., the Russians or anybody," said Gabriel Cáceres, a leading fund raiser for the PIR, a small party that broke away from the Allende coalition. "We didn't because it was not offered."

El Mercurio, the leading anti-Allende newspaper, which is reported to have received financial backing from the C.I.A., has published news of the disclosure in detail.

'Such Incredible Cheapness'

In editorials, the newspaper has asserted that the disclosure "undoubtedly has Communist inspiration, which blows through the minds of liberals in the country to the north."

The newspaper added that, if anything, the C.I.A. was "miserly." "Spending \$10-million for the fall of Allende," stated a recent Mercurio editorial, "have you ever seen such incredible cheapness?"

Among Christian Democrats, the main concern over the disclosures appears to be the effect they might have in reducing financial contributions to the party from Christian Democratic sources in West Germany.

Spokesmen for the military junta have responded to the charges of C.I.A. interference by suggesting that the issue is basically an internal United States matter. The junta, which has strongly rejected a return to civilian politics, has also sought to dismiss the charges as evidence of the corruptness of the political party system before the coup.

"Nobody has suggested that C.I.A. bought off military officers," said Federico Willoughby, a ranking Government official. "As far as we are concerned, this was all a symptom of the political decomposition in the country before the military junta took power."

Mexicans Deny Involvement

Special to The New York Times

MEXICO CITY, Oct. 15—Alfredo Molina, executive vice president of Protexa, said yesterday that it was "absolutely false" that the company helped finance the anti-Allende strikes.

"At no moment did we have any contact with the strike movement," he said in a telephone interview from his office in Monterrey. "Nor were we ever asked. We had a policy of not interfering in Chilean politics in any way."

Mr. Molina said that Protexa's Chilean affiliate was "symbolically" taken over by

WASHINGTON POST
12 October 1974

Tom Braden

Decision-Making and 'Covert Operations'

This town is disturbed about what the CIA did in Chile and is asking itself where to place the blame and how to prevent something similar from happening again.

Some people—Sen. James Abourezk (D-S.D.), for example—are saying that so long as you have covert operators ready to operate somebody is going to approve a plan to use them, and that the best way to avoid future misadventures is to abolish the jobs of the operators and forbid the hiring of any more.

On the other hand, Sens. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) and Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.) think they can envision occasions when covert operations might be essential to the survival of the nation. What went wrong in the Chilean affair, they say, is that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger approved a plan which was not only not essential to the survival of the nation but not even conducive to the nation's good.

They have introduced a bill to give Congress an official oversight function on covert operations. But they are not very clear as to whether Congress should approve the operations in advance or merely be told about them after they are under way.

The ambiguity points up the weak-

ness of their arguments. If Congress knows officially about operations in advance, Congress is responsible for a lot of dirty business, and no representative or senator wants to be so responsible. On the other hand, if Congress were merely told about covert operations after the fact, what good would that do?

There's a third aspect to the argument, and it is put forward by Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.). Church spent a lot of time last year investigating an earlier CIA effort in Chile—the campaign to defeat Salvador Allende at the polls. Obviously, he didn't probe deeply enough. At the same time he was getting testimony about a 1970 operation, the CIA was off on another one.

What irritates Church even more is that Henry Kissinger, whom he regarded as a friend, was a great deal less than candid with him when Church asked him questions about the downfall of Allende.

Kissinger kept repeating he knew nothing of the coup—without saying he knew a good deal about what brought about the coup. He also told Church that the CIA intervention was limited to paying newspapers and ra-

dio stations which Allende was trying to put out of business.

Church took him at his word and then discovered that the CIA had also paid for the truck strike which paralyzed the Chilean government and led directly to the death of Allende.

What disturbs Church is the lack of trust as well as the lack of judgment. He's even willing to finesse the judgment. Perhaps, he says, Kissinger had reasons for the operation which are not now clear. But if so, why not explain them to key members of the Foreign Relations Committee? Why dissemble to the very people who are trying to help him with detente and in the Mideast?

Right after World War II, this country was asking itself whether a democracy could engage in covert operations. Experience since then seems to demonstrate that it can but only at the tremendous risk of judgment and government by the few. Chile is another example of that risk.

The question people are asking now is whether the decision-making group can be enlarged, the judgment made more responsible and the risks minimized.

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WASHINGTON POST-PARADE
27 October 1974

Q. Recently I attended a conference on the CIA in Washington, D.C., where I heard a professor from

Vanderbilt University—I believe his name was Ransom—cite an exchange of letters between Adm. Sidney Souers, first temporary director of the CIA, and President Truman, who founded the CIA. Both were disillusioned with the agency. Can you fill me in on the details?—David Marks, Washington, D.C.

A. On Dec. 27, 1963, Admiral Souers, then chairman of the board of the General American Life Insurance Co. in St. Louis, wrote Truman a letter in which he stated: "...Allen Dulles caused the CIA to wander far from the original goal established by you, and it is certainly a different animal than I tried to set up for you.

"It would seem that its principal effort was to cause revolutions in smaller countries around the

globe.

"As bad as that was, it was worse to try to conduct a 'war' invading Cuba with a handful of men and without air cover. The campaign had been designed and carried out by Mr. [Richard M.] Bissell who was on my staff in the N.S.C. (National Security Council). He had been a professor at Harvard and wrote good staff papers, but he had little or no experience in practical warfare. As a matter of fact, it is my understanding that he has never worn a uniform.

"With so much emphasis on operations, it would not surprise me to find that the matter of collecting and processing intelligence has suffered some."

In reply, Truman on Jan. 17, 1964, wrote Souers: "Thanks for yours of December 27. I more than appreciated it, and I am as happy as I can be that my article on the Central Intelligence Agency rang a bell with you because you know exactly why the organization was set up—it was set up so the President would know what was going on...."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
31 October 1974

Argentine Senate blasts interference by U.S. CIA

By the Associated Press

Buenos Aires

The Argentine Senate has condemned interference in the affairs of other nations by the United States Central Intelligence Agency and similar organizations.

the "Marxist union" about six months before the coup but that "in practice we continued to administer the factory and after the coup everything continued quite normally."

Special to The New York Times

CARACAS, Venezuela, Oct. 15 — A spokesman for Grupo Mendoza today denied "emphatically" making any contribution to the campaign to overthrow President Allende.

NEW YORK TIMES
20 October 1974

C.I.A. Said to Have Asked Funds for Chile

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 20.—The Central Intelligence Agency sought to finance an extreme right-wing opposition group in Chile six weeks before the overthrow of President Salvador Allende Gossens in September, 1973, highly reliable sources said today.

The sources said that the first word of the C.I.A.'s attempt to become involved with the extremist group became known two weeks ago when a close aide to Secretary of State Kissinger leaked documents in an effort to discredit a former high Nixon Administration intelligence official who was known to be privately critical of Mr. Kissinger's role in Chile.

The documents, although intended to show that there was a consensus inside the Administration over the clandestine C.I.A. operations in Chile, have instead raised new questions about the extent of the secret United States involvement in the overthrow of Dr. Allende.

The sources said that Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Mr. Kissinger's executive assistant, leaked three summaries of proposals for clandestine C.I.A. operations in Chile during a briefing for the CBS television newsman Daniel Schorr. The documents had been prepared for meetings in 1970 and 1973 of the 40 Committee, the high-level intelligence board that reviews covert activities for the United States Government.

A Reactionary Group

The 1973 document, sources said, showed that as late as July 5, 1973, the C.I.A. recommended to the 40 Committee that \$200,000 be provided clandestinely to the National party in Chile, a conservative group that had urged Chileans to reject—with violence if necessary—the Allende Administration as "illegitimate" and "unconstitutional."

The National party was considered to represent the views of the propertied class in Chile and, in the year before the overthrow of Dr. Allende, was known to have close ties to Patria y Libertad, a reactionary group that openly boasted of its involvement in military efforts to overthrow the Allende Government.

Since the first published disclosures last month of the C.I.A. operations in Chile, knowledgeable Ford Administration officials have maintained that the main goal was to enable moderate political factors to survive the Allende period.

Whether the 40 Committee specifically approved the proposed funds for the National party could not be learned, but William E. Colby, the C.I.A. director, told a House intelligence subcommittee earlier this year that \$1-million was authorized in August, 1973, for use in Chile. Mr. Colby further testified, however, that less

than \$50,000 was actually spent because of the coup d'état in Chile the next month.

Mr. Eagleburger's intention in briefing Mr. Schorr, the sources said, was to rebuff off-the-record statements made to the newsman earlier by Ray S. Cline, the former director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence. Mr. Cline participated in 40 Committee deliberations on Chile from 1970 to 1973 and has recently criticized Mr. Kissinger's role at those meetings.

The disclosure of the documents took place less than a week after Mr. Kissinger, through his spokesman, had publicly called such leaks "a disgrace to the Foreign Service" and dangerous to national security.

One of the 1970 documents shown to Mr. Schorr included the name of a Chilean Government official who served as a conduit for C.I.A. views and also apparently helped relay funds to anti-Allende forces. Such information traditionally has been among the most closely guarded government secrets.

A number of persons familiar with State Department operations expressed doubt that Mr. Eagleburger would have shown Mr. Schorr such documents without the direct or indirect concurrence of the Secretary of State.

Mr. Eagleburger has denied showing Mr. Schorr any documents and insisted that he had personally made the decision to brief Mr. Schorr. "I did not show any documents, cables, letters or memoranda to anybody," he said. "I did not describe any of the particular events that were being argued about. All I provided was a general broad statement [dealing with Mr. Cline's role]."

"Henry's role was only to ask me to do a check of the files," Mr. Eagleburger said. "It was me, on my own, who told some people what the files said."

Mr. Schorr has made no public use of the materials reportedly supplied by Mr. Eagleburger and in a telephone interview refused to discuss the issue, adding: "I don't know what you are talking about."

The first word of Mr. Eagleburger's action came indirectly from State Department officials who learned that a search had been made of the department's special vault containing its 40 Committee documents.

In a telephone interview yesterday, Mr. Eagleburger acknowledged that Mr. Kissinger had authorized file searches both of the National Security Council minutes in the White House and of the 40 Committee documents stored in the State Department in an effort "to see whether we could come up with something that would indicate whether those [Mr. Cline's] statements were correct."

As Mr. Eagleburger described it, the file searches began short-

ly after Mr. Kissinger learned that Mr. Cline, who retired last year, "had made some statements about his opposition to a number of activities in Chile and Henry and Nixon had overruled him and the State Department."

"It is true," Mr. Eagleburger added, "that I have told some people who asked about it that the documents made available demonstrated the opposite of what Cline said."

"I guess that I have to say that a check of the files showed nothing to support the contention that Mr. Cline registered any opposition to proposals that had gone to the 40 Committee on Chile," he added. "In fact, those files demonstrated the opposite."

In an interview with The New York Times published Thursday, Mr. Cline said that the impetus for the Chile programs had come from either Mr. Kissinger or President Nixon, or both. Mr. Cline also confirmed that the C.I.A.'s activities in Chile included the financial support of strikes by shopkeepers and truckers.

President Ford and Mr. Kissinger have said that the C.I.A. funding in Chile was limited to opposition newspapers and politicians.

Told of Mr. Eagleburger's efforts to contradict his views, Mr. Cline said that he was "unwilling to comment on the staff papers prepared for 40 Committee meetings."

"No one should discuss internal papers of such importance," he added.

Mr. Cline, who served with the C.I.A. for more than 20 years before becoming the head of State Department intelligence, is now executive director of the Georgetown University School of Strategic Studies.

The Three Documents

The three documents described by Mr. Eagleburger dealt with the State Department's comments on C.I.A. proposals to be discussed at 40 committee meetings.

According to reliable sources, Mr. Cline, as director of intelligence, could make additional recommendations or comments on the documents, which were to be forwarded to the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, the official who tradi-

Rightists in '73

tionally represented State on the 40 Committee.

The first document, the sources said, was dated Aug. 31, 1970, and dealt with the C.I.A. recommendations in case the pending Chilean presidential elections resulted in a runoff involving Dr. Allende.

Three proposals, or options, for investing money in amounts ranging from \$350,000 to \$900,000 were reported discussed, with the State Department urging limited funds or no funds at all for covert activities. Mr. Cline, in a handwritten comment, called for major financial support for anti-Allende forces

if it could "make a difference" between victory or defeat for Dr. Allende, the source said.

A second document, dated Sept. 4, 1970, the day Dr. Allende barely won the Chilean election, reportedly discussed a C.I.A. proposal for bribing members of the Chilean Congress, which, under that country's Constitution, would have to ratify the election and thus ultimately choose the President.

Wymerly Coerr, then the State Department's coordinator for 40 Committee staff recommendations, urged that "no program involving what he termed 'subornation' be initiated, according to the sources.

Mr. Cline, in another handwritten comment, reportedly depicted Mr. Coerr as being "hung up" on the emotional overtones of the word subornation. "In the world of realpolitik," Mr. Cline is said to have written such activities do take place.

Spending Authorized

The 40 Committee eventually recommended that \$350,000 be spent in an attempt to bribe the Congress, which voted nonetheless in October to ratify Dr. Allende as President.

The third document, dated July 25, 1973, was said to have been forwarded to William J. Porter, then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, by Jack B. Kubisch, then the Assistant Secretary for State for Inter-American Affairs. The document reportedly discussed C.I.A. proposals for clandestine financing of the anti-Allende political parties, including a specific recommendation that \$350,000 be given to the Christian Democrats and another suggestion that \$200,000 be given to the National party.

NEW YORK TIMES
17 October 1974

DOUBT ON U.S. ROLE IN CHILE RECALLED

Ex-Intelligence Aide Asserts
C.I.A. and State Dept. 'Went
Along' With Nixon Plan

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16—Ray S. Cline, a former high-level intelligence official in the Nixon Administration, said today that he was dubious about the ultimate wisdom of the Administration's covert intervention against President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile but that he supported it because he feared more serious intervention by the Soviet Union.

Mr. Cline, who was interviewed by telephone, is the first high official to permit his name to be used in confirming published reports that the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the effort to oust the Marxist Government included the direct financing of a number of anti-Allende trade groups and labor unions, including truckers.

Despite warnings about the Allende Government's intentions relayed in the intelligence reports, he said, many high officials did not believe that clandestine operations would accomplish the "goal in mind"—to keep a center coalition alive until 1976.

"State and the C.I.A. were dubious, but naturally went along," Mr. Cline said, because the White House—either Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, or both—decided the push the program.

"They key role in this whole thing was in the White House," he added, "but it's impossible to tell whether only one or both were enthusiastic about it because the orders came through Kissinger and the 40 Committee. It was a National Security Council decision and not a decision made by the C.I.A. or the State Department."

'Resistance Strikes'

"Some of the money was intended for financial support of the small businessmen and the truckers in their resistance strikes against the Allende Government," Mr. Cline said. "I think it was very logical to enable those groups to keep alive economically so that we could maintain a core of private entrepreneurs until the 1976 elections."

Disclosed by C.I.A. Chief

The extensive C.I.A. role in Chile became known Sept. 8 when it was reported that the

agency's director, William E. Colby, had told a Congressional committee that \$8-million in clandestine funds was authorized for operations against the Allende Government between 1970 and 1973. Dr. Allende died in a military coup that overthrew his Government in September, 1973.

Mr. Cline served as director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and was directly involved in much of the planning and discussions that went on in the 40 Committee, the top-level intelligence board that oversees all covert operations of the intelligence agency. Before joining the State Department, from which he retired last year, Mr. Cline served more than 20 years with the agency, eventually becoming its deputy director for intelligence.

His account of the assistance to labor groups flatly contradicts both the public and private descriptions of the C.I.A. role presented by President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger.

At a televised news conference on Sept. 16, Mr. Ford said that Dr. Allende had been attempting to suppress opposition newspapers and politicians. He added that the "effort that was made in this case was to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties."

Program Termed Broader

In the interview, however, Mr. Cline said the program—as approved by the 40 Committee, he noted—was far broader.

"What the C.I.A. was trying to do," he said, "was to see that at least 50 per cent and probably 60 per cent of the electorate would be disillusioned by the time of the presidential elections in 1976"—when, under the Constitution, Dr. Allende could not run again.

"Well," the former State Department official added, "by 1973 they were totally disillusioned with him." Mr. Cline was alluding to the protests and strikes in the last months of the Allende Government.

"I decided to speak out because I feel that there's such a superficial understanding as to why the United States has tried to assist democratic political organizations abroad," Mr. Cline asserted.

"I'm not happy about the way I can defend them because I think our strategy was not unreasonable or immoral. It was our duty to preserve institutions which we call free."

He explained that the ultimate goal of the clandestine activities was to enable the center coalition factions of the Christian Democratic party to survive the Allende period. "And," he said, "I think the center groups did survive, as they might not have under a prolonged Allende Communist regime."

BALTIMORE SUN
15 October 1974

CIA rivals Cuba on OAS agenda

By RICHARD O'MARA

Rio de Janeiro Bureau of The Sun

Rio de Janeiro—Central Intelligence Agency skulduggery in Latin America is expected to preoccupy the foreign ministers at next month's meeting of the Organization of American States at least as much as the Cuba question, the issue for which the meeting is being convened.

In fact, the potential for embarrassment to the United States at the forthcoming meeting in Quito, Ecuador, is so great that some observers here suggest that as the real reason Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, is not likely to attend.

Both Cuba and the CIA are sensitive subjects with American diplomats and policy-makers in Latin America.

The OAS meeting will be held November 8. The member states will have to vote on whether to end the 10-year economic boycott of Cuba. A majority of the members are expected to approve ending the embargo.

According to a report out of Washington published here yesterday, Mr. Kissinger will not attend the Quito conference. A State Department spokesman said the secretary's schedule was filled through November.

The CIA has become something of an obsession with many Latin American leaders since its subversive activities against the government of Dr. Salvador Allende of Chile became known in early September. Sunday, a former foreign minister of Colombia, Alfredo Vasquez Carrizosa, published an article in a Bogota newspaper that blamed the weakness of the OAS on the CIA.

Writing in *El Espectador*, Mr. Vasquez described the CIA as "the mysterious arm of the United States." Its interventions in the affairs of other countries, he argued, has become "an inter-American problem."

lem."

The former Colombian politician recalled the CIA's three most spectacular operations in Latin America: The overthrow of President Jacob Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954, the unsuccessful invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, and the Chile operation.

Because of these, and other less visible operations, he wrote, the OAS has been converted into a "debating academy, a forum for discussion," an organization "without any real power in hemispheric affairs."

The reason, he maintains, is because the Latin American members have tacitly given the United States the right to intervene in their domestic affairs, even though this is in violation of the Charter of the OAS.

The Vasquez article is only the most recent attack against the CIA, and indirectly, against the U.S. government. In late September two Argentine politicians, Rodolfo Ugrios and Hector Sandler, attributed much of the terrorism and political violence in their country to the CIA.

Mr. Sandler, a left-wing congressman, suggested that the CIA was behind the new right-wing assassination squad active in Argentina, the Argentine anti-Communist Alliance.

Most observers agree that the revelations, made in Washington September 7, that the Nixon administration had authorized \$8 million to subvert Dr. Allende's government, which was ousted in 1973, has fired the imaginations of many Latin Americans, who before that were not so disposed to find U.S. spies behind every plot and economic bad break.

These imaginations are expected to be fully alight in Quito next month, especially if Mr. Kissinger is not there.

NEW YORK TIMES
22 October 1974

CORRECTIONS

In an article published Thursday, Ray S. Cline, was quoted as saying that trade groups and labor unions in Chile, including truckers, had received direct financing from the Central Intelligence Agency. He actually said they had benefited indirectly from political parties.

NEW REPUBLIC
28 Sept. 1974

Getting to the Bottom Of the CIA Cover-up

Tad Szulc, in his article that follows, writes about Central Intelligence Agency subversion in Chile and the hiding of it from congressional scrutiny. The judgments that led to secret intervention in Chilean politics deserve to be criticized, but at least the CIA was within its legal authority under its charter. That is not the case with CIA's complicity in Watergate "extra-agency activities." The law barring the agency from undertaking domestic operations was clearly violated. Moreover, when former CIA Director Richard Helms gave misleading and inaccurate answers to questions posed by senators about past CIA assistance to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt, who worked for the Nixon White House, he was covering up possible criminal activity.

On May 21, 1973 Helms was recalled from his post as ambassador to Iran and questioned under oath by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, by then had been uncovered, along with information that CIA had given equipment and aid to Hunt who had directed the illegal entry. Helms said he had never heard of Dr. Fielding until the psychiatrist's name appeared in the newspapers. When asked about photographs that had been taken by Hunt with a CIA camera and developed by the agency, Helms swore, "I do not know what the contents of the film were in the latter part of August [1971]." One senator asked if anyone at the agency who reviewed the film thought Hunt might be contemplating a break-in. "I never heard anybody at the agency mention such a theory," Helms replied and later added, "nobody had given us the slightest indication that anything underhanded was afoot."

Helms was asked why CIA had cut off its assistance to Hunt on August 27, 1971. Twice the former director said it was solely because Hunt's requests had become "too extensive." To support that, he recollected that Hunt asked to have a secretary brought back from Paris and a covert New York telephone and address established for him. Helms never mentioned the photographs and what they appeared to show as the reason for the agency's stopping its aid to Hunt.

A review of the House Judiciary Committee material on the Ellsberg break-in and CIA's role indicate Helms' Senate testimony was not the true agency story. On July 7, 1971 White House aide John Ehrlichman called then CIA Deputy Director Robert Cushman, and according to Cushman's secretary's notes, said: "I want to alert you that an old acquaintance [of Cushman's], Howard Hunt, has been asked by the President to do some special consultant work on security problems. He may be contacting you sometime in the future for some assistance. I wanted you to know that he was in fact doing some things for the President. He is a long-time acquaintance with the people here. He may want some help on computer runs and other things. You should consider he has pretty much carte blanche."

Cushman did not know that Ehrlichman's call had

been prompted by Hunt's then-White House boss Charles Colson. And at the time Cushman could not know that the reason for the call was to pave the way for Hunt to get disguises, false identity cards, a clandestine camera and tape recording equipment from the CIA which were to be used for domestic political purposes.

In making this July 1971 request to the agency for "carte blanche" aid to Hunt and wrapping it in vagueness about "security problems," Ehrlichman and Colson seemed to be sure they would encounter no CIA demand for proof that Hunt was not violating the agency's charter—and the law—prohibiting domestic operations. Would Cushman have cared? Why were these White House aides either unaware of the law or not fearful such an illegal request, if identified, would be turned down, or worse, exposed to the public?

Again, another flashback—this time to 1969. According to the House Judiciary Committee's final report on the impeachment articles against Richard Nixon: "In 1969, Haldeman and Ehrlichman asked the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct physical surveillance of Donald Nixon, the President's brother, who was moving to Las Vegas. Haldeman was reported to have feared that Donald Nixon would come into contact with criminal elements." Thereafter is cited a report by the CIA inspector general and Deputy Director Cushman dated June 29, 1973. The House report goes on to say that the CIA refused to undertake that mission because it had "no jurisdiction to engage in domestic law enforcement or internal security activities . . ." So some line was drawn.

Sometime after the July 7 Ehrlichman call to Cushman, which was dutifully reported to the CIA staff meeting the next morning, and before July 27, 1971, CIA was asked to prepare a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg. The request came from White House aide David Young, who along with Hunt and others were investigating Ellsberg. Young reportedly said that both Henry Kissinger, then running the National Security Council, and Ehrlichman wanted CIA to help. Helms' director of security, Howard Osborne, to whom the request was first made, has stated he initially told Young it would have to be cleared by Helms, since Ellsberg was "a United States citizen who was presently involved in a legal sense with the United States government." Helms approved the project after talking to Young. He told Osborne that nothing was to be sent to the White House "without his personal prior approval." It is interesting that Helms, in later testimony on the matter, said he complained to Young that for the agency to write a profile on an American citizen was "an imposition," since CIA knew nothing about Ellsberg. Nowhere did Helms complain that the task involved CIA in a domestic matter. Later Helms was to weasel out some language in the law that permitted the agency to study problems associated with the security of CIA classified documents.

With the profile project approved, FBI documents on Ellsberg and published materials were sent to the CIA employee who handled the job, Dr. Bernard Malloy. Meanwhile Hunt followed up on the July 7 Ehrlichman call and visited CIA Deputy Director Cushman

on July 22. A tape of that meeting relates that Hunt said the equipment was needed because of "a highly sensitive mission by the White House to visit and elicit information from an individual whose ideology we aren't entirely sure of. . . ." That "individual" was Clifton DeMotte, a man who supposedly had information on the Kennedys. Hunt also said it would be a "one time op[eration] . . . in and out." Cushman did not ask if this was a domestic activity, instead he said: "I don't see why we can't" provide the equipment. The next day Hunt got what he wanted. One week later Hunt called the CIA technician who supplied the first material and asked for a tape recorder and additional help, including credit cards, a second speech alteration device and a New York address and telephone number.

On August 11 the CIA's first profile on Ellsberg was delivered to the White House, after having been reviewed by Helms. Attached to it was a note from CIA Security Director Osborne stipulating: "I know that you appreciate that however this is used, the agency should not become involved."

The report disappointed Young and his colleagues at the White House. That same day, Young and Emil Krogh proposed "a covert operation be undertaken to examine" the files of Ellsberg's former psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding. Thus plans were launched for the subsequent break-in, and on the following day Mr. Malloy of CIA met with Young, Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy to discuss the agency report on Ellsberg. Malloy has recalled that when he was told that Ellsberg had been under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr. Fielding's name was also given to him. Though Hunt asked Malloy to keep his name out of any report on the meeting, Malloy responded he could not. The White House aides asked Malloy what additional material he needed to expand what had already been done. Malloy suggested data from Ellsberg's early life, "from nurses or close relatives. . . ."

Conversations continued to take place over the next weeks between Malloy and Hunt with the latter pressuring for a new profile. On August 25, 1971, Hunt and Gordon Liddy requested and received additional disguise material from CIA, along with a camera concealed in a tobacco pouch. A day later the CIA technician who delivered the material was called long distance by Hunt and asked to meet him at six am at Dulles Airport to receive the camera and film and develop them. The film was taken for development but

the technicians began to question the use to which Hunt was putting the equipment. The camera had been used by Hunt and Liddy to clandestinely photograph Dr. Fielding's office, inside and outside, in order to prepare for the burglary. The photographs were reviewed by CIA technical supervisory personnel before they were delivered to Hunt. They revealed a shot of a parking space with the name "Dr. Fielding" clearly visible. They also disclosed shots of the office and one CIA official speculated at the time they were "casing" photographs. Deputy Director Cushman's office was informed. A decision was made to tell Hunt that no more requests for assistance would be honored. According to Gen. Cushman's aide, the CIA technical people thought the assistance given Hunt "appeared to involve the agency in domestic clandestine operations," a finding confirmed by the CIA general counsel's office. That same day, August 27, Cushman called Ehrlichman at the White House and told him aid to Hunt was being halted because of those concerns.

On September 3, 1971 the break-in at Dr. Fielding's office took place. On October 14 or 15, 1971 the CIA technician who had developed the pictures for Hunt was told Gen. Cushman was lunching with Hunt the next day and wanted a complete briefing on what assistance Hunt had been given. The technician included in the briefing material xerox copies of the Hunt photographs. What happened at that meeting (if it took place) between Hunt and Cushman, and why did the CIA deputy director at that time want to be brought up to date on Hunt's requests? Did the agency figure out that there was a relationship between the Ellsberg profile and the Hunt casing job of Fielding's office? Was any additional material supplied by CIA on Ellsberg after the Fielding break-in? I've asked that question several places and have no answer. It is known that the final CIA profile went to the White House on November 9, 1971 and carried with it a note from Helms stating: "I do wish to underline the point that our involvement in this matter should not be revealed in any context, formal or informal." Though Helms was later to testify he meant the work might reflect adversely on the capabilities of the agency, the men who put the study together have said that their concern was that the "agency's involvement become known and particularly that it might come to light during any proceeding."

Walter Pincus

EDITOR & PUBLISHER
12 October 1974

Chilean daily denies involvement with CIA

El Mercurio of Santiago, Chile, has denied it was the recipient of CIA funds (E&P, September 28, page 14). In a cable to E&P, Rino Silva, director of *El Mercurio*, said:

"A parliamentary group from the Democratic Party, in its campaign against the present U.S. administration, did not

hesitate in using *El Mercurio* for their purposes, without any proof, that it had been one of the newspapers that had received financial aid from the CIA. An editor of *El Mercurio*, even though I have no participation in the financial affairs of the newspaper, I know that its income has a normal and legal origin, known by all involved and carefully controlled by the legal and tax authorities of the country. Not even in our worse moments of political persecution, was there any shadow of doubt about such matters."

NEW REPUBLIC
28 Sept. 1974

Candid but Mistaken about Chile

Where President Ford Is Wrong

by Tad Szulc

Gerald Ford's first public pronouncement on a controversial foreign policy question—secret intervention in Chilean politics prior to last year's bloody coup d'état—was as startling in its sweep as it was erroneous on virtually every point of fact. Probably the first American President to do so publicly, Mr. Ford last week delivered an extraordinary defense of covert intelligence operations abroad, claiming that in this particular case it was "in the best interest of the people of Chile, and certainly in our best interest," and that "our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security."

By thus advertising the subversion engineered on a continuing basis by the super-secret "40 Committee" of the National Security Council, the President handed the worldwide Communist propaganda mill some of the best grist it has had in years.

Now for the facts.

Mr. Ford stated that the US government "had no involvement in any way whatsoever in the coup itself." In the strictest sense, this is probably true: the Chilean army needed no further physical help from us to launch the September 11, 1973 revolution and the subsequent terror. Chile's armed forces are equipped mainly with US materiel, and our military advisers worked with the Chileans throughout the Allende period. Likewise between 1970 and 1974, when the US deprived Chile of commercial credit, including credit for vitally needed food imports, it supplied the Chilean armed forces with at least \$30 million worth of arms, primarily aircraft, on credit. A squadron of S-5 jet fighters was delivered a few weeks before the coup and more planes were in the pipeline. The regime fell after jet fighters bombed the presidential palace. For what it was worth psychologically, a US naval task force was off the shores of Chile the week of the coup in preparation for joint exercises with Chilean warships. Most loans to Allende's Chile were refused by the US on the grounds that Chile lacked credit worthiness, although this was no bar to military credit sales.

What of US assistance to anti-Allende forces before the coup and before Allende took office? Here is where the President was misinformed, perhaps by Secretary of State Kissinger who himself is caught in a credibility squeeze on Chile.

Until the surfacing of secret congressional testimony last April by CIA Director William E. Colby, the administration had insisted, as did Kissinger a month after the coup, that the US did virtually nothing to damage Allende. Colby testified, however, that the CIA spent eight million dollars in Chile between 1970 and 1973 to prevent Allende, in effect, from governing

Ford and Frankfurter

Q. Mr. President, under what international law do we have a right to attempt to destabilize the constitutionally elected government of another country? And does the Soviet Union have a similar right to try to destabilize the government of Canada, for example, or the United States?

A. I'm not going to pass judgment on whether it's permitted or authorized under international law. It's a recognized fact that historically as well as presently such actions are taken in the best interests of the countries involved.

Presidential press conference, Sept. 16, 1974

I remember shocking him [the Judge Advocate General] . . . when he came into my room and said, "Frankfurter, I want you to help me. I've just been over to the White House"—this was just after we had seized the customs house at Vera Cruz [April 1914] "and I'm asked to write a memorandum whether that seizure should be treated as an act of war and what its status is in international law. Will you work with me on that?"

I said, "General, I'm going to ask to be excused. I don't have to work on that. I know the answer to that."

"You do?"

"Yes, I do."

"What is the answer?"

"It would be an act of war against a great nation; it isn't against a small nation."

"I can't give him that."

"I know you can't, but that's the answer."

from Felix Frankfurter Reminiscences

Reynal & Company, © 1960 by Harlan B. Phillips

efficiently. He also said that three million dollars had been expended in 1964 to keep Allende from winning in that election. This is how Mr. Ford explained these pre-coup activities: "In a period of time, three or four years ago, there was an effort being made by the Allende government to destroy opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press. And to destroy opposition political parties. And the effort that was made in this case was to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties. I think this is in the best interest of the people in Chile, and certainly in our best interest."

The President's statement is inconsistent with reality in these respects:

1) The US, through authorizations issued by the 40 Committee, embarked on undercover support of the anti-Allende press and opposition parties nearly four months before Allende took office. Former CIA Director Richard Helms testified last year that \$400,000 was approved for media support in Chile on June 27, 1970. After Allende won a plurality, but not a majority in

the elections on September 4, 1970, the US, according to Colby's testimony, invested \$350,000 to bribe Chilean congressmen to vote against Allende in the runoff in the Congress on October 24. So there was no question of saving opposition parties and press at that time from persecution by Allende.

2) After Allende became President, his minority Marxist regime, the *Unidad Popular*, did precious little to "destroy opposition news media." *El Mercurio*, the principal anti-Allende newspaper in Santiago, was closed down only once for several days, after publishing an editorial calling, in effect, for insurrection. When its owner, Augustin Edwards, fled Chile immediately after Allende took office (Edwards came to the US and became a member of the board of directors of the Pepsi-Cola company, which is headed by Richard Nixon's close friend, Donald Kimball) the new government began tax and antitrust litigation against the Edwards empire. While *El Mercurio* remained the voice of the opposition (it could be read in the waiting room of the Chilean embassy in Washington, along with pro-regime leftist publications), the Edwards family was divested of its bank and other nonpress holdings. A right-wing newspaper, *La Tribuna*, ran into some trouble after charging in print that Allende had been expelled from medical school for raping a 14-year-old girl.

The Allende regime did refuse to authorize the Catholic university in Concepcion to go on the air with a new radio station. The university thereupon set up a relay from the Catholic university's station in Santiago. After the regime began jamming these broadcasts, persons believed to be linked to rightist militant groups blew up the jamming facility.

3) There is no evidence that Allende was out to "destroy opposition political parties," unless we are willing to say that the Nixon administration was out to destroy the Democrats here. The Chilean Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, both with anti-Allende majorities, functioned until the day of the coup. Allende resisted pressure from the extreme left of his coalition to call a plebiscite to abolish the existing Congress and replace it with a hand-picked unicameral parliament. There were few political prisoners in Chile under Allende. Today there are over 20,000.

If the opposition was not in that much trouble (Allende failed to win a majority in the Congress in the 1972 parliamentary elections), the question arises why the CIA needed eight million dollars to preserve the "best interest" of the Chilean people. Colby, who

is more precise in his statements, told a conference on the CIA and Covert Actions in Washington, DC earlier this month that all that money went to Chile to help "our democratic friends" to survive until 1976, so that they could then vote the Marxists out of office. Addressing specialists, Colby knew better than to argue that the CIA was saving the opposition from destruction by Allende.

4) Mr. Ford asserted that the 40 Committee keeps the appropriate congressional committees informed of its plans for covert intrigue. This is not so. The 40 Committee as such has never briefed the Congress and, as far as it is known, Kissinger, who runs the secret group, never confided in congressmen on its behalf. There is an oversight authority in four subcommittees over the CIA's activities, but these bodies meet seldom and their members rarely ask searching questions. Colby has acknowledged that the congressional subcommittees are told of CIA activities *post facto* rather than before the fact as Mr. Ford claimed.

The day after the President spoke, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously to reopen its investigation of the US role in the Chilean events. Its staff recommended that perjury or contempt citations be considered against former CIA Director Richard Helms and former senior CIA and State Department officials for misleading the Senate in earlier testimony. And the senators want to hear again from Kissinger, who heads the 40 Committee.

The question I find so puzzling is why Mr. Ford is so misinformed about the history of our involvement in Chile—and about the Chilean situation in 1970-1973—and why the 40 Committee approved the eight million dollars for covert operations, a rather large sum to keep Chilean newspapers going and "our democratic friends" in pocket money. If, in the name of democracy, the US was aiding the opposition in Chile against an elected government, was it also aiding the press and the opposition under dictatorships in Brazil, Greece and Spain or the Soviet Union? It would be interesting to know. Is it helping the new opposition in Chile, where a police state has been constructed by the military junta? Kissinger claims that the US must not interfere in the internal affairs of others—even to encourage Soviet dissidents.

If the issue was the nationalization by Chile of US foreign investments with inadequate indemnification or none, why not admit it instead of sermonizing about the opposition press and parties? Why doesn't this "open administration" come clean?

WASHINGTON POST-PARADE 20 October 1974

Q. Of the men who have been directors of the CIA—Adm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, Gen. Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles, John McCone, Adm. William Raborn, Richard Helms and William Colby—which one in your opinion has been the best?—G.T., Langley, Va.

A. William Colby. He is a modest, strong, efficient director whose experience in the intelligence community goes back to 1944. Colby has had visited upon him the sins of his predecessors; many of them almost unforgivable, and under the circumstances, he

has carried the burden well. Moreover he has been sensitive to the rising opposition in this country to "a secret government" and has opened the heretofore closed CIA window enough to provide the agency with a new image. If he can resist the temptation of introducing new legislation calling for 10-year jail terms and \$10,000 fines for anyone writing a book about the CIA, he will retain the admiration and high standing he so richly deserves.

NEW YORK TIMES
23 October 1974

Issues and Debates

C.I.A.'s Covert Role: Should the Agents Come Home?

By DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 22—Prompted by new disclosures of covert operations of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in Chile, a growing number of Congressmen are demanding that such agency actions be curtailed or stopped altogether.

The involvement of the C.I.A. in subverting foreign governments deemed hostile to American interests has become fairly well known over the years—the buying of voters, the arming of plotters, the infiltration of labor unions and all the other “black” arts of intelligence.

The catalogue includes C.I.A. activities in Iran, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Bolivia, Berlin, Albania, Greece, Italy, the Congo, Indonesia and Indochina.

Covert operations of the Chile type have a long history, dating from the very inception of the “central intelligence group” on Jan. 22, 1946, under President Harry S. Truman. Within a short time American agents were buying up Italian parliamentary deputies by the dozen and using secret funds to help Italian conservative forces stop the Communist influence in trade unions.

The justification then, and almost always thereafter, was to halt the spread of Communism and support free institutions.

What made the case of Chile different?

Background

When the highest Administration officials, including Secretary of State Kissinger, declared flatly last year that the United States was not involved in the military coup that overthrew President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile, Senators and Representatives took them at their word.

Now, in light of new disclosures from secret testimony by William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other revelations in the press, it seems obvious to at least a score of legislators on Capitol Hill that they were at best misled and at worst lied to.

The furor over the Chile operations of the C.I.A. may also be related to the mood of the times—marked by the aftermath of the Watergate scandal and the strengthening of East-West détente. Both post-Watergate attitudes and the feeling that international tensions have eased appear to be conducive to the questioning of the reasoning behind covert intelligence operations.

At the heart of the current debate is the question whether

the United States should have at this phase in its history a 16,000-member intelligence agency, with an estimated annual budget of \$750-million, functioning on a worldwide scale.

Administration Point of View

Reduced to its most simple form, as expounded by President Ford on Sept. 16, the United States is big in the intelligence field because the other side—the Communists—is big in it. It is a logic also applied to the strategic-weapons race.

It was held justifiable in the late nineteen-fifties to monitor Soviet missile development with U-2 spy planes, a practice Nikita S. Khrushchev damned in 1960 when a U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union. Now both sides maintain similar surveillance with spy satellites, and the United States holds its efforts doubly justified.

In the Chile situation, a justification by United States intelligence officials was that the Communist powers, notably the Soviet Union and Cuba, invested a great deal in men and material in Chile on behalf of the Allende Government.

The President said: “Our Government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security.”

The clincher followed: “I am reliably informed that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes.”

Mr. Colby, with wide experience in intelligence, applies a sophisticated line of argument. In the year since he became director of intelligence, he has told newsmen—on and off the record—and public audiences that properly conceived intelligence operations constitute an indispensable defensive weapon.

He is careful to distinguish between the three branches of intelligence: the gathering of raw intelligence material by secret means, the analysis and estimating of raw intelligence gathered both clandestinely and openly, and the deliberate actions taken to disrupt adversaries, whether they be constituted governments or other intelligence agencies.

Few domestic critics of the C.I.A. dispute the necessity for the secret gathering of intelligence—by human, electronic or photographic means. None disputes the need for analysis and estimation of adversary capabilities.

It is the nature and purpose of covert operations that have drawn the sharpest fire, especially from Congress. Mr. Colby's response, made in public early in September and previously in private, is that the covert capability is a “useful dagger in the sheath” ranged among the multitude of other military and economic weapons available to the Administration.

The Critics' View

“I don't think the C.I.A. should be engaged in covert operations at all,” Senator J. W. Fulbright, the Arkansas Democrat who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said last month. “I think it should be an intelligence-gathering operation. Their covert operations get involved in elections in foreign countries and we usually end up electing the wrong people.”

Mr. Fulbright has joined a group of 12 Senators sponsoring a new bill that would create a 14-member joint Congressional committee to oversee the United States intelligence community.

The legislation was proposed by Senators Lowell P. Weicker Jr., the Connecticut Republican, and Howard H. Baker, the Tennessee Republican, who asserted last month that Congress had been remiss in exercising control of the C.I.A.

They were following up the protest by Representative Michael J. Harrington, the Massachusetts Democrat, that the Administration was telling one thing about the Chile operations in public hearings and a different, darker tale in private sessions with the House intelligence subcommittee.

NEW YORK TIMES
23 October 1974

Ex-Envoy to Chile Denounces Leaks Discrediting Aides

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 22—The director general of the foreign service has expressed concern in the State Department's newsletter about “malicious or calculated” leaks aimed at discrediting high officials.

Nathaniel Davis, former Ambassador to Chile, wrote in his regular column in the monthly newsletter that there were three kinds of leaks.

The first, “the classic security breach,” is not a major

Mr. Colby had gone into considerable detail about C.I.A. operations in Chile at an informal session last April of the seven-member subcommittee headed by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, the Michigan Democrat. The subcommittee was exercising its authority to oversee C.I.A. operations.

In legislative practice, however, the intelligence subcommittee does not approve or veto the details of covert operations.

There is one more argument against covert operations of the Chile variety.

“They are stupid,” said a retired C.I.A. official who participated in some. “The case of Allende is a classic example. He would have gone down the drain all by himself as any intelligent person could see. It didn't help him along.”

Finally, there is a question of ethics, whether the ethics of individual C.I.A. operatives whose zeal might have carried them beyond their authority in places like Chile or Greece, or the ethics of the United States as a nation.

At the beginning of the month, Senator James Abourezk, Democrat of South Dakota, submitted an amendment to the foreign aid bill that would have halted all covert operations by the C.I.A.

Before it was defeated, 68 to 17, Senator Abourezk said: “There is no justification in our legal, moral or religious principles for operations of a U.S. agency which result in assassinations, sabotage, political disruptions, or other meddling in another country's internal affairs, all in the name of the American people.”

problem now, he said. The second kind, he said, involves information by responsible officers “to clarify policy or fact, to promote understanding, and reduce mischief.”

“The greatest damage to constructive interchange between foreign service officers and the press results from the third kind of leak,” he said. “This is the leak designed to cut down a superior or colleague, or to gain advantage in an internal policy question in dispute.”

Mr. Davis's article did not specify which leaks had caused concern, but he has made clear in private his own unhappiness with articles printed recently on the Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in Chile while he was ambassador there.

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EX-CIA OFFICER REPLIES TO WTOP CRITICISM OF CIA

ANNOUNCER: A recent WTOP editorial criticized the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile during the regime of President Salvador Allende. With an opposing view, here is Thomas Ernst.

THOMAS ERNST: As a former CIA and U. S. Air Force intelligence officer, I take issue with WTOP's recent editorial regarding the covert operations of the Agency. In my judgment WTOP erred in its criticism of the Agency and in the covert nature of some of its activities.

I believe the American people and most liberal critics of the CIA would support many of the following covert operations, and I ask, would WTOP object to a covert operation designed to free black political prisoners in racist South Africa? Would WTOP object to secret activities directed against the racist government of Rhodesia? If such covert action would result in a bi-racial and black majority government in that country, I think not.

Would most Americans, liberal or conservative, object to CIA-directed operations in Southeast Asia to free POWs and MIAs? Again, I think not. Would WTOP and most Americans object to covert operations designed to free Soviet Jews from that still oppressive country? I think not.

Who could object to secret CIA moves to capture or kidnap Arab terrorists or PLO leaders who planned and ordered the Mahlot massacre? Hopefully, not WTOP.

For these reasons I believe the majority of the American people should and do support such CIA operations. In closing, I ask WTOP to criticize the policy makers like Mr. Kissinger, and I ask that it refrain from criticizing the CIA in its necessary secret operations. Thank you.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 October 1974

The Intrigues Before Allende Fell

BY RICHARD E. FAGEN

My wife and I gained first-hand experience of American involvement in Chilean affairs a few months after we arrived in Santiago in February, 1972.

That was when a U.S. Foreign Service officer—an acquaintance of mine—got in touch with me and said that the U.S. Embassy in Santiago had succeeded in infiltrating all parties of the Popular Unity coalition, but that it had not yet managed to infiltrate the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, a group outside the government and critical of it.

This U.S. official thought my university connections—which he knew about at first hand—might provide links for infiltrating that group. He offered to change money for me on the black market. Because of our old association and strictly for my own information, he also sketched the number and distribution of CIA agents masked as regular diplomats in the U.S. Embassy in Chile—about one-third of the total.

I doubt that I was the only American citizen approached in this manner. I hope I was not the only one to refuse. The incident is a measure of how blatantly the U.S. Embassy operated during that period.

There was no question by the middle of 1972 that the Allende Government was in serious trouble. The inflationary spiral was twisting upward, shortages of foodstuffs had developed—although much was available on the black market—and the centrist Christian Democrats, led by ex-President Eduardo Frei, (whom the United States had once actively supported) were in open alliance with the right-wing National Party. Many members of this center-right coalition has passed in word and deed far beyond the point of "loyal opposition."

The political and economical situation was ripe for what later came to be known as "destabilization."

In October, 1972, the massive walk-out of truckers, shopowners, and businessmen in opposition began. Those of us living in Santiago were amazed at the seeming ease with which tens of thousands of persons without visible income—and without savings because of the inflationary spiral—were able to support themselves. The dollar rate on the black market dropped, indicating that fresh sources of currency were flowing into the country. It was everyday speculation in Santiago, both on the Right and Left, that the United States was funding the walkouts, speculation later confirmed in the recent disclosures about CIA activities.

Despite political and economic difficulties, however, the government was actually gaining support at the polls. Much to the dismay of his opponents, in the congressional elec-

tions of March, 1973, the Allende coalition gained electoral strength, receiving 44% of the total vote.

Ironically, this election was the first step toward the military coup. Convinced that Allende could not be removed constitutionally—his con-

Richard Fagen, professor of political science at Stanford, was in Chile for 18 months in 1972-73 as a consultant to the Ford Foundation, and visiting professor at the Latin American Faculty of the Social Sciences. He is coauthor of "Latin America and the United States: the Changing Political Realities."

gressional support would have had to drop below 33% for him to be impeached—the Right began to plot in earnest. Violence, sabotage, and a final series of crippling strikes wracked Chile during July and August of 1973. The full role of the CIA in these events is yet to be told.

Throughout this period, the Chilean political situation was fragile, the economy was in trouble, and class and political tensions ran high. We now know that \$8 to \$11 million were used covertly to support opposition newspapers, parties and strikers. The United States infiltrated political parties, and, as now conceded, attempted to buy votes in order to prevent the election of Allende.

Furthermore, because the CIA and its friends certainly had the means to change their dollars into Chilean currency somewhere other than at the Central Bank, the money pumped into Chile may actually have bought \$40 to \$50 million worth of subversive activities and services. With a raging black market, opposition parties, newspapers, and operatives could be purchased in dollars at a very substantial discount. All of this makes a mockery of official claims that the United States did nothing—in Mr. Ford's words—"but ensure that democratic institutions and parties survived." What Washington did do was put a very substantial thumb on the scales, tipping them against the freely elected government of Chile.

Against the background of what we now know of CIA involvement in Chile, the statements by high U.S. officials that "we did not participate in the overthrow of the Allende Government" are seriously misleading. Perhaps the United States did not participate in the planning or help in the attack on the Presidential palace. But as is well recognized in the American legal system, accessories before-the-fact must share responsibility with those who actually commit the criminal act, even though the former may not be present at the scene of the crime.

As tragic as the events in Chile are, perhaps even more significance to Americans is the incredible web of coverup, false justifications, and outright lies being told to the American people by the highest officials of the Ford Administration. For example, in justifying covert CIA activities, the President has claimed that "there was an effort being made by the government of Salvador Allende to destroy opposition news media and to destroy opposition political parties."

This does not reflect the true precoup situation in Chile. Actually, the opposition parties and newspapers kept functioning from 1970 to 1973—and not only because our government was pouring money into them. In fact, one of the most significant attempts to tamper with Chilean constitutionalism had occurred in 1970 when the CIA tried to buy opposition votes in Congress so as to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency.

In all of this sorry recent history, the key actor and prime villain has been Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. As head of the Forty Committee, Kissinger was the chief architect of covert operations against the Allende government. It was he who first articulated the "domino theory" of the "threat" that Chile (with a population 5%, and wealth less than 1% that of the United States) posed to this country. "I don't think we should delude ourselves that an Allende takeover in Chile would not present massive problems for us..." Kissinger said in 1970.

This is the same man who just a few weeks ago told the U.S. ambassador in Chile to "cut out the political science lectures" because the ambassador brought up the question of human rights with members of the junta when he "should have been" discussing military aid.

All of this betrays a scenario in which the U.S. government—once again—has set itself implacably against political and economic experimentation in the Third World.

It's the spirit of Vietnam and Watergate at work in hemispheric politics. This scenario, in Chile as in Vietnam, involved disregard for the sovereignty and rights of others, the violation of national and international law, dirty tricks by the CIA and other agencies, cozying up to repressive governments, and withholding vital information from Congress and the American electorate.

The people of Chile and Latin America deserve better from the government of the United States—and so do the American people.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 October 1974

U.S. Ought to Suspend Covert Activities Abroad

BY DAVID WISE

When Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev was in Washington in 1973 for a summit meeting, Richard Nixon introduced him to a short, thin man with graying black hair, sharp features and very cold blue eyes behind glasses rimmed in flesh-colored plastic frames.

Brezhnev stared for a moment at William E. Colby, director of the

David Wise is the coauthor of "The Invisible Government," a critical study of the CIA, and of "The Espionage Establishment." His latest book is "The Politics of Lying."

Central Intelligence Agency, and asked: "Is he a dangerous man?"

Colby replied soothingly: "The more we know of each other, the safer we both will be."

The answer was disarming, but it also was consistent with the CIA's current strategy of emphasizing its information, intelligence-gathering, and analytic functions, and downplaying its covert operations or "dirty tricks."

The CIA does indeed collect foreign intelligence. But its Directorate of Operations—which Colby formerly headed—also conducts secret political operations around the globe. These have ranged from payments to foreign political leaders and attempts to rig elections, to overthrowing governments and paramilitary invasions. CIA-backed coups have sometimes resulted in the assassination of the political leaders who are overthrown. At times, the CIA has even operated its own air force, army and navy.

Increasingly, these secret operations have come under criticism, in and out of Congress. Covert activities have focused public attention on the question of whether the United States has the right to intervene secretly in the internal affairs of other nations. And secret operations have raised basic questions about the role of an intelligence agency in a democracy.

Recent disclosures that the CIA, apparently with the approval of high officials of the Nixon Administration, spent \$8 million in Chile to "destabilize" the Marxist government of Salvador Allende have increased demands for either an end to such secret political operations, or tighter control by Congress over CIA, or both.

The CIA was created in 1947 as the successor to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The same legislation created the National Security

Council. The purpose of the CIA, as set forth in the law, was to pull together the intelligence information that the President needs to make decisions in the field of foreign policy. There is nothing in the law about overthrowing governments; there is language, however, permitting the CIA to perform such "other functions" as the NSC may direct.

Under this umbrella clause, the CIA has engaged in its global dirty tricks, manipulated the politics of other countries, directed a secret war in Laos, funneled millions of dollars through foundation conduits into student, academic and labor groups, dropped agents by parachute in various countries and served as the clandestine arm of the U.S. foreign policy.

A partial list of such covert operations includes the following:

Burma: In the 1950's, the CIA financed approximately 12,000 Chinese Nationalist troops who fled to Burma as the Communists took over mainland China in 1949. The CIA's troops, discovering poppies to be more profitable than politics, soon became heavily involved in the opium trade.

China: In the early 1950's, the intelligence agency air-dropped agents into the People's Republic of China. Two CIA men, John T. Downey and Richard Fecteau, were captured and spent 20 years in Chinese prisons before they were released.

Philippines: Also in the early 1950's, the CIA backed Ramon Mag-saysay's campaign against the Communist Huk guerrillas.

Iran: In 1953, the CIA overthrew the government of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, who had nationalized the Iranian oil industry. The coup was led by CIA agent Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt. The operation kept the shah in power, and in its wake, American oil companies were permitted into Iran.

Guatemala: In 1954, the CIA toppled the Communist-dominated government of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala with the help of a CIA air force of old World War II fighter planes. President Eisenhower later confirmed that he had approved the CIA operation.

Indonesia: In 1958, with a secret air force of B-26 bombers the CIA backed Indonesian rebels against the government of President Sukarno. One of the CIA pilots, Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down and captured; he was freed in 1962 through the intervention of Robert F. Kennedy.

Tibet: In the late 1950's, the CIA established a secret base at Camp Hale, Colo., nearly 10,000 feet high in the Rockies, and there trained Tibetan guerrillas to return to their homeland to fight against the Chinese Communists. CIA covert operators later claimed that some of the Tibetans trained in Colorado helped the Dalai Lama to escape to India in 1959.

Cuba: In 1961, a brigade of Cuban exiles trained by the CIA on a coffee plantation in Guatemala invaded

Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. More than 250 of the invaders died on the beaches and almost 1,200 were captured in President Kennedy's worst foreign policy disaster.

Vietnam: In 1963, the CIA worked closely with the South Vietnamese generals who carried out the coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was killed. In Vietnam, the CIA also created the Phoenix program, which killed 20,587 Vietcong during the period William Colby headed it, between 1968 and 1971.

Bolivia: In 1967, a team of CIA operatives was sent to Bolivia, where they helped to track down Ernesto "Che" Guevara, former aide to Castro. Guevara was captured and killed.

The rationale for all such covert CIA operations is that they are justified and necessary to protect American national security. A secret five-man government committee, known over the years by various names and currently as the Forty Committee, has the responsibility of approving covert operations in advance. At present, the chairman of the committee is Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Its other members are Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco; William P. Clements, Jr., the deputy secretary of defense; Air Force Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Colby.

The extent to which the Forty Committee controls secret CIA operations remains uncertain for the very reason that the committee, like the CIA itself, operates in great secrecy. In any event, what control does exist is within the executive branch; the Forty Committee does not include any members of Congress in its ranks. Nor, as far as can be determined, does the CIA discuss its covert operations to any significant extent with the four shadowy House and Senate subcommittees that supposedly monitor CIA activities. In the case of Chile, various Executive branch witnesses assured congressional committees that the United States had not intervened against Allende.

In an era of cold war, secret intervention in other countries might have seemed justified to many; it does not appear justifi-

fied today. There is no moral or legal basis for covert operations—the 1947 act does not specifically authorize them—and such intervention violates the charter of the United Nations, which the United States is pledged to respect.

Moreover, the Constitution gives Congress the war power; secret operations involving paramilitary action and the overthrow of governments are clearly the equivalent of undeclared war and, on their face, unconstitutional.

The price of secret operations is too high in a democracy that rests on

LOS ANGELES TIMES

6 October 1974

President Must Balance Interests, Share Planning

BY HARRY ROSITZKE

From the Bay of Pigs to the current Chilean case, there have been sporadic denunciations of the CIA's action operations abroad—in the press, in books from inside and outside Washington's intelligence establishment, and occasionally in Congress.

The issue is heightened rather than resolved by President Ford's statement that "our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policies and protect national security."

The central question: Should the United States employ secret means to interfere in the affairs of other countries? The debate is waged on two levels—moral and pragmatic.

For pure men of principle, covert action is impermissible as a means, whatever the end. Covert actions are

Harry Rositzke, retired after many years in operations with the OSS and the CIA, is the author of "U.S.S.R. Today."

immoral not only because they are secret and therefore violate the canons of an open society, but also because by interfering in the domestic affairs of another country they violate the U.N. Charter and the moral and legal principles of American society.

At a more realistic level, the critique of secret operations addresses itself to profit and loss: Are secret operations worth carrying out?

On the loss side are not only the moral objections, but the conspicuous failures of the past (the Bay of Pigs), the sinister image of the CIA abroad (the bogie of "American imperialism"), the compulsion of the executive to lie in public and to Congress in order to keep secret its sponsorship of "unofficial" actions (Chile), and the domestic disen-

chantment with secrecy deepened by Watergate. Often, the government has lied to protect covert CIA activities. Such official lying has eroded confidence in our national leaders and the American system of government.

It is high time that the CIA put away its cloak and dagger and packed up its bag of deadly tricks. The CIA should be confined to gathering intelligence overseas. President Ford, Secretary Kissinger and their successors should conduct a foreign policy that is visible and accountable to the American people.

What are the entries on the profit side? The list of past successes on the public record is short. President Truman authorized large-scale official and unofficial support for the democratic parties in the 1948 Italian elections to prevent a Communist victory—and the Communists lost.

President Eisenhower triggered a coup in Tehran in 1953 to keep Iran out of the Soviet sphere—and it still is. The following year he authorized a coup in Guatemala to prevent the export of Soviet arms into the Western hemisphere—and the coup succeeded without bloodshed.

What are the secret successes? No one knows outside the small elite in the executive.

Political action operations have played a marginal role in American foreign policy since 1948, but the full record is not available either to Congress or the public. For a decade after World War II they played a tangible but minor role in the American effort to restore a stabilized, democratic Europe. Through its contacts with non-Communist politicians and government officials, with labor leaders and media figures, the CIA added its influence to that of the State and Defense Departments in containing the expansion of Soviet power west of the Elbe.

In the late 1950s and 1960s, the focus of political operations shifted to the Third World, the terrain chosen by Moscow to weaken the "imperialists." In the Near East, in Africa, briefly, and in Southeast Asia, covert operations played their part in furthering overall American objectives, however ill-conceived some of these objectives may appear in retrospect.

In Latin America the political situation became even more challenging after Castro's victory, and counterinsurgency became the order of the day for half a dozen federal

agencies. The CIA's political action operations were aimed mainly at the legal and illegal Communist parties supported by Moscow with money, training and advice, at the insurgent groups working out of Havana, and at the minor rash of "Chinese parties" that broke out in the mid-60s. The evolution of purely domestic insurgencies and of urban terrorist groups further broadened the challenge to local security agencies working in concert with the CIA.

It is a mistake to think that all CIA operations in Latin America were aimed at supporting right-wing militarists. America's ultimate goal in Chile's 1964 election, of course, was to thwart the election of Salvador Allende, but Washington put its money on a reform-minded Christian Democrat, Eduardo Frei, and actively sought the achievement of his goals—breaking up the dominant financial oligarchy, for instance. Indeed, as an action arm of government, the CIA historically has attracted many liberals to its ranks, for they saw in it a chance to bring democratic reforms to parts of the world that most needed it. One reason that the CIA now is widely perceived as far-right is that its failures have been more publicized than its successes, and these usually have involved strictly anti-Communist activities, as in Allende's Chile.

In the new world of detente, it is often argued, secret action operations are no longer needed. Detente, however broadly defined, has not affected Soviet competition on the ideological and political front. Moscow continues to exploit the resources of its built-in political action instruments—the Communist parties abroad. It continues to export strong anti-American propaganda on its own radios and news services and by the distribution of anti-capitalist "literature and general subsidies" to local editors and columnists. The KGB continues to recruit "agents of influence."

Secret political action is not the only antidote for secret Soviet actions, but it is one instrument. Situations are bound to arise, especially in Latin America or the Near East, in which the President will find a secret American action is the only effective response. Such occasions may be rare, but it would be foolish to deprive him of the secret option.

Who will measure the profit and loss of such operations?

It is a fundamental and frustrating fact that the pragmatic equation can be written only within the executive. The broad moral-pragmatic issue is inevitably reduced to the question of controlling the action of the executive—and here frustration persists, for there are no adequate answers.

A Hoover-type commission on in-

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
18 October 1974

Uncovering the CIA: Is congressional oversight needed?

By Editorial Research Reports

Intelligence and secret operations can, at best, make broad bureaucratic and policy recommendations. Congressional oversight can do no more than rubber stamp executive decisions or hold dramatic post mortems. Legislation, a "foreign intervention control act", for example, is impossible to write on such a rarified subject, nor can Congress or a committee vote on individual strategic operations that are to be carried out secretly.

The burden is clearly on the President to resolve at least some of the public suspicion and distrust about secret political actions abroad. He can change the machinery of secret committees to bring in a broader adversary point of view in the initial stages of secret action proposals. He can make the National Security Council as a whole responsible for final recommendations to him. He can exercise his sharpest judgment on the possible profit and cost of each operation. And he is the only man who can bring to bear a moral judgment that reflects the values of the electorate as a whole.

The President can take one further step to bring in the people. He can arrange for the participation of select congressmen in the National Security Council's deliberations on secret action proposals.

Who monitors the President? In any government, secret activities are peculiarly the province of the executive: secret negotiations, back-door diplomacy, foreign intelligence and domestic security operations, covert action operations. In a republic without an official secrets act there is only one check on what he does in secret—the press.

The adversary relationship between the media and the executive on official secrets may in individual cases entail some damage to national interests, but without private investigators, we cannot know who is doing what to us or for us. Exposés of the government's secret operations, whether on Cambodia or Chile, can throw light on the acts of the past, and provide a cautionary signal for the decisions of tomorrow.

The past two years have not been kind to the American intelligence community in general, and especially not to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Tainted by Watergate, the CIA is taking it on the chin for having spent \$8 million to "destabilize" the Marxist regime of Chile's late president, Salvador Allende. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee immediately launched an investigation into the matter.

In addition, Sens. Howard H. Baker (R) of Tennessee and Lowell P. Weicker (R) of Connecticut have introduced legislation to establish a 14-member congressional oversight committee for all federal agencies with intelligence functions. These include not only the CIA but also the FBI, Secret Service, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency.

The idea of an intelligence oversight committee is hardly a new one. In an extensive survey of the intelligence community in 1968, a team of New York Times reporters found that the "overwhelming consensus" of those interviewed was that Congress should not attempt to "control" the CIA through a special committee. It was felt such a panel "might become a new intelligence empire on Capitol Hill that could exert a direct policy influence on the CIA separate from and challenging the President's policy decisions."

Covert activities

If the CIA did nothing but gather and evaluate intelligence, it would have few critics. But the agency also engages in covert political operations

LONDON TIMES

8 October 1974

Mr McMahon's denial on CIA connexion

From Our Correspondent
Melbourne, Oct 7

Mr William McMahon, the former Liberal Prime Minister of Australia, denied today that his Government had authorized the Australian Security Intelligence Organization to cooperate with the American Central Intelligence Agency in any activity designed to overthrow the Allende Government in Chile. Mr McMahon said that there was no truth in the allegation (reported to have been made by an unnamed official in the United States State Department) that the Australian intelligence organization had acted as a watchdog for the CIA in Chile. The Liberal Government, he said, had made it a strict policy

abroad, and these occasionally have brought it into disrepute. The disastrous invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 is perhaps the classic example of a bungled CIA adventure. From time to time the agency's intelligence-gathering activities also cause embarrassment, as when the U-2 spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960.

President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger both defended the CIA's covert activities in Chile as in the best interests of that country as well as of the United States. Others are not so certain.

"Special operations pose dangers not only to the nations against which they are directed, but to ourselves," wrote David Wise and Thomas B. Ross in "The Invisible Government," a book about the U.S. intelligence community. "They raise the question of how far a free society, in attempting to preserve itself, can emulate a closed society without becoming indistinguishable from it."

Apprehension justified

The CIA's involvement in Watergate, limited and reluctant though it was, has raised questions about the nature of the agency's activities within the United States. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, authors of a recent book about the CIA, say that Americans are justified in feeling apprehensive.

"Nurtured in the adversary setting of the cold war," they wrote, "shielded by secrecy, and spurred on by patriotism that views dissent as a threat to the national security, the clandestine operatives of the CIA have the capability, the resources, the experience — and the inclination — to ply their skills increasingly on the domestic scene."

The CIA's capacity to defend itself against such attacks is limited by its overriding need to operate in secret. To provide a detailed rebuttal might expose sensitive matters of national security. Still, the mover for greater congressional oversight of the CIA is gathering force and may become law.

affairs of other nations. It would certainly have never countenanced activities whose object was to overthrow the legally elected Government of Chile.

Mr McMahon also repudiated any suggestion that the CIA might have contributed funds to the Liberal Party general election campaign earlier this year. This suggestion has been made in a book entitled *Looking at the Liberals* just issued in Melbourne and edited by Mr Ray Aitchison, a former Canberra journalist.

"I can assure you we would never accept funds from the CIA nor have they ever been offered."

NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1974

Kissinger Assures India That C.I.A. Won't Interfere

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, Oct. 30 — Secretary of State Kissinger bluntly assured India today that the Central Intelligence Agency would not interfere in the political situation here.

Mr. Kissinger, ending a three-day visit to New Delhi, said at a news conference: "I reject the implication that the United States is engaged on a systematic basis in undermining any government, and, particularly, constitutional governments. Exactly the opposite is true."

In making the comments before departing for Bangladesh, Mr. Kissinger sought to ease the persistent and expressed fears of Indian politicians, including Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, that the C.I.A. was bent on subverting India. American officials here have termed the fears obsessive and Mr. Kissinger was questioned several times about the agency as well as United States involvement in the coup.

A year later, American newspapers reported that the director of the intelligence agency, William E. Colby, had told Congress that the Nixon Administration had authorized more than \$8-million for covert activities by the agency in Chile between 1970 and 1973 in an effort to prevent the election of Salvador Allende Gossens as President after he was elected anyway, to make it impossible for him to govern. Dr. Allende died in the 1973

coupe.

Asked by several Communist newsmen about United States involvement in the coups in Chile, and last summer in Cyprus, Mr. Kissinger replied:

"The United States did not foment the overthrow of a constitutional government in Chile. That has been made sufficiently plain by the President."

"Secondly, the United States had nothing whatever to do with the coup in Cyprus. This is simply repeating totally unfounded propaganda."

"Thirdly, the United States is not engaged, directly or indirectly in any attempt to influence the domestic situation in India."

Mr. Kissinger added: "It has not authorized such a program, it is not engaged in such a program and it has repeatedly pointed out that if any of its officials should ever be caught in unauthorized action, we would take strong measures."

'New Page' Turned

Mr. Kissinger's visit to India has been widely applauded by Indian and American officials. The Secretary relaxed and seemingly cheerful at a crowded government auditorium, said that "a new page" had been turned in Indian-American relations.

"In terms of the purpose that we set ourselves, which was to establish a basis for a new and mature relationship, I consider the trip completely successful," Mr. Kissinger said.

He flew from here to Dacca, Bangladesh, on a trip that will also take him to Pakistan, Af-

ghanistan, Iran, Europe and the Middle East.

Mr. Kissinger's visit, at the behest of the Indian Government and his first time here in three years, was largely designed to lift relations between India and the United States. Resentments linger here over Washington's support for Pakistan before and during the 1971 war that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.

Also, many Indians view the \$10-billion in United States economic assistance to India in the nineteen-sixties as a symbol of dependence and a source of American political leverage here.

Americans See Hostility

Americans often contend that the Indian Government has been hostile to the United States in recent years and has spent too much time lecturing and criticizing successive United States Administrations while ignoring repressive tactics of the Soviet Union, such as crackdowns on dissidents.

Moreover, Indian comments that the United States seeks to exploit India's poverty politically and economically have soured the relationship and annoyed Americans.

Mr. Kissinger said today, while discussing food aid to India, "I think one of the aspects of the relationship that is developing now between India and the United States is that we can talk to each other free of complexes."

"One of the complexes that has affected our relationship in

the past has been who was asking whom for what. And secondly, whether the United States was doing anybody a favor by extending aid."

"Let me say first of all that when the United States undertakes a certain measure, with respect to India or any other country, it does so in its own interest as well as the interest of the other country."

Decision on Food Awaited

Mr. Kissinger said that a "final judgment" on food aid for India would be made when he returned to Washington next month. Current estimates are that India will receive about 500,000 tons of food at preferential prices within the next few months. Indian sources said that by next summer the total of new American food aid might reach one million tons.

On other issues, Mr. Kissinger, who spoke with newsmen more than 30 minutes, conceded that there was "an absence of identity of views" on the establishment of a United States naval base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, about 1,000 miles south of India.

He declined to discuss the possibility of lifting or relaxing the United States embargo on the supply of weapons to Pakistan.

"I do not think it is appropriate for me to make statements that affect other countries on the subcontinent while I'm in New Delhi," Mr. Kissinger said.

EDITOR & PUBLISHER

28 SEP 1974

CIA influence in Chile condemned by IAPA

The Inter American Press Association issued a statement September 20 condemning attempts by governments to influence newspapers through financial support.

The statement, signed by IAPA president Robert U. Brown, publisher and editor of *Editor & Publisher*, was issued after the *New York Times* disclosed that the Central Intelligence Agency had secretly financed Chile's striking labor unions and news media threatened by Salvador Allende's minority government.

In testimony, September 19, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asserted that the intelligence agency's involvement in Chile had been authorized solely to keep alive political parties and news media threatened by Salvador Allende's minority Government.

Ford favors CIA

President Gerald R. Ford, revealed at his September 16 press conference, that he supported the CIA involvement in Chile and said that it had been authorized because "there was an effort being made by the Allende Government to destroy oppo-

sition news media both the writing press as well as the electronic press, and to destroy opposition political parties."

Times' sources declared that "less than half of the money made available for clandestine activities in Chile was provided for the direct support of the allegedly threatened politicians, newspapers and radio-television stations, referred to by Mr. Ford."

An official disclosed to Seymour Hersh New York Times reporter that "some financial support for newspaper and radio stations was needed in Chile, because it wouldn't have been good to have strikes if nobody knows about it."

Hersh suggested that most of the funds invested for propaganda purposes, according to his sources, "went to *El Mercurio*, the main opposition newspaper in Chile. It was the only serious political force among the newspapers and television stations there," the source noted.

IAPA president Brown explained in a statement:

"The Inter American Press Association deplors reports that the CIA has spent funds in Chile to support the opposition press under President Allende. The IAPA condemns any attempt by Governments to either subvert or financially support the press. In either case, a newspaper accepting such support loses its independence."

JAPAN TIMES

5 OCTOBER 1974

CIA's Agents Listed

-LONDON (Kyodo-Reuters) — A former United States spy turned Marxist, Philip Agee, Thursday moved to embarrass the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by making public a list said to be the agency's operatives in Mexico.

A book by Agee, to be published here in January, tells of his work with the CIA in Latin America up to the time he resigned, disillusioned, in 1969.

Thursday he told a press conference held above a Fleet Street pub that he wanted to expose CIA officers and drive them out of the countries where they operated.

He said his list of agency personnel in Mexico, under Station Chief Richard Sampson, was drawn up recently "by comrades who I trained to follow the comings and goings of the CIA."

The 39-year-old writer, who now lives in southwest England, attacked the agency as the "secret political policy of American capitalism and the enforcer of economic exploitation."

LOS ANGELES TIMES
29 October 1974

DESPITE COLBY CLAIM, IT WASN'T AGENCY'S FINEST HOUR

The CIA in Laos: 'An Equivocal Success'

BY CHARLES A. STEVENSON

The Central Intelligence Agency doesn't brag very much, nor does it get many compliments. With its reputation tarnished by such misadventures as the Bay of Pigs and secret support to opposition groups in Chile, the CIA is seldom credited for its political analyses and its intelligence on Soviet weaponry.

So it was somewhat unusual when CIA Director William E. Colby emerged from the shadows in September to defend covert operations. And it was ironic that he decided to praise the "effective but modest manner" in which the CIA operated in Laos. Over the past dozen years, he said, "a small commitment of CIA Americans and a small expenditure" had defended Laos so well that the battle lines remain "essentially unchanged."

To a student of American policy in Laos, this was hardly a "small" effort.

The CIA spent about \$100 million per year in Laos in the early 1970s — an amount equal to about half of that small country's total gross national product in those years. Together with even larger sums openly given in military and economic aid, U.S. assistance dwarfed the local economy, giving the United States a dominating influence.

CIA-financed Americans—probably numbering fewer than 1,000—supported, supplied, advised, and in effect commanded a 45,000-man army (at its peak) in a bloody, decade-long war.

This struggle produced an estimated million refugees and left uncounted civilian casualties. The Meo and other hill tribes, for whose benefit and protection the CIA aided the conflict, saw their villages devastated and their populations decimated.

Even U.S. air support, which dropped 21 million tons of bombs during 1964-73, could not alter the outcome of the war—a stalemate.

Whatever one's judgment on the magnitude of these efforts in Laos, the most basic question is what we want the CIA to do—and to be.

When established by law in 1947, the CIA's chief purposes were "to correlate and evaluate intelligence" and to coordinate the various intelligence activities of the government. Authority for covert actions was derived from a catch-all clause allow-

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ing the CIA "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

Although Director Colby favors no restrictions on the CIA's ability to conduct covert operations, he did tell the Senate Armed Services Committee last year that the agency "undoubtedly" went beyond what Congress had intended by running the war in Laos.

This admission suggests that we should look more closely at the record before accepting the CIA's "effective but modest" actions in Laos as a good example to follow.

The CIA got a key role in Indochina on Aug. 20, 1954, when the National Security Council adopted a policy of "covert operations on a large and effective scale."

Acting sometimes without the knowledge or approval of the U.S. ambassador, CIA agents in Laos proceeded to bolster their own chosen factions as cabinets were made and broken.

According to U.S. personnel in Laos at the time, the CIA supported groups which brought down Prince Souvanna Phouma's neutralist coalition government in 1958 and almost succeeded in bringing down its successor in 1959. (This later attempt was foiled when the U.S. ambassador, unable to harness the CIA, obtained diplomatic support for his stand from other nations.)

In 1960, the CIA helped rig elections to keep its clients in power. When an indigenous, grass-roots military coup returned Souvanna Phouma to power later that year, the CIA continued monetary and material aid to its military friends, who sent rebel forces to oust the government. All the while, President Eisenhower and the U.S. ambassador proclaimed their support for Souvanna Phouma.

CIA assistance to the hill tribes, which had been organized into a 9,000-man army, also contributed to the breakdown of the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, which had put Souvanna Phouma once again in charge of a coalition government.

As the conflict in Vietnam intensified, the United States expanded its efforts in Laos and secretly aided the fighting there as a rear-guard action against the North Vietnamese. Said former Secretary of State Dean Rusk: "After 1963 Laos was only the wart on the hog of Vietnam."

The U.S. Air Force concentrated on the so-called Ho Chi Minh trails leading through Laos into South Vietnam, but it also bombed heavily in support of Laotian units, the most aggressive and effective of which were the CIA's clandestine army.

As the Meo were forced to rely more and more on preteen-age boys for soldiers, the CIA expanded its secret army with Thai "volunteers." Eventually these forces numbered over 40,000 — and could not really be kept secret.

Some members of Congress and the press had piecemeal knowledge of these activities, but they generally accepted the operations as a useful adjunct to the Vietnam war.

Now, according to news reports, the CIA's presence in Laos has been greatly reduced. A new, shaky coalition government has brought peace.

A new mood is taking over in the United States as well — a rejection of the cold war mentality of the 1950s, of unrestrained presidential power and of secret wars. Many people are beginning to question whether the President should have, in effect, a private army to use to intervene in other nations (often in their domestic political affairs), with little if any accountability to Congress and the public.

Colby has justified covert CIA operations as the only choice "between a diplomatic protest and sending the marines." In Laos, however, other options were available and used with some beneficial effect: suspending aid, soliciting international diplomacy or refusing to deal with certain self-proclaimed local governments.

These steps were at least open to public scrutiny, while the CIA's clandestine manipulations and intervention were not.

Secrecy tends to produce a moral blindness toward the means, ends and consequences of U.S. actions. In Laos, the CIA's record of political interference and of bloody, stalemated war can be judged, at best, only an equivocal success.

WASHINGTON POST
27 October 1974

U.S. Said to Fear Lisbon Shift to Left

By Miguel Acoca

Special to The Washington Post

LISBON—Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, apparently skeptical of U.S. Embassy reports from here minimizing the peril of a Communist takeover in Portugal, sent high-level intelligence and diplomatic experts to this Iberian country recently to make independent evaluations.

Informed sources said that Kissinger dispatched Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to Lisbon in August for a "personal appraisal." The general, who speaks excellent Portuguese and is considered a specialist on Portugal, was in Lisbon from August 9 to 12 for meetings with high government officials and senior U.S. embassy staffers.

The CIA would not comment on the persistent reports of Walters' visit, refusing even to confirm that it took place. A CIA spokesman said that the agency never comments on the travels of its top personnel.

Two weeks ago, Kissinger sent a four-man State Department mission to Lisbon for still another independent review of Portugal's future course, the sources said. The group, headed by Alan Lukens, director of the department's Iberian section, included Robert Ryan, a department monetary expert, and Michael Samuels, an authority on Portugal's African colonies. The identity of the fourth mission member was not disclosed.

The pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party has become an important factor in Portugal since the right-wing, pro-U.S. dictatorship which ruled Portugal for 48 years was deposed in April. The young military officers who have been running the country since then have given the Communists a Cabinet post and full participation in the country's new military-controlled government. Much of the strength and popularity of the Communists derives from their long underground fight against the dictatorship, which had outlawed the party.

While nothing could be learned of the thrust of Walters' report to Kissinger, sources said that the Lukens group diverged from the embassy's appraisal. The extent of the differences was not disclosed, but sources said that the embassy's reporting had grown more cautious as a result.

The sources said that Kis-

singer and others in Washington were obsessed with the fear that Portugal will be the first country to go Communist in what was called "a southern Europe domino theory" also involving Spain, Italy and Greece. This fear apparently has been fed by pessimistic intelligence assessments, press reports stressing the power of the left in Portugal, and the anxieties of multinational companies with interests in Portugal and its African colonies.

Washington apparently fears that the emergence of the Portuguese Communists following the fall of the dictatorship will be duplicated in neighboring Spain, the last remaining pro-American rightist government in Western Europe.

Since his visit to Portugal, Walters has also been in Spain for secret talks with high Spanish officials, the sources said. The CIA deputy director's latest visit reportedly took place two weeks ago when he had a briefing on Portugal with senior Spanish military and civilian authorities.

Spanish and U.S. officials are known to be concerned by the potential for Communist infiltration from Portugal, which has a long and hard-to-guard border with Spain. The Communist Party has been banned in Spain since the end of the civil war in 1939, but it has remained a major clandestine political force in industrial urban centers and the backbone of opposition to Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

Another recent visitor to Spain was William Colby, the CIA's director, but sources said that he had merely stopped in Madrid on his way east. One source, however, pointed out that visits to Iberia by high U.S. intelligence official could become more frequent because the Mediterranean has risen in U.S. priority.

Many Portuguese rightists who fled following the populist military coup in April are now living in exile in Madrid. Some have been beating a path to the U.S. embassy in Madrid to lobby for their views and to plead for help in preventing a Communist takeover.

Conservatives and moderates still living in Portugal are also said to be seeking to influence the United States.

Informed sources here said that during Walters' visit in August, he met with Gen. Antonio de Spínola, then provisional president. At the time, Spínola, a conservative, was locked in a struggle for power

with populist Premier Vasco Gonçalves and the coordinating committee of the Armed Forces Movement.

Spínola resigned Sept. 20 after failing to win a bid for one-man rule and martial-law powers. He sought to curb Communist activities and the leftist-controlled press and to increase his control over the decolonization of Portugal's African colonies.

Both U.S. and Portuguese government sources have privately confirmed Walters' meeting with Spínola, and a subsequent conference with Gen. Francisco da Costa Gomes, the armed forces chief who succeeded Spínola.

High-ranking revolutionary military officers have claimed repeatedly that there are at least 100 CIA agents operating in Portugal, striving to create "another Chile."

The news that Walters had been in Portugal, reported in August and September in the Portuguese press, aggravated

WASHINGTON POST
9 October 1974

CIA Role Is Alleged In Portugal

By Jonathan C. Randal

Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, Oct. 8—The U. S. Central Intelligence Agency was instrumental in persuading executives of unnamed multinational companies in Lisbon to subsidize a conservative newspaper and right-wing political parties last summer, the satirical weekly *Le Canard Enchaîné* says in its current issue.

In an article by investigative reporter Claude Angeli, the French weekly stopped short of suggesting that the CIA actually financed the political parties or the newspaper, called *O Tempo*.

The CIA also tried to get the now ousted chief of state, Gen. Antonio de Spínola, to approve a new radio and television station to be financed by *Bulhosa*, a Portuguese company, two unnamed Lisbon radio stations and two unnamed Brazilian stations, the weekly added.

The inclusion of the Brazilian interests was to "allow the Americans to be present in the deal," the paper said, without making clear whether Spínola had agreed or if the new station was ever set up.

Gen. Vernon Walters, deputy director of the CIA, spent a week's vacation — apparently in August — in southern

Portugal "as an innocent tourist" after visiting Mediterranean countries, the weekly said sarcastically.

the fears of leftists of a rightist coup during the crisis which culminated in Spínola's resignation.

Rightists took the visit to mean that United States was casting its lot with Spínola and his ideas.

Leaflets and posters linking the CIA with Portuguese right began to appear throughout Lisbon as the crisis developed, and walls were sprayed with anti-CIA slogans.

The special Revolutionary Security Command, led by Brig. Gen. Otelo de Carvalho began to track foreigners coming into Portugal, particularly anti-Castro Cuban exiles, Chileans, Spaniards and Americans. This led to a series of raids on luxury hotels here.

Also placed under surveillance was the Brazilian embassy, which security officials suspect of being a conduit for counter revolutionary activities.

In Washington, the CIA refused to confirm or deny whether Walters had visited Portugal.

The newspaper also said Secretary of State Henry Kissinger let the revolutionary Portuguese leadership know in May that the "United States" was not opposed to independence for Guinea Bissau, but would not stand for the Portuguese giving up the Cape Verde Islands to the Guineans.

Kissinger's warning was based on fears that "one day" the Soviets would set up a naval air base on the strategically located islands off the coast of West Africa if they ceased to be Portuguese.

The newspaper credited U. S. ambassador Stuart N. Scott and the CIA with sizing up Spínola early on as a "bad bet." Spínola was judged unable to reach political compromises and over-optimistic about his real influence in the Army and the willingness of the public to back him.

By May, Washington had decided to step up contacts with the Portuguese general staff, but that effort apparently was not a success, the weekly suggested, noting that a purge of officer ranks was already under way.

The conflict between the Portuguese Communist and Socialist parties is being closely followed by the CIA, the weekly said. It quoted an unnamed American diplomat as saying "logically we should play the Socialist card but I don't know if my government will make up its mind to do so."

WASHINGTON STAR
20 Oct. 1974

Betty Beale

"MY COUNTRY HAS BEEN laughing for a month now," said Manuel Trucco, Chilean ambassador to the OAS, at a diplomatic dinner. "The CIA could not have destabilized the Allende government for \$8 million. It's ridiculous."

Manuel Trucco is no fly-by-night observer. He has served his country in such capacities as undersecretary of foreign affairs, ambassador to Bolivia, to the OAS in the 60's, president of the OAS commission on economic affairs, and now again as his country's envoy at the Pan American Union. So in view of the horrified reaction of certain senators and columnists over the CIA supposedly causing the downfall of President Allende, his comments are worth hearing.

First he had something to say about the \$350,000 the CIA allegedly spent to bribe Chilean congressmen not to vote for Allende. "It's ridiculous because everybody had decided to vote for Allende anyway. He had an agreement before the election with the Christian Democrats. The vote was 160 to 30 for him."

Second, Allende had nearly \$2 billion in government funds at his command compared to the \$8 million. "Allende during his three years in government had \$450 million in reserves; he got a credit of over \$850 million from the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and even Spain. He didn't pay any of the \$800 million debts to foreign countries during those three years; and he negotiated another \$140 million credit from abroad. On top of that the money in circulation in Chile increased fiftyfold in three years. It broke the economy and paralyzed everything."

And third, as for the truck strike which the CIA is now said to have paid for, thereby paralyzing the Allende government, Trucco says: "The truckers did not have any spare parts, and Allende wouldn't give them the currency or the permission to import spare parts, so their 50,000 trucks were being paralyzed. They struck in 1972 and again in 1973. The only difference in '73 was they concentrated their

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
6 October 1974

JOHN P. ROCHE

That CIA in Chile Question

About the only thing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has not been blamed for in recent months is the Honduran flood. (And some KGB operative has probably suggested that mystery planes were seen seeding the rain clouds so the agency may yet end up with the flood on its doorstep.) When the Greek junta withered away, for example, Americans were suddenly in bad odor in Athens as the old charge resurfaced that the CIA had sponsored the 1967 coup, which put the military junta in power. In addition, the United States generally came under attack for sustaining the junta.

Now as far as CIA involvement in the events of 1967 is concerned, let us set the record straight. By accident, I was sitting with President Johnson and national security adviser Walt Rostow when we heard of the coup. (We were in the president's compartment of Air Force One, en route back to the United States from Konrad Adenauer's funeral.) Johnson and Rostow did not look knowingly at each other and wink — the president blew his very substantial cork. Poor Walt spent the rest of the ride desperately trying to find out what had happened in Athens. If the President of the United States has, as advertised, the most sophisticated communications equipment in the world, I would hate to see how unsophisticated stuff works. When we got off the plane at Andrews AFB some hours later, we still didn't know who had done what to whom in Greece.

It turned out that American intelligence had been worried about a military coup, but by an entirely different cast of Greek characters! The bunch that pulled it off had gone undetected. When it began, the American ambassador prepared to implement "Operation Prometheus" (a contingency plan against a Communist coup) and offered the king a helicopter to go to Salonika and rally his allegedly loyal troops. The king refused. That was the extent of American involvement. Note that our effort was to maintain the constitutional monarchy.

Once the colonels were in power, what should we have done? Send the Sixth Fleet and land Marines? Or treat the junta as the government of

Greece and continue on a business as usual basis? Or privately put the heat on the dictatorship to restore civil rights, a free press, and other constitutional guarantees? When I was young, I thought a question like this could be simply answered, but in watching the internal debate in the U.S. government over Greek policy I learned an awful lot. Let me put it in question and answer form:

Roche: Why can't we cut off military supplies until they release political prisoners and restore civil rights? Are the Bulgarians or the Albanians planning to invade if Greek tanks aren't up to date?

Answer: Do you want the Sixth Fleet to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean?

Roche: Of course; it's essential if the Arabs jump Israel and the Soviets threaten to get into the act. (As indeed happened about six weeks after the Greek coup.)

Answer: Then you must want to maintain our base at Suda Bay on Crete. Without it the fleet has to go all the way to Italy for supplies.

Roche: What you are saying is that, in overall strategic terms, the colonels in Athens have us over a barrel?

The question answered itself. In fact, as current developments in Athens — the semi-exodus from NATO in particular — indicate, whoever rules Greece has us in a strategic bind.

Reluctantly I concluded we could not put the arm on the Greek junta, though in fairness we did persistently urge it in private to modify its repressive tactics.

However, we now have in the case of Chile a situation where direct pressure in defense of human rights creates no strategic problem. In Secretary Kissinger's phrase, "Chile is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica." Yet the Secretary of State recently reprimanded the American ambassador, David H. Pepper, for linking possible American military assistance to an easing of the military dictatorship.

Having been to the other side of the moon, I am incapable of a pious shriek, but the burden of proof is clearly on Kissinger to demonstrate the rationale for "gigging" Ambassador Pepper.

trucks in the mud on the outskirts of Santiago.

"I have no idea if the \$8 million was earmarked (by the CIA to overthrow Allende) or not, but if so," Trucco said, "it wasn't enough to even get one

Los Angeles Times

—Wed., Oct. 16, 1974

BOOK BLOWS COVER

CIA and Mexico:
Close Association
Leaves Red FacesBY STANLEY MEISLER
Times Staff Writer

MEXICO CITY—Both the United States and Mexican governments have been embarrassed recently by an accelerating series of revelations about the work of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in Mexico.

The revelations are far different from those about the CIA efforts in Chile to weaken the government of the late Salvador Allende. There has been no hint that the CIA is doing anything to hurt the government of President Luis Echeverria of Mexico and his ruling Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI). In fact, the stories stress that there has been close cooperation between the Mexican government and the CIA. That is what makes the revelations so embarrassing to Mexico.

Though it won't be listed on any public agenda, a discussion of changes in CIA personnel and perhaps operation stemming from the revelations will probably take up some of the time of President Echeverria and President Ford when they meet at the border towns of Nogales, Ariz., and Nogales, Sonora, next Monday.

The revelations have come from a former CIA agent in Mexico, Philip B. F. Agee, who is now living in London. Publishers in London and Paris plan to publish his book, "Inside the Company: A CIA Diary," in January. In advance of publication, Agee has been talking with newsmen about the work of the CIA in Mexico and the rest of Latin America. These interviews have made the front pages of most Mexican newspapers.

In some ways, the revelations have been less startling than the Mexican reaction to them. They have provoked confusion in government statements, recriminations among politicians, accusations and counteraccusations, and a campaign by some Mexican journalists and politicians to blame a good deal of Mexico's troubles on the CIA.

In an interview in London in early October, Agee named 35 agents within the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City and two others

outside. He said that Richard Sampson was the CIA station chief in Mexico and that Jonathan Hanke was his assistant. Both are classified officially as political officers of the embassy.

There were obvious errors on Agee's list. One man listed had left the embassy a few months ago. Another, Winston Scott, whom Agee identified as a former station chief now living in feigned retirement in Mexico, died a few years ago.

Despite this, most independent observers believe that the list is, in general, very accurate and up to date. The identity of most of the CIA agents within an embassy is usually an open secret, known both by other employees of the embassy and by outsiders, like American newsmen, who spend much time talking with embassy officials.

The publication of the list has put the Mexican government in a kind of quandary. It is doubtful that many of the names surprise Mexican officials. Most of the CIA employees listed were probably what are known in the diplomatic world as "revealed agents." That term describes CIA agents, usually working in an embassy, whom the U.S. government identifies to a friendly and cooperative government.

But the Mexican government does not want to be known as friendly and cooperative to the CIA. A few days after the list was published, a Mexican delegation asked the Interparliamentary Union meeting in Tokyo to condemn the interference by intelligence agencies in the internal affairs of other countries. The Mexicans, however, cited the CIA in Chile, not Mexico, as an example.

So far, the Mexican government has not expelled any of those on the list. Asked about this at a news conference, President Echeverria, in a mild and somewhat confusing comment, said, "In regard to two or three of the people, we can never expel them from the country because they died some time ago. The others are officials of the American Embassy who worked there publicly in different offices.

"This man (Agee) was here in 1968," Echeverria went on. "and he had interests, who knows why, to make these declarations, and, curiously, he is very insistent about the subject. But there are dead people on the published list. I believe that it will soon be made more precise for me who is dead and who works in the American Embassy.

This is the present situation. We are going to invite this man to Mexico to help us find them."

The reaction of the U.S. Embassy has been about what might be expected. When Agee's first revelations came, U.S. Ambassador Joseph John Jova told Mexican newsmen, "You have to realize that Agee is a bitter, fired ex-employee. That's why you should take these things with a grain of salt."

But once the list was published, the embassy switched to silence. Without denying the accuracy of the list, the embassy has refused to comment on it.

Assuming the list is generally accurate, it is obvious that the work of some CIA agents has been handicapped by the loss of cover. Few Mexicans will want to keep up friendships with those on the list. The CIA obviously needs to send at least a few new agents to Mexico now.

Watergate burst a prominence to the CIA operations in Mexico. According to the House Judiciary Committee, the aides of former President Richard M. Nixon tried in vain in 1972 to persuade the Federal Bureau of Investigation that its investigation of campaign money laundered in Mexico would hurt the CIA's operations there. The CIA, however, refused to support the White House on the contention. In the Senate, Watergate Committee's investigation, Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) learned by accident that the CIA had disbanded a Washington public relations firm in 1972 because it feared that a former agent was going to reveal that the firm was acting as its cover in Mexico City. Watergate conspirator and former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt Jr. had once been identified as an employee of the firm, the

Robert Mullen Co.

The former agent who worried the CIA was Agee. Agee, now 33, resigned from the CIA in 1969 after working for the agency for 12 years in Washington, Mexico, Ecuador and Uruguay. After his resignation, Agee visited Cuba three times.

In early July, a U.S. government source told newsmen in Washington that Agee had revealed CIA secrets to a Soviet secret agent in Havana. Agee denied this and said he had visited Cuba only to gather more material for his book. The U.S. source later withdrew the accusation but said "the presumption is that he (Agee) was very forthcoming in Havana, and that Havana was very forthcoming with Moscow." In any case, the source said the CIA arranged some of its Latin American operations after Agee's visits to Cuba.

In his many press interviews and leaks of his manuscript, Agee has described Mexico as an extremely important base of operations for the CIA. "Because of the strategic importance of Mexico to the United States, its size and proximity, and the abundance of enemy (i.e., Communist) activities, the Mexico City (CIA) station is the largest in the hemisphere," Agee has said.

Agee has also characterized the relations between the CIA and the Mexican government as "exceptional," claiming that Mexican security forces collaborate closely with CIA agents. In fact, according to Agee, former President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz preferred meeting with station chief Winston Scott rather than U.S. Ambassador Fulton Freeman in the late 1960s, causing conflict between the station chief and the ambassador. This conflict man, who is now president has been denied by Free of the Monterey Institute of Foreign Studies in Monterey, Calif.

The close relationship between Scott and President Diaz Ordaz began, according to Agee, in the previous Mexican administration when Diaz Ordaz was secretary of the interior, the official in charge of Mexican security. Agee has also said that President Echeverria, when he was

WASHINGTON STAR
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A Heady but Misleading Account of the CIA

By Harry Rositzke

Special to the Star-News

According to its author, "Without Cloak or Dagger" will set the record straight on CIA's remarkable success in its operations overseas, a "balanced and accurate" inside account to place against the dismal record of publicized failures and hostile exposes. It professes to offer "the truth about the new espionage," though author Miles Copeland has stated that he left the CIA more than 17 years ago.

It is a naive and unpersuasive performance.

What emerges is the writer's main bent, as a schoolmaster. Apparently an intelligence instructor in his early days, he refers frequently to training courses, curricula, and lectures. Like any good teacher, he likes tidy rules and numbered boxes.

THE MOST ludicrous example of the author's schematic approach is his model for "the ideal espionage operation." An agent is handled, through a cutout, by a principal agent who, through a cutout, transmits both instructions from and intelligence reports to a resident who in turn contacts his "case-officer" — five points of contact and possible exposure. Ideally, the case-officer handles only one agent, though elsewhere the author notes that the best case-officer is the busiest case-officer.

The author also has a flair for making flat statements that are wrong:

- About half the agents in the world have been recruited through their wives, and many agents are wives (this is a notion, Khrushchev tells us, shared by Stalin).
- Blackmail now plays a greater role in recruiting agents than it ever did before.
- Most spies do not know what espionage service they are working for.
- Espionage services use "intelligent, emotionally stable women for a wide variety of purposes including the

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY

30 Sep 1974

UNDERCOVER: Memoirs of an American Secret Agent. E. Howard Hunt. Putnam, \$8.95

As few do, Hunt's absorbingly written memoir provides an authentic view of the hangover, in our time, of the romantic good guys vs. bad guys notion that had unquestionable validity during World War II when Hunt went on worldwide "ops" for the OSS—Mexico, China, Japan, etc. Hunt was a derring-doer in a murderous business whose "enemies list" came ready-made. It seems inevitable that the patriotic justifications would carry over from hot war to cold war—and ultimately to the Oval Office. Hunt's fast-paced narrative, read with sophis-

Books

WITHOUT CLOAK OR DAGGER. By Miles Copeland. Simon & Schuster. 351 pages. \$8.95.

seduction of prospective agents" (it is reassuring to hear that "the CIA is now out of the brothel business").

● Until the CIA developed modern methods (whatever they are), its spies were "universally unreliable."

● The British and Americans normally run operations into a country from an outside capital.

Copeland is a romantic at heart. He dresses up CIA officials with droll, nonexistent nicknames in the best spy-fiction tradition: Mother, Kingfish, Jojo, Fisherman. He casually tosses around such hip phrases as "termination with extreme prejudice (i.e., liquidation)."

A FAVORITE phrase of Copeland's is "creative intelligence." What stands out in his account of CIA operations is his own creative imagination. After asserting in his preface that the CIA cannot be as ineffective as it appears to be — otherwise, there would be no CIA — he proceeds to garnish his tale with entirely mythical examples of its great prowess, especially in operating inside the Soviet Union: The CIA sends agents into a remote Siberian village to get data on its electric supply; It runs full-time Communist Party workers as principal agents with contacts throughout the Soviet Union; it covers vast areas of the USSR and China with agents sent in by air and across the border, etc. etc.

It is all very heady.

The author's cheerfully laudatory comments on CIA performance have led some observers to see his book as a CIA built-up job. With friends like Copeland, the CIA has no need for the surfeit of enemies it now possesses.

Harry Rositzke is a former employee of the CIA.

licated hindsight (and an eye on some seemingly disingenuous passages), fascinates as it carries through his postwar CIA career (Mexico and the Guatemalan coup; the Bay of Pigs) right into Hunt's step-by-step story of Watergate and its aftermath. It hardly seems in Hunt's nature to re-examine the underlying assumptions of his lifetime of undoubted patriotic service. But few readers can escape the weight of his personal tragedy—wife dead, his life shattered. For that reason, its pungent readability and its "revelations" aside, his book seems the most moving account by any Watergate figure thus far. *National ad-promo campaign.*

[November 11]

secretary of the interior in Diaz Ordaz' administration, worked with the CIA station chief. But according to Agee this personal relationship with the CIA was broken when Echeverria took over the office of president in 1970.

This disclosure has so upset the Mexican government, Agee has said, that the Mexicans have tried to pressure his publishers to delete all references to Echeverria in the book.

Besides naming the American agents within the U.S. Embassy, Agee has said that at least 50 Mexican agents, working for the Americans, have infiltrated the Mexican government, the ruling party and other Mexican organizations.

The Ministry of the Interior issued a statement saying, "The government of Mexico does not permit and will not permit activities in our territory by any foreign agency, no matter what its origin, that tries to interfere in our internal affairs." The ministry promised an investigation of Agee's charges.

Although the government has not expelled any American on Agee's list of CIA agents, some Mexicans have been using the publicity over Agee's disclosures to blame many of Mexico's troubles on the CIA.

JAPAN TIMES

5 OCTOBER 1974

CIA Airline

BANGKOK (UPI)—A civilian airline with links to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has begun flights that include parachuting military supplies to beleaguered Khmer garrisons, officials said Friday.

A U.S. spokesman said C130 transports operated by Bird Air, headquartered in Washington State, started some supply flights from U Tapao Air Base in Thailand this week and was expected to take over the airlift from the U.S. Air Force by Oct. 14.

The Pentagon announced last week that Bird Air would fly the four-engine transports belonging to the Air Force with civilian crews under a \$1,760,000 contract. A spokesman said the move was aimed at reducing U.S. military presence in Khmer.

THE MURDER OF CHE GUEVARA ACCORDING TO MARCHETTI AND MARKS

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek 5 Sep 74 pp 32-34, 41

/Text/ EPIKAIRA starts today the exclusive publication of the most revealing document that has ever come to light on the activities of the American CIA. It concerns the book "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti and John Marks, two former CIA senior officials.

The things revealed in the 400 pages of the Marchetti and Marks book are truly shocking; so much so that the CIA tried through every legitimate and illegitimate means to prevent its publication. When the CIA found out that it could not stop publication, it resorted to the courts and asked for the deletion of 368 "hot" paragraphs which referred to specific persons and events. Publication was delayed for over a year. Finally, the courts "cut" 168 paragraphs and allowed the other 200 to go through. From the very first week of publication the book became an instant best-seller in the United States, the first book in American history to have been censored before publication.

In the two chapters published today by EPIKAIRA, the authors reveal how the CIA developed into such a powerful agency that operates beyond the law, and CIA's involvement in the capture and execution of Che Guevara in 1967 in Bolivia.

CIA: Above and Beyond the Law

A powerful and dangerous cult is currently prevalent throughout the United States--a cult which holds spying as its god. The saints of this cult are the professional agents of the CIA. Its patrons and protectors are the highest officials in the federal government. Its membership which extends beyond government circles includes leading personalities in industry, commerce, finance and labor. Its friends are many in all those sectors which exert significant influence on public opinion, the academic world and the media. The cult constitutes a secret fraternity of the American political elite.

The CIA is both the center and the main instrument of this cult. Its task is intelligence and counter-intelligence, propaganda and "provocatsia"--the deliberate distribution of false information--psychological warfare and paramilitary actions and activities. It infiltrates and manipulates private institutions, it even establishes its own organizations--known as "companies"--when this becomes necessary. It recruits agents and mercenaries. It bribes and blackmails foreign leaders to carry out the most malodorous objectives. It uses any means to accomplish those goals, without any reservations as to the methods used or as to the moral consequences of its activities. The CIA's most potent weapon is its covert intervention in the internal affairs of countries the American government wishes to control or influence.

The Presidents Lie

The cult insists on directing the US governmental affairs without informing the people and without public participation. It does not accept any checks on its activities from the legislative bodies or the press. Its followers believe that they alone have the right and the obligation to decide what is needed to serve the national interest.

The "mentality of secrecy" is cultivated in a climate of illegality and fraud. It encourages professional amorality--the belief that right objectives may be achieved by unholy and normally unacceptable means. In this way, the leaders of the cult keep their official activities out of

public view with constant vigilance.

Whenever necessary, the members of the cult--including the presidents of the United States who always know, generally approve and often inspire the more significant CIA operations--have lied without shame to protect the secret service and to conceal their own responsibility for its actions.

The Eisenhower administration lied to the American people on the CIA involvement in the Guatemala coup in 1954, on its support to the unsuccessful uprising in Indonesia in 1958 and on the mission of Gary Powers with the U-2 spy plane over Russia in 1960.

The Kennedy administration lied on the CIA role in the unsuccessful invasion in Cuba in 1961 and confessed its involvement only after the catastrophic failure of that operation.

The Johnson administration lied on the extent of the American commitments to Laos and Vietnam and totally concealed the role of the CIA.

The Nixon administration, too, lied on the CIA attempt to "manipulate" Chile's election in 1970.

For the cult followers, hypocrisy and deceit as well as secrecy are the sacred methods used to prevent the public from learning about the CIA's secret operations and to avoid any accounting on those operations by the American government.

Blunders and Luck

The absolute secrecy surrounding the CIA's activities has resulted--and continues to do so--in keeping the public from even imagining how many times the agency has failed. In the sector of classic spying, the CIA's secret services have failed dismally in their efforts to infiltrate their major targets. The Penkovsky affair in the early 1960s--the only intelligence operation against the Soviets for which the CIA can be proud--was just a "lucky break" due entirely to the British Intelligence Service. The widely-advertised operation of the Berlin tunnel in the middle 1950s--in reality it was a giant wiretapping network--resulted in meager gains in terms of significant information that could be of use to the CIA brain-trust. The true value of that operation lay in the embarrassment it caused to the KGB and the favorable publicity it brought to the CIA. Not a single intelligence success was scored against China.

The CIA secret services were more successful in counter-intelligence than in the sector of classic spying. But even in this case, the successes are mostly due to luck. Most successes were not due to CIA spies but to the good offices of escapees who divulged all they knew in exchange for gaining safety for themselves.

In the CIA's favorite sector of covert activities, the operatives scored their greatest successes but it is also true that their blunders and failures often very seriously embarrassed the United States.

Specifically, the CIA played a basic role in keeping Western Europe outside the Iron Curtain following the first Cold War period, although it failed dismally in its efforts to push back the Iron Curtain as well as the Bamboo Curtain in the late 1940s and in the 1950s. It also succeeded, by questionable means, in its effort to prevent communist expansion in other parts of the world.

Even Against the USA

Some of its "successes," however, boomeranged and hit the American government itself. It is hard to understand how the CIA braintrust failed to realize that it would have been more prudent for the agency not to get involved in Guatemala, Cuba or Chile, to avoid its secret role in Iran or in other parts of the Middle East and to avoid getting so deeply involved in the internal affairs of Southeast Asia and especially in Indonesia. But

the CIA became involved and the American nation has to live with the consequences of those activities.

More recently, the Watergate investigation revealed some of the CIA secret operations within the US itself and presented a terrifying picture of the methods used by the CIA for so many years in other countries. Its assistance to the White House "plumbers" and the attempt to put all the blame for the cover-up on the CIA revealed to the American public the dangers involved for a democracy in an inadequately controlled secret intelligence agency. The issue is simple: Should the CIA operate in keeping with its original objectives--as a coordinating agency responsible for gathering, evaluating and processing information for the perusal of the appropriate officials as they formulate government policies--or should it be allowed to operate in this fashion for so many years as a secret instrument of the White House and of a clique of powerful individuals who are not subject to accounting for their actions and whose main objective is to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries--and possibly of the United States as well--through agents, propaganda, covert paramilitary interventions and all kinds of dirty tricks?

Hunting Che in Bolivia

When Ernesto "Che" Guevara disappeared from the political stage in Cuba in the spring of 1965 nobody could give a specific explanation. Some reports said that the Argentine revolutionary, a physician and a comrade-in-arms of Fidel Castro, had challenged the authority of the Cuban leader and that he had been imprisoned or executed as a result. Other reports claimed that Guevara had lost his mind and with no hope of recovery he had been confined to a country villa in one of Cuba's provinces. Some other reports said that Che had formed a band of devoted followers and had left Cuba to start another revolution somewhere else.

At first the people in the CIA did not know what to believe. But gradually some information on Guevara's whereabouts began to filter in from the CIA field stations. The clues were loose and imprecise but they all seemed to point to Africa. In the Republic of the Congo (today's Zaire) another uprising had broken out and the reports from the CIA agents there indicated the presence of foreign revolutionaries. Some of their methods and tactics revealed Guevara's unique style. But the uprising fizzled out suddenly before one could verify those reports. By the fall of 1965 that area was calm again. But the CIA mercenaries--some of them "Bay of Pigs" veterans--who assisted the Congolese government in putting down the uprising were convinced, and so were their superiors in Washington, that Che was indeed in that area.

It was later that the CIA learned that Che Guevara and a band of over 100 revolutionaries had slipped into the Congo from neighboring Tanzania in the spring of 1965. Their objective was to spark a general uprising in Africa but their revolutionary zeal found no worthy imitators among the native guerrillas and the local population. Disillusioned, Che returned secretly 6 months later to Cuba to make plans for his next adventure. At that time, however, all that the CIA knew was that he had disappeared again. Once again conflicting reports regarding his role, his health, etc, began to reach the CIA. In early 1967, reports reaching the agency pointed to the heart of South America--to Bolivia.

Many of the CIA officials in charge of secret operations were convinced that Guevara was the brain behind the guerrilla movement in Bolivia's southern mountains but some of the CIA top leaders were reluctant to agree. In spite of this climate of doubt, some CIA special operations agents were sent to Bolivia to assist the local forces in their fight against the guerrillas. Ironically, not even the then president of Bolivia, Rene Barrientos, believed that Guevara was involved in the guerrilla movement.

Two months later, in April 1967, two events dramatically reaffirmed the belief of the CIA agents in Bolivia as well as in the CIA headquarters

that Guevara was the leader of the guerrillas. At the beginning of the month, a unit of the Bolivian army captured the guerrilla base in Nandachausu [transliteration] where they found a wealth of documents, pictures and diaries left by the guerrillas as they fled. Included in the material seized by the army were pictures of a slightly balding gray-haired man with glasses who bore a striking resemblance to Guevara, as an exhaustive study of the pictures revealed. Moreover, two fingerprints seemed to resemble those of Guevara. The documents further revealed that some of the guerrillas operating in Bolivia were Cubans, possibly the same individuals that had gone to the Congo with Guevara.

Ten days later, the French leftist journalist Regie Debre was arrested near Muupamba [transliteration] together with two other foreigners who were suspected of having contacts with the guerrillas. Debre had disappeared a few months after he had come to Bolivia to collect material for a geopolitical study. As he stated several months later, Debre escaped execution thanks to the intervention of the CIA operatives who accompanied the Bolivian forces which arrested him. Those CIA agents later showed him certain confidential data which convinced him that the CIA knew much more about his activities abroad and especially in Bolivia than he could ever imagine. Debre initially refused to admit that he knew anything at all about Guevara's involvement in the guerrilla movement. But soon he gave in and started talking in an effort to save himself from being tried and executed.

The clues were coming in fast. But the CIA director, Richard Helms, continued to refuse to believe that the legendary revolutionary had indeed appeared again and that he was leading another revolt. Helms derided the reports of the field agents who claimed to have in their hands proof of Guevara's presence in Bolivia. Helms was of the opinion that Guevara was probably dead.

But Thomas Karamesinis, chief of secret operations in the CIA at that time, who had presented the case to Helms, did not give up his conviction that his agents were on Guevara's trail. Other CIA "advisors," some of them Bay of Pigs veterans, were soon dispatched to Bolivia to help in tracking down Guevara. A group of specialists from the American Army Special Forces came to La Paz from the Canal Zone to train Bolivian commandos in anti-guerrilla warfare.

The secret services were obsessed with Guevara, and in a way they were afraid of him. He was a constant, irritating reminder of their Bay of Pigs failure. Unable to vent their anger on the American officials who had undertaken that desperate operation, and without any possibility of getting even by destroying Castro himself or his Soviet or Chinese allies, the CIA Secret Services continued to deplore their failure--until the reappearance of Guevara offered a provocative target to the CIA. His arrest or death would give the CIA an opportunity to take revenge for past failures.

A \$4,200 Reward

In the summer of 1967, while the men of the CIA Special Operations division were helping the Bolivian army in its pursuit of Guevara, reports came in regarding the way he had entered Bolivia. It was made known that he had arrived in La Paz in November 1966 from Havana by way of Prague, Frankfurt and Sao Paolo, traveling with a false Paraguayan passport and disguised as a bald, gray-haired bespectacled merchant--totally different from his familiar appearance on posters. Fifteen other Cubans had preceded him to help him with the Bolivian operation.

There was no longer any doubt that Che Guevara was in Bolivia, leading the guerrilla movement in the country's southern region. The Bolivian government offered a reward of \$4,200 for Che Guevara--dead or alive. Now his extermination was only a matter of time.

In the following months the guerrillas met one defeat after another at the hands of the Bolivian commandos who had been trained by the Americans and

were assisted by CIA advisors. One encounter on the last day of August ended with the death of the mysterious Tania, the only woman in Guevara's guerrilla band. Although she appeared as a Cuban secret agent, a liaison between the guerrillas and Havana, it was at last revealed that this East German woman was in reality a double agent. Her main employer was the Soviet KGB which--like the CIA--wanted to keep an eye on the Cuba-financed revolutionary activities of Guevara in Latin America. Less than 6 weeks later, on 8 October, Guevara himself was wounded and captured near the small mountain village of La Higuera.

As with Debre earlier, the CIA advisors who were with the Bolivian army tried to bring Guevara alive back to La Paz for an in depth investigation. But the commander of the Bolivian units had orders to execute him. The only proof he had to bring back was the head and the hands--irrefutable proof that Guevara was dead.

While the CIA advisors were trying to delay the Bolivian colonel, the chief of the CIA field station in La Paz was trying to persuade President Barrientos of the long-term advantages to be gained by having Guevara moved from the mountains to the capital as the government's prisoner. But Barrientos was adamant. He claimed that Debre's case had caused him enough headaches and Guevara's arrival at the capital alive might possibly set off demonstrations by university students and leftists--demonstrations that the government might find impossible to contain.

Desperate, the field station chief turned for help that same evening to the CIA headquarters at Langley but to no avail. Convinced that neither the field station nor the Washington headquarters could convince Barrientos, the CIA chief agent at La Higuera...made an effort to interrogate Che. But the revolutionary did not appear willing to cooperate. He was willing to talk about political philosophies and the revolutionary movements in general but he refused to give any information on the details of his Bolivian operation or on his previous activities in other areas. The CIA had to be content with his personal diary which he carried at the time of his arrest.

Che Is Executed

The final decision came from the capital early the next morning. The prisoner was to be executed on the spot and his body, tied to the landing gear of a helicopter, was to be transferred to Villagrande for identification by a small group of journalists and government representatives. Then the body was to be buried in a nameless grave outside the city. As soon as the CIA agent learned of this order...rushed to the school building where Guevara was being held and made a last attempt to interrogate the prisoner. There was not much time left. The execution would take place in a couple of hours.

Guevara's last moments are described in a rare, moving report sent by the agent to the CIA headquarters. The Cuban, a veteran CIA liaison officer, remarked that Guevara was certain at the beginning that somehow he was going to come out alive from this ordeal. But when he finally realized that he was about to die, his pipe slipped from his mouth. But soon he regained his composure and asked for some tobacco. His painful leg wound seemed no longer to bother him. He accepted his fate with a stoic sigh, without asking for any last favor. The agent...apparently felt admiration and compassion for the man whose capture and execution he had aided. A few minutes later Che Guevara was dead.

The following summer Che's diary appeared suddenly and quickly reached the hands of his comrades in Havana and some of his American admirers--the magazine RAMPARTS--which immediately verified its authenticity and began its publication, to the great discomfort of the CIA and of the Bolivian government which had made public only those parts which supported their charges against Guevara and his guerrillas. In the confusion of conflicting accusations, Antonio Argentas, the Bolivian minister of interior, disappeared in July while an orgy of rumors identified him as the man who had given the diary for publication. As minister of interior, Argentas

was the chief of the Bolivian Secret Service which had close ties with the CIA. Argentas himself was a CIA agent.

It soon became known that Argentas had escaped to Chile where he intended to seek political asylum. But the Chilean authorities delivered Argentas to the CIA field station and the agent who was initially his superior was immediately dispatched from the Washington CIA headquarters to bring him back to his senses. But in spite of the CIA admonitions, Argentas continued to speak in public against the CIA and its activities in Bolivia. He denounced the Barrientos regime as an instrument of American imperialism, criticized the government for its handling of the Guevara case and then he disappeared again, causing a serious political crisis in Bolivia. During 1968, Argentas appeared from time to time in London, New York and Peru. Sometimes deriding and sometimes threatening the CIA agents in every field station who were trying to keep him from talking, the former minister confessed that he was the one who made Che's diary public. He claimed that he did so because he agreed with the motives of the revolutionary and with his effort to impose popular social, political and economic changes in Bolivia and in the other countries of Latin America. In the end, to the consternation of the CIA and the Barrientos government, he revealed that he had been a CIA agent since 1965 and that some other Bolivian politicians were also included in the CIA's payroll. He described the circumstances of his recruitment and he revealed that the CIA had threatened to disclose his radical past as a university student and thus destroy his political career if he did not agree to become an agent. Finally the CIA came to some agreement with Argentas who returned voluntarily to Bolivia-- apparently to stand trial.

During the flight from Lima to La Paz, Argentas told a NEW YORK TIMES reporter that in the event "something happened" to him, a tape recording with all his charges against the CIA and the Barrientos government would be delivered to certain persons in the United States and in Cuba. The tape, he said, was in the custody of Lieutenant Mario Teran. Strangely, Teran had been previously identified as the man who executed Guevara.

In his interview, Argentas hinted at the extent of his potential revelations by disclosing the names of several CIA officials with whom he had worked together in the past: Hugo Murrey, field station chief, John Hilton, former field station chief, Larry Sternfield and Nick Lendiris. He also revealed the identity of some CIA liaison officers who had assisted in the capture of Guevara: Joli Gabriel Garcia, a Cuban, and Edie and Mario Gonzales, Bolivians. Argentas also stated that the Gonzales brothers had saved Debre's life. He claimed, however, that Barrientos and even the American ambassador did not know the full extent of the CIA's infiltration into the Bolivian government.

The last act of the story was written the following summer, almost 2 years after the death of Che Guevara. President Barrientos was killed when his helicopter crashed on his return from a tour. Six weeks later, Antonio Argentas, by his own admission a CIA agent who was to be tried for treason and for the publication of the Guevara diary, was murdered in one of La Paz' narrow back streets. A month later, Herberto Rojas, the guide of the Bolivian commandos and of their CIA advisors in the search for Guevara and one of the very few people who probably knew where the revolutionary leader was buried, was murdered in Santa Cruz.

The tapes with the incriminating evidence, which Argentas claimed to have entrusted to Mario Teran, disappeared.

GENERAL

LONDON OBSERVER
13 October 1974

Opium film as hint to US

by our Foreign Staff

COPIES of the television film 'The Opium War-Lords,' shot in Burma by two young Britons and screened by ATV last week, are being flown to the United States in an attempt to rouse official and public interest in the startling offer it contains.

In interviews in the film, officers of the rebellious Shan State Army (SSA) undertake to destroy the region's poppy crop, believed a major source of the heroin sold illegally to addicts on the streets of America.

In return, the SSA wants \$12 million (about £4,500,000) and American help towards 'a permanent solution' of its prolonged rebellion against the Burmese central Government.

With the co-operation of SSA, the two British filmmakers, Mr Chris Menges and Mr Adrian Cowell, spent more than a year in Shan State filming the conflict between rival war-lords centred on the opium convoys heading towards America's illegal drugs market. The two also brought out a written statement of the SSA's offer.

But the American Narcotics Bureau, Mr Cowell says, at first showed no interest in the plan. When pressure was applied by Mr Lester Wolff, a New York Democrat and chairman of the House of Representatives narcotics sub-committee, the bureau considered the SSA plan—and rejected it.

At this point, neither Mr Wolff nor the bureau had seen the British film, which many viewers believe adds a great deal to the credibility of the Shan State's Army's plan.

The hope now is that the



film will be shown on America's national networks, enabling Mr Wolff—if he is returned to the House at the coming elections—to revive the issue.

Mr Cowell says Mr Wolff is willing to meet some of the Shan leaders at the Thailand border. It might be possible to persuade them to send representatives to the US and talk about their offer.

At least a third of the world's illegal narcotics supplies are produced in this area of Burma and the quantity passing through the Shan area each year amounts to about 400 tons, in the form of opium. The total production of Turkey—now the primary concern of Mr Wolff's sub-committee—is only about 100 tons.

The 400 tons of opium the SSA and its allies are now offering to burn, under international supervision, is the equivalent of 40 tons of heroin, which would be worth about £400 million sold on the streets of America. In addition, American efforts to impede the illegal drugs traffic cost vast sums of money every year.

Our Washington correspondent tells us that American opposition to the plan is based on the belief that an operation aimed at acquiring and destroying the whole of the tribesmen's poppy crop could not be made to work.

It is also feared that much of the money would be used to buy arms for use in the Shan rebellion—to which the Burmese Government would obviously raise the strongest objections.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 October 1974

Ford, Moscow and Peking

WASHINGTON

By James Reston

WASHINGTON, Oct. 26—The relations between the United States and both the Soviet Union and China have changed in subtle ways since President Ford moved into the White House.

Washington's policy toward the two major Communist states remains the same, but Moscow and Peking are being very cautious about Mr. Ford, who is a new figure on the world stage, and they are wondering what he's like, how long he will last and who will succeed him.

All the civilities and diplomatic courtesies of the last couple of years were extended to Secretary of State Kissinger in his latest mission to Moscow, but progress toward the control of nuclear arms was slight, at best, and for obvious reasons.

Any really serious agreement to end the nuclear arms race could not begin to be effective for two or three years, and it would limit freedom of action for the major nuclear powers thereafter, but who would be President of the United States in three years? Mr. Ford, whom the Soviets don't know, or maybe even "Scoop" Jackson, the Democratic Senator from Washington, who is regarded in Moscow with almost as much suspicion as Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.

So there is a pause now in talks among representatives of the big continental and nuclear nations. Nobody knows what is going to happen after the departure of Gerald Ford in Washington or the aged leaders in Peking. They are all willing to meet but not to decide, and particularly not to lock themselves into long-range policies for a future nobody can foresee.

There is another change in the recent propaganda of both Moscow and Peking. They seldom agree these days in their relations with one another, but lately they have been agreeing about the economic crisis in the capitalist world. Both have been dramatizing the problems of inflation in Europe, the United States and Japan; the crises of colonialism in Portugal; the transition from fascism to monarchy in Spain.

Both have also been supporting the Arab oil states against the industrial capitalist states and seeing in the "energy crisis" a new economic opportunity to weaken the free world, and a new strategic opportunity to blockade Europe, Japan, and even the United States at the source of their oil and industrial power in the Middle East.

Leonid Brezhnev, by all reports, was very tough on Mr. Kissinger in Moscow. He was bitter about Senator Jackson's insistence on the immigration of 60,000 Jews a year from the Soviet Union to Israel and astonished that Mr. Jackson would be allowed to come out on the White House steps and define, inaccurately, the compromise. Mr. Kissinger was furious about this and President Ford ignored it at

first and finally had to correct it, but Mr. Kissinger had to deal with this confusion when he got to Moscow.

President Ford, out campaigning for Republicans in Congress, is not really putting his mind to this world problem. He is looking for Republican seats in the House and Senate, and arguing that somehow this will help deal with these larger world questions.

The truth is that even his own Cabinet, which is also trying to deal with inflation, the balance of payments, the Russians and the Chinese, thinks that he is not only wasting his time but is raising doubts about his judgment.

In the next two or three years, the leadership of the United States, China and probably the Soviet Union, is going to pass from the old generation to the new. In the United States, it may pass from Gerald Ford to Nelson Rockefeller, to Henry Jackson, or even to a third-party conservative coalition of Ronald Reagan and George Wallace. In China, it may even pass from the anti-Soviet leadership of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai to a new military junta that will revive the Soviet-Chinese Communist alliance against the West.

Nobody knows, so everybody is waiting. Mr. Kissinger hoped when he came to Washington that he was going to define and organize arrangements for the coming world, but it is not working out exactly as he had hoped.

There is no political, economic or financial stability in the world today.

Last year, it seemed that the major powers were coming together on the control of arms and the avoidance of war, and they are still trying to do so. But on the problems of food, energy and population, and on the organization of a new order of the world, they are still deeply divided.

In fact, the political trend now is toward division and confrontation. The Communists are seeking economic disarray of the capitalist world as confirmation of their Marxist prophecies. The Jacksons and Reagans in America are swinging American politics toward nationalism and anti-Communism, and the Russians and Chinese are watching all this with their usual skepticism.

The result is that no big deals about disarmament or anything else are likely to be made in the next few years with either the Russians or the Chinese or even the Europeans. They know that American power in the world is probably decisive, both economically and militarily, but they don't know how President Ford is going to use that power or who is going to succeed him.

So the Russians have been polite with Mr. Kissinger in Moscow, and the Indians will probably also be polite in the next few days, and so will the Chinese when he goes to Peking later on. But nobody is in a mood now to make any long-range commitments. We are now in a holding operation for the next few years, waiting to find out who is going to come after the temporary leaders who now preside over the major capitals of the world.

Western Europe

NEW YORK TIMES

27 October 1974

Europe's Communists Adjust, for Power's Sake

By ANDRE FONTAINE

PARIS—Lenin in his day denounced the treason of the Social Democrats and broke with them because they rejected what he saw as inescapable recourse to violence and instead accepted "class collaboration." What would he say today seeing the Communist parties of the Latin part of Europe set out, one after the other, on the very road he condemned?

The French Communist party has just held in a Paris suburb an extraordinary congress, the first in its history. Its objective was to turn into durable strategy, not to say doctrine, the political line that has led to its alliance with the Socialist party and aims to gain power legally, even if it is shared. The French Communist chief, Georges Marchais, does not hesitate to reduce to mere "nuances" the past disagreements of his party with Charles de Gaulle to be able to invite "the authentic Gaullists" to join the union of the left.

The Italian Communist party is going even further. While in France it is a case of having the right beaten by the left, the Communists of the Italian peninsula are campaigning for an "historical compromise" with the Christian Democrats in order to avert a threat to existing freedoms posed from the extreme right.

The same game is played by the Spanish Communist party, now reconciled with the Kremlin after a long quarrel. The party's boss, Santiago Carillo, has taken up contacts in almost all quarters, including the army. And, together with Rafael Calvo Serer, the Catholic and monarchist who was one of the founders of the famous Opus Dei and one of the pillars of the Franco regime, he has constituted a "junta of national union" which aspires to govern the country after the Caudillo has left the scene.

Finally in Portugal, the Communist party is already partaking in power through its Secretary General, Alvaro Cunhal, back from a long exile in Prague immediately after the fall of the Caetano regime. In a short time he has become the principal political force in the country and has officially rejected all references to "the dictatorship of the proletariat," a notion going back to Marx and as fundamental to Leninist thought as that of class struggle.

The Rise of the 'Maoists'

As always when an extreme left movement modifies its political line, a more extremist movement arises on its left. That is the case in all four countries. In France, the radicalism that had its high point in May, 1968, appears to have lost ground since and the "Maoists" are now only a handful. But "gauchiste" influence has much increased inside of the rejuvenated Socialist party.

In Italy and in Portugal, the old anarchist heritage

is surfacing. Particularly in Lisbon, there is not a day when the radical press does not denounce "revisionist" compromises. In Spain, the clandestine nature of politics does not permit a clear idea of the balance of forces, but a Marxist-Leninist party favorable to the Peking's ideas does exist, especially among the Basque separatists responsible for the assassination of Premier Carrero Blanco. These groups do not hesitate to resort to armed action.

It is significant that the softening of the Communists' doctrinal positions comes when everywhere in Mediterranean Europe they are closer to power and in Portugal share it already. Violence does not seem necessary when the inability of capitalist states to face world economic crises and social imbalances is leading a growing number of voters to put faith in those who promise them a society, at once more equitable and more rational.

Elementary tactical intelligence should thus suffice to lead the Communist parties to adopt a moderate line that respects existing institutions. But doubtless there is more: The party workers and Communist leaders—it is enough to watch them in the flesh to be convinced of this—have not escaped the sociological changes of the Western countries. The time of the robots remote-controlled from Moscow, if it ever existed, died with the myth of Stalinist infallibility. It is, incidentally, manifest that in the East there is too much need for Western technology and capital for there to be much encouragement for violent adventures: The Chilean tragedy is still too much in the minds of all the Communist leaders, and who knows how the United States would react?

The Americans, it would seem, find themselves embarrassed by the erosion of their positions in Mediterranean Europe. For having recklessly bet on regimes cut off from all popular roots, they lost, two vital bridgeheads. Admittedly Portugal has stated its intention to remain in NATO, in spite of the presence in its government of a Communist Deputy Premier. As to Greece, if it has left NATO, like France it remains a member of the Atlantic alliance, and the vigor with which the Communists are denouncing as premature the Greek elections scheduled for November confirms the impression that they have little chance of winning more than 15 per cent of the seats. However, in both cases, the Soviet Union has applauded the downfall of dictatorships while the United States cannot wield as much influence on the new teams as it did over the old.

If, added to this, the precarious situation on Cyprus is taken into account, where the local Communist party can take advantage of the idea prevalent on the island that it was the Central Intelligence Agency that encouraged the coup against Archbishop Makarios, the balance sheet appears negative for the United States. The United States would be wrong, though, to view those events through the spectacles of the Cold War. Much as the Eastern Communist regimes are keeping their distance vis-à-vis the Soviet model, the West European parties are differentiating themselves as they approach power and ally themselves with other political groupings.

It is significant that in France, where the current in favor of the left has been so powerful over the last 18 months, the Communist party has regressed rather than progressed in elections, whereas the Socialist party—supposed to be its "hostage" according to government spokesmen—has registered a spectacular advance. This means that the memories of the Stalin era and of the invasion of Czechoslovakia still weigh on the image of the French Communist party. Perhaps it cannot enlarge its area of influence without establishing more clearly the distance between itself and the superpower of which it used to proclaim itself the unconditional ally. If that day came, many things would change, not only in France but in all of Europe, perhaps inclusive of the Europe east of the Iron Curtain.

Andre Fontaine is managing editor of *Le Monde*. This article was translated by the Paris bureau of *The New York Times*.

NEW YORK TIMES

27 OCT 1974

The U.S. Is Scouting Iberian Regimes

The extent of existing and potential Communist influence in Portugal's new regime is known to worry Secretary of State Kissinger, so much so that he has sent a four-man mission to Lisbon to scout the situation; there is anxiety as well in Washington over the political uncertainty in Spain.

The instability on the Iberian Peninsula could create doubt about the continued existence of a number of United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization military bases. During the Cyprus fighting, Greece withdrew from NATO, and American ships have since been prevented from using anchorages there.

In Spain, the United States has four installations, among them one at Rota, home for Polaris submarines, and an air base at Torrejon near Madrid. Under present age agreements, which are to be renegotiated starting Nov. 4, the United States has given the Franco Government about \$1-billion in military and economic aid since 1970. Spain, not a member of NATO, would like to extend the present arrangement in the form of a mutual defense treaty, something the United States has so far avoided.

In Portugal's Azores Islands, the United States leases the Lajes Air Base. In return for a five-year renewal of the lease, Portugal wants increased aid in an amount not yet made public.

Both Spain and Portugal say that, despite their desire for change, they want to keep their military ties to the United States. President Francisco de Costa Gomes of Portugal, on his return from the United Nations and Washington last week, took care to stress the importance he placed on his country's NATO link.

But other influential members of the new military regime are not so enthusiastic about the American presence, either military or diplomatic. They have expressed fear that Washington might start to treat Portugal like Cuba or Chile.

Brig. Gen. Otelo de Carvalho, head of the Lisbon garrison, said: "The Americans have a morbid terror of Communism, and have a series of organs to fight against it. The C.I.A., which uses the most incredible methods—and you only have to look at the example of Chile—is probably the most dangerous, but it is not the only one."

NEW YORK TIMES
27 October 1974

3 Men in an Aegean Boat

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—The most urgent task Henry Kissinger has set himself on his current diplomatic foray is moving the Cyprus crisis along the path to peaceful settlement, thereby healing a serious breach in NATO. The undertaking's magnitude may not compare with the ultimate goals sought in continued talks with Russia; but the immediate dangers of failure are great.

Mr. Kissinger's efforts to get some motion on Cyprus have been delayed by two things. First, the United States Congress sought to impose a handicap on Presidential policy-making by abrupt termination of aid to Turkey. This would have removed a principal trump from the Secretary of State's hand as he began negotiations. Even now he has very limited leeway but at least he is not in a position of appearing to be an outright bully to the Turks, something he must avoid.

The second obstacle has been Turkey's failure to replace the Ecevit Government after it resigned. Mr. Ecevit's widespread popularity, stemming from the landings in Cyprus, nevertheless hasn't yet enabled him to make a deal with other party leaders and his parliamentary backing remains a minority pending next spring's elections.

Thus, curiously, the politics of Turkey where a strongman seemed to be emerging, have proved to be a greater hurdle than the politics of Greece, where an entire system of government has been replaced. Mr. Kissinger desperately hopes to see a new Turkish Cabinet formed under Mr. Ecevit within the next few days so he can include Ankara—and perhaps Athens—on his forthcoming schedule and pull Cyprus away from the brink.

No contemporary Greek leader save Constantine Caramanlis, the provisional Premier running for formal leadership in the Nov. 17 elections, the first in many years, has the strength and prestige to get a sensible deal with Turkey accepted by the Greeks. Therefore Mr. Kissinger hopes to obtain some yield from the Turks by early November, in order to improve Mr. Caramanlis's vote-getting position and set the stage for Greco-Turkish talks.

Before Mr. Ecevit's resignation, he had already promised Mr. Kissinger initial concessions. It wasn't entirely simple for him because of his political situation and also because he had initially offered a cantonal solution after the first Turkish landing in Cyprus.

This was a plan to split the island into mixed provinces with the largest of the five dominated by Turkish-speakers situated in the north. But when Mr. Kissinger passed the formula on to James Callaghan, chairman of the first Cyprus peace talks in Geneva, the British Foreign Secretary failed to present the paper.

Mr. Kissinger's margin of maneuver is very slender. Congress has put a time limit on future Turkish aid—unless Ankara budges considerably on Cyprus. This has irked many Turks who talk of quitting NATO completely. The Greeks themselves have already withdrawn from the alliance's military commands but are moving very slowly to implement their decision.

The Secretary of State's chances of cutting the Cyprian knot depend almost wholly on two men: Mr. Ecevit as Premier in Turkey and Mr. Caramanlis as head of the first parliamentary government Greece has had since 1967.

Curiously enough, although both may seem to symbolize vigorous nationalism and somewhat anti-American feelings in their own countries, they are also acknowledged to be realistic, strong-willed and possessing broad vision. And Mr. Kissinger's reputation as a diplomatic miracle-maker rides along with them.

Mr. Kissinger, aware of the political intricacies inside Greece and Turkey and of the ancient passions involved, was quietly proceeding along lines desired by an emotional Congress responsible to well-organized American lobbies.

But Congress did not sufficiently appreciate either the present complexities or the past historical background. Professor Arnold Toynbee wrote in 1923 ("The Western Question in Greece and Turkey") words that could apply today in Cyprus:

The Greeks have shown the same unfitness as the Turks for governing a mixed population . . . The herd instinct can be relied on, as it cannot be in the West, to override the interest and judgment of the individual . . . Each nation fears that its own hostages in the other's territory may be ill-treated and that the other's hostages in its own territory may undermine its sovereignty, and such expectations have a fatal tendency to realize themselves . . .

The United States Congress is perhaps less acquainted with this background than it ought to be. But then, as Toynbee also wrote: "Western sentiment about the Greeks and the Turks is for the most part ill-informed, violently expressed and dangerously influential."

Near East

NEW YORK TIMES
27 October 1974

Subcontinent's Leaders Face The Enemies Within



The
Smartest
Around

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

By BERNARD WEINRAUB

RAWALPINDI — Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan rarely goes to bed before 2 or 3 in the morning, and sometimes he hardly sleeps at all. He prowls his official residence, reading documents, leafing through American news magazines, writing statements, abruptly phoning foreign diplomats about food imports or arms supplies or aid.

Within the past few weeks, Mr. Bhutto has been particularly busy. He has stepped up his pleas to the United States to relax the ban on arms sales to coincide with the visit this week of Secretary of State Kissinger to India and Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto visited Baluchistan, the most troubled province in Pakistan, and announced that "organized" resistance by anti-Government rebels had ended. He has expressed readiness to hold talks with India over the perennial Kashmir issue. At the same time he has been exultant over a quiet but significant breakthrough in Indo-Pakistani relations: the resumption of telephone and postal links between the two nations after a break of nearly three years.

Mr. Bhutto's activity — he makes pronouncements and calls news conferences with the abandon of a New York city mayoral candidate — is a measure of the style and pace of Pakistani politics. After three years in power, and after taking over a divided and undisciplined nation, Mr. Bhutto has thrust Pakistan forward and sought to shape a new identity for the country of 70 million. The results are mixed.

Pakistan's internal problems are glaring. The nation, with an annual per capita income of about \$110 and illiteracy that totals nearly 80 per cent, is impoverished and riven with despair. One out of every four babies dies before the age of five.

Nevertheless, Pakistan's economic position seems surprisingly bright, compared with that of her neighbors. Inflation is running at 25 per cent annually, but the Government subsidizes such essentials as wheat, flour, vegetable oil and sugar.

Pakistan says she needs to import about a million tons of wheat, but this is because the current record crop of about 8 million tons was below expectations. Pakistan does not suffer from the large-scale food problems of India or Bangladesh.

Even the oil price increase has been less damaging to Pakistan than to her neighbors. The cost of Pakistan's

imports will reach \$385-million next year, but loans from two fellow Islamic nations, Iran and Saudi Arabia, will help.

Although the economy has proved surprisingly buoyant, Pakistan is weighted down by internal troubles. Rebellious tribesmen in Baluchistan resent Mr. Bhutto's efforts to gain firm central control in the state, which could be a potential source of oil.

There are troubles along the Afghan border, persistent Pakistani fears of being swallowed up by India, and a consistent need by Pakistan to feed her own military machine.

Without American arms, Mr. Bhutto relies on China for weapons as well as support. The relationship is based on the mutual fear of Soviet involvement on the subcontinent and the anxiety, on Mr. Bhutto's part, that Moscow is stepping up its role in the area.

As an independent magazine, Outlook, commented last spring in a discussion that dealt with the enduring angers on the subcontinent that trap India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: "It is a bizarre setting in which cupboards full of poverty-stricken skeletons are rattling with the din of sophisticated and outdated armaments. Countries which cannot afford to provide two square meals a day to their teeming millions are wrapped up in visions of hegemony, spheres of 'peace' and their 'manifest destiny.'" The magazine, like several opposition newspapers, has since been banned.

Bhutto supporters assert that the 1971 Bangladesh war, when Pakistan lost her eastern wing, still affects the nation.

Bhutto critics point out that several assassination attempts have been made on his key opponent, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, leader of the National Awami party, whose strongholds are Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier province. Lesser opposition figures have been "bullied" and tough security police generally forbid large public gatherings. Defenders of Mr. Bhutto, however, and even some of his critics, maintain that the Prime Minister is adept and pragmatic, and his singular achievement remains impressive: He has restored some self-respect to a nation that was an object of scorn three years ago.



The
Pivotal
Figure

Indira Gandhi

NEW DELHI—She has been called the Empress of India and the most powerful woman in the world. In New Delhi, she is known as "Mrs. G." or "Mataji," Big Mother.

Whatever the title, Indira Gandhi remains the pivotal figure in the nation of 580 million, a woman who has plainly decided to move in new directions at home and abroad. To Prime Minister Gandhi, the changes are necessary because India's economy is in a shambles, food scarcities are growing, the mood in the cities where inflation is climbing annually at 30 per cent, seems bleak and uneasy.

India is hardly on the verge of revolution, but the nation does face a deepening crisis. To avert it, Mrs. Gandhi has reshuffled her Cabinet, cracked down on smugglers, sought to fragment her political opposition and in foreign affairs, seems bent on easing relations with the United States.

Beyond these shifts, and intertwined with them, is a persistent and melancholy criticism that the idealism and adventure in democracy of the 1950's has turned cynical, that too many people are going hungry, that there are too many allegations of corruption and manipulation and police activities. Government allocations to maintain law and order have doubled in the past five years, and climbed by 52 times in the last 24 years, a figure termed "alarming" by a parliamentary committee.

"The nation is adrift," said one columnist. Jayaprakash Narayan, an ailing figure whose prominence dates to the time of Mahatma Gandhi, has abruptly emerged politically to frighten the Congress party. He said the other night that Jawaharlal Nehru "was one hundred times more democratic" than his daughter, Mrs. Gandhi, who has served as India's

Mrs. Gandhi's problems at home are immense. The

nation needs anywhere from 5 to 10 million tons of food imports to avoid widespread starvation. The population is growing by 13 million each year, and per capita food consumption is steadily declining. Industrial growth is negligible, despite sizable assistance. Land reforms have failed. Shortages of water, seeds and fertilizer have throttled the "green revolution."

Mrs. Gandhi's critics place much of the blame for the nation's faltering policies on radical—and unkept—promises such as "Garibi Hatao," or "Abolish Poverty." "The appeal of the Garibi Hatao promise was based on the fact that it articulated the vast needs of society," Rajni Kothari, a prominent political scientist said. "The violence, that is engulfing the country is the result of the Government's failure to even make a start in fulfilling that promise."

Perhaps the key criticism of Mrs. Gandhi is that the Government has twisted its priorities and has concentrated on the development of heavy industry despite the fact that India is an agrarian nation: 80 per cent of the populace lives on farms.

To critics, the symbol of India's distorted priorities was the nuclear blast on May 18. Indians insist that the blast was "for peaceful purposes" but the Government obviously weighed the propaganda and military impact of the surprise move. As the Economic and Political Weekly said recently: "Deaths from starvation are taking place. No famine is going to be declared. But officially the country will continue its 'progress.'"

"This year it was the first nuclear implosion followed by [the takeover of] Sikkim. Next year, perhaps, it will be an Indian version of the sputnik, and we will have arrived in space. Once you have attained such heights, people and their need for food must indeed seem remote and trivial."

The annual outlay for agriculture has dwindled. Last year, for example, it was about \$1.03-billion. This year it amounts to \$850-million.

In fairness to Mrs. Gandhi, who remains an aloof and chilly figure, the task of dealing with India's poverty is extraordinarily difficult. "I think that the only reason I'm able to survive this with equanimity is that I'm just myself, regardless of the situation in the country," she has said. "I know the condition of the people. There's nothing I can see that I don't know about already. It's not that you don't feel it but—it's like a nurse and illness. You see it in perspective."

To Mrs. Gandhi's numerous critics, however, the recent steps taken by the Prime Minister are cynical gestures to cope with India's emergency. Yes, critics say, Mrs. Gandhi has finally reshuffled her Cabinet and placed Jagjivan Ram, a tough and powerful figure, in the key post of Food Minister, a position that has too often been held by inept figures. But the Cabinet, the critics add, consists of merely the same old faces in new jobs.


Even critics have welcomed the crackdown on smugglers, whose illicit trade threatened to damage the economy. But there is resentment that the pay-offs by the smugglers, and the alleged involvement of government officials, is ignored.

Moreover, the seizure of the smugglers under emergency measures coupled with the increased use of such laws to arbitrarily arrest strikers, students and terrorist suspects as well as the dismissal of an anti-Government newspaper editor, B. G. Verghese, have spurred debate about the quality of India's democracy. The nation remains an open, free-wheeling society, with a lively press, but recent events have left Indian intellectuals uneasy.

In recent months, Mrs. Gandhi has managed her foreign policy with some success. Relations with Pakistan, always fragile, are still so but India's friendship with Iran has deepened, with the recent visit here of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi. Now Secretary of State Kissinger's visit is expected to lift relations between Washington and New Delhi whose friendship soured during the 1971 Bangladesh war when the United States sided with Pakistan over India.

"It's a question of Kissinger and Mrs. Gandhi meeting again and, hopefully, hitting it off after three years," said one American source here. "If they do, that's fine, and if they don't, well. . . ."

The American merely shrugged. —BERNARD WEINRAUB



The Father Figure

Sheik Mujibur Rahman

By KASTURI RANGAN

NEW DELHI — After winning Bangladesh's admission to the United Nations, when China withdrew its opposition, Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman returned home this month asserting that his country's "dark days" were over. With famine threatening and industry almost entirely idle, there were some to whom his optimism seemed premature.

The diplomatic breakthrough at the United Nations was accompanied by a shipment of 5,000 tons of urgently needed rice from China. The Dacca Government has also received an offer from the United States of 150,000 tons of wheat and rice and the promise of a large development loan.

But the grain from the United States has not arrived and officials in Dacca complain that Washington has ignored a plea to speed deliveries by diverting some grain going to nearby countries. Only last weekend, because of prodding by the United Nations, an American shipment of 10,000 tons of rice to Indonesia was diverted, but even this consignment will not reach Bangladesh before the end of this month.

Officials here are hurt by the belated sympathy for the millions of people starving following floods earlier this year.

Further, more than a half-million workers have been rendered jobless by the closure of hundreds of factories because of a shortage of fuel and raw material. Nearly 200 big textile, jute, sugar and paper mills, perform on the average 40 per cent below normal capacity. At least 10 of the 70 jute mills, which contribute the bulk of foreign exchange earnings, were closed for many months by labor troubles.

According to the Government, the floods destroyed nearly a third of the expected grain crop; the loss in crops, homes destroyed and factory production could exceed \$300-million. Foreign observers say that, even with foreign aid, 100,000 people could starve.

The Government has concluded that these compulsions require Bangladesh to adjust its foreign policy to maintain good relations with all the parties seeking influence on the subcontinent, not just with India and the Soviet Union, but also with China and the United States.

But relations with the Soviet Union and India, the two countries that wholeheartedly backed Bangladesh in winning her independence from Pakistan four years ago, have cooled. Despite a recent pledge of \$21-million dollars from the Soviet Union, people remain suspicious about Moscow's gestures.

Smuggling over the 1,300-mile border the two countries share is the principal irritant in relations with India.

Despite these troubles, Sheikh Mujib's popularity remains intact. Even though his administration is saddled by inexperienced, inefficient and corrupt officials, there is hardly any political opposition to his rule. He is still venerated by most people as the father of the nation.

Far East

WASHINGTON STAR
21 October 1974

Gloom Is Deepening Throughout Indochina

By Henry S. Bradsher
Star-News Staff Writer

SAIGON — Throughout Indochina today, the gloom is deepening.

The old threat that has loomed larger ever since the United States began withdrawing from South Vietnam has now acquired a greater sense of immediacy.

Government officials, politically aware citizens and diplomats are wondering with growing concern whether this blood-soaked peninsula is moving with accelerating speed toward eventual control by North Vietnam, or by local Communists under strong influence from Hanoi.

This concern still falls considerably short of desperation, despair or a sense of inevitability. A collapse of anti-Communist morale is not in sight. But there is a distinct ebbing of confidence in long term prospects. It results from a strong apprehension that resistance to continuing Communist pressure cannot be sustained at an adequate level.

THE WAR GOES ON in South Vietnam, little affected by the American unilateral declaration of peace almost two years ago. Cambodia, too, suffers unending war, stalemated at the present level of outside aid to the two sides. The fragile cease-fire in Laos has shifted the nature of that struggle without ending it. And in Thailand, Communist insurgency continues with North Vietnamese aid.

The basic problems remain the same as they were when the Americans were here with their half-million soldiers and their willingness to pour in whatever money and material was needed to meet the threats to friendly governments.

If the Americans had never been here, those governments would not exist in their present form, but they were and they do and hence the gloom.

The problems are the same; the old solutions are either no longer available or no longer work very well.

With American support dwindling, the governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia, and non-Communists in Laos who are now in uneasy coalition with the Communists, are caught between continuing Communist pressure and their own inability to generate greater internal strength.

No one knows just where the threshold lies at which U.S. military and economic aid will be too low to

keep viable the Saigon and Phnom Penh governments, and the non-Communist element in Vientiane. Computing a dollar figure for each country is complicated by unstable local factors, varying degrees of corruption and wastage, and deliberate exaggeration of need in order to provide a margin for cuts.

There is also the psychological factor of maintaining confidence in each country. The feeling is widespread in Indochina that the United States public in general and Congress in particular misjudge the threshold, or simply do not care. Congress has cut military aid to South Vietnam in the year which began July 1 to about one half in real terms what it had been the previous year, and chopped economic aid to Saigon, and refused to give special military aid to Cambodia like that which kept the Cambodian army going in the last fiscal year.

Just how real and direct is the tie between aid cuts and the ability of these governments to survive is, however, open to debate.

A SENIOR AMERICAN official in one of the Indochinese countries said candidly the other day that "I don't know how we can spend all the money" that was left after Congress had made cuts in the now-postponed version of the foreign aid bill. A deputy premier in another of the countries said, "American aid is more than sufficient if we can use it properly" — adding that it is not used properly now. Some military officers in the third country feel that their army could and would fight better if it had less American equipment and ammunition to perpetuate the addiction to inappropriate U.S. Army tactics.

These are, though, disputed opinions. The more general attitude, as well as the official posture, among both government ministers and diplomats is that while inflation is pushing up the threshold Congress is going the opposite direction.

The psychological result is perhaps as significant as any measurement in 105mm artillery shells, M79 grenade launchers and gallons of

aviation fuel. If the feeling spreads in these countries that they cannot keep going on the old basis, not only for lack of ammunition but also because inflation makes it impossible for a soldier to feed his family, then that alone can cause a crumbling.

Some of the same top officials who talk one moment of the desirability of negotiations with the Communists — whether directly with Hanoi or with local elements whom they view as Hanoi's agents — speak the next moment of the implacability of the adversary. They remain equivocal whether their hope of a negotiated settlement is sufficient to overcome their assumption, based on long and bitter experience, that North Vietnam will never settle for less at the negotiating table than it hopes to win from protracted war.

HERE IN SOUTH Vietnam "our war will not be solved by military means, it must be negotiated," Hoang Duc Nha said in an interview the other day. Nha, the minister of information, has been President Nguyen Van Thieu's key adviser and was the only South Vietnamese official to sit with Thieu in all the tortuous negotiations two years ago that finally produced the Paris agreement, which was supposed to halt this war but did not.

The Cambodian regime of President Lon Nol has been seeking futilely for years to establish contact with its enemies in order to negotiate a truce but the other side appears to be divided and rejects every negotiating offer, even when the regime retreated last July to offering talks without any preconditions.

In his office at the education ministry in Phnom Penh, from which his predecessor was dragged to a mysterious death last June, acting Premier Pan Sothi said recently that "low-intensity war is the prospect." But efforts by Prince

Norodom Sihanouk's exile regime to take away the Cambodian seat in the United Nations is causing grave concern.

"A doubt exists that we could go on and fight the war" if the seat is lost, Pan Sothi said, because the climate of confidence would be destroyed.

Laos has negotiated, and the result has been the re-establishment of coalition government, which has broken down twice before in the last two decades. Now members of the old Vientiane government that had been fighting the Pathet Lao are worried that the Pathet Lao are dominating the coalition. One of them, Major General Oudone Sananikone, said in his Defense Ministry office recently that "the war goes on, a political war now." He complained that the Communists had all the advantages in the coalition, getting a share of power in Vientiane without giving up any control of their own territory and supported by the neutralist premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, in arguments with the rightists.

The deputy foreign minister of Thailand, Major General Chatichai Choonhavan, in his ministry building overlooking the fabulously spired and tinted roofs of the royal palace at Bangkok, said that if North Vietnam "wanted to bring back peace in one region it could in a few days." But Hanoi goes on supporting wars and the Communist insurgency in Thailand, he said. The opening up of democratic debate in Thailand which began a year ago with the overthrow of military rulers who committed the country to American policy in Indochina has created uncertainty over future attitudes of this situation. For now, however, American warplanes remain on standby alert in Thailand for possible resumption of bombing in Indochina.

IT IS ONLY in Thailand that basic policy toward the Communist problem seems to be under active consideration.

Officials and opposition political leaders in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos talk gloomily of short-term prospects. There is a marked reluctance to dwell upon the ultimate result of the current gloomy trends in the economic and military situations, should they continue unchecked by

some presently unforeseeable change of circumstances. Some kind of mental block seems to make it impossible to face the possibility of losing these long wars and falling under the control of the enemies, or a single enemy for those who see the local threat as only a front for Hanoi. This block exists on conversation with outsiders, anyway.

It is generally assumed among foreign observers and even among lower officials that many of the top people in these countries are looking ahead to the possibility of collapse. Although no proof is offered, many say that Swiss bank accounts and other fallback arrangements are being made with funds which originate through U.S. aid.

Diplomats are also more open in their speculation about the future than local people, being less personally involved. Many of them wonder aloud whether the three Indochinese countries are already on an inevitable slide into Communist control, and how long it will take. A few years? A decade?

It is an impossible question to answer, as everyone realizes, even though the essential importance is the pessimism of the asking. The ability of nations to survive apparently hopeless situations is often surprising, and conditions that look desperate can sometimes drag on indefinitely.

THE MILITARY situations in South Vietnam and Cambodia are the primary reason for the regional gloom. Economic problems are generally seen as a result of the continued fighting, although the difficulties of paying former soldiers in Laos suggests that a cease-fire alone fails to remove economic problems. Since the Paris agreement supposedly went into effect in South Vietnam almost 21 months ago, fighting has continued at approximately the same level as it did in between major offensives of the war. Each side has been guilty of violating the cease-fire when it felt it could gain territorial or population advantages.

The Saigon government's internal propaganda has wavered between proclaiming a major Communist offensive to be underway or to be imminent, as if the Thieu regime cannot itself decide. This has been paralleled by U.S. embassy wavering that has apparently been keyed to efforts

to obtain larger aid allocations from Congress.

The current intensive fighting around Hue and Da Nang along South Vietnam's northern coast, and in almost uninhabited parts of the central highlands, is more jockeying for future positions of value in any big Communist offensive than a major drive in itself.

There is no doubt that the North Vietnamese army, at a currently estimated strength of just below 200,000 soldiers in the South, is stronger than it has ever been. It has more artillery, some big enough to shell government positions from outside the range of return gunfire, more armored vehicles, more anti-aircraft cover and better mobility than when it launched the last big offensive at Easter 1972.

The development of roads and pipelines into Communist controlled areas of South Vietnam has significantly changed the prospects for any future upsurge. Hanoi can now rush reinforcements south in a few weeks instead of taking months on the old bomb-harassed Ho Chi Minh trail. The trail itself remains in use, contrary to North Vietnam's obligation to remove its troops from Laos after the cease-fire there. In Cambodia some 50,000 soldiers, labeled by the Americans "Khmer Communists"

for lack of any more discriminating identification of probably still disparate opponents of Lon Nol, control most of the country. Neither side presently has the manpower or armaments to make a decisive breakthrough. The Phnom Penh government just staggers on from one dry season to the next wet season, reacting to what the enemy does.

"As long as U.S. aid stays at last year's level, this war could go on for another 10 years," one informed observer commented as Congress was cutting the aid. Unlike the Viet Cong, however, enemy propaganda in Cambodia does not talk of a long war. It emphasizes that the withdrawal of U.S. aid would bring a quick end with the collapse of Lon Nol's regime. Pathet Lao troops in Laos, who have mostly replaced in forward positions North Vietnamese units that did the actual wartime fighting for them, have been jockeying for territorial advantage, particularly around the royal capital, Luang Prabang. But a Pathet Lao spokesman in Vientiane, the government seat, serves cold drinks and talks of his side observing the cease-fire. He also still insists U.S. and Thai military forces must leave Laos, although independent observers agree that they already have.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 30 October 1974

Cambodia UN mission occupied by protestors

United Nations, N.Y.

Four women and six men occupied the Cambodian Mission to the United Nations on Third Avenue early Tuesday morning, pushing two young Cambodian staff members out of the building, writes David Anable, Monitor staff correspondent.

The 10, apparently all Americans identifying themselves as members of an "anti-imperialist group in New York," were removed within an hour or so by the police, and, according to Cambodian Government sources, charged with criminal trespass.

The aim of the occupation seems to have been to dramatize calls for the Lon Nol government's replacement by Prince Norodom Sihanouk's government-in-exile — both at the UN and in Phnom Penh itself.

The UN is scheduled to debate Cambodian representation here next month. It remains touch and go as to whether the present government will be able to retain its UN credentials.

Washington Star-News

Tuesday, October 22, 1974

INDOCHINA IN AGONY

Economic Woes Intensify

By Henry S. Bradsher
Star-News Staff Writer

SAIGON — Duch Sule sat on a wooden bed in the garden outside his weather-beaten house near Phnom Penh, talking with the quiet air of an educated man, but worried.

"I tried to get a job as a taxi-bus driver, but I couldn't. Some of the other teachers have part-time jobs, but even then it's hard."

Before war came to Cambodia, Duch Sule earned 78,000 riels a month at his school. It cost about 8 percent of that to buy the basic staple, rice, for his family.

Now he earns 30,000 riels and rice takes up half of it. Other food expenses take the remainder. His wife is able to earn only 400 riels a day in the marketplace — not enough for all the other things the family needs.

On the outskirts of Saigon, Nguyen Van Than, who was called away from teaching to fight in the army, is now back teaching 55 pupils all subjects in five elementary grades after losing his right eye in combat.

When he started teaching in 1960, Than paid one-seventh of his salary of 5,500 piasters to feed his family. Now it costs two-thirds of his current salary, 34,000 piasters. He and his wife sew mosquito nets at home to try to make ends meet.

While hundreds of thousands, perhaps 2 million, persons are unemployed and unable to pay for enough rice, even people on fixed government salaries in Indochina like teachers are hard-pressed these days to survive. Both South Vietnamese and Cambodian soldiers, whose monthly pay has been whittled down by inflation to only enough to feed their families for about 10 days, are resorting to looting and petty extortion from the people they are supposed to be protecting from Communism.

IT WAS just such military abuse of the civilian population in Vietnam more than a decade ago that alienated popular support and enabled the Viet Cong to build up its strength. The massive American involvement in Vietnam reduced this problem for some years. But now the combination of reduced U.S. aid and roaring inflation has brought it back to South Vietnam, posed addi-

tional problems for Cambodia and led to rioting by soldiers in Laos.

These three Indochinese countries have for years existed on American money.

The United States provides approximately two-thirds of the combined civilian and military financial needs of South Vietnam. As the Cambodian government's territorial control and tax base have contracted, the U.S. contribution to the national budget has risen from about a quarter two years ago to two-thirds now — and if military supplies are added, the American share comes close to 90 percent of total expenses. Laos would scarcely have a monetized economy without U.S. aid.

All three countries are worried how they might survive in the future. Their economies have been adapted to the modernization that war has brought, and it is no easier to send an unemployed Saigon dockworker or former U.S. army camp laborer back to the rice paddy than it is to get a laid-off Detroit factory hand to return to a Kentucky farm — harder, even, when the farm is now occupied by the enemy.

Officials in Vietnam and Cambodia are even more urgently concerned with the possibility that reductions of military aid will leave their soldiers without adequate ammunition to withstand Communist attacks. Some outposts have been abandoned as no longer feasible to maintain with less firepower available, enabling the enemy to expand his control.

Despite the arguments being made for continuing American aid at more or less same levels, there is widespread skepticism among observers in Indochina that even the full amounts would do much more than keep the governments grinding into seemingly endless wars, rather than solving basic problems. It is even uncertain that the same levels would remain adequate as inflation, both the imported worldwide variety and that spurred by deficit financing in these countries, eats into resources.

NOR IS THERE any certainty that aid cuts will have the theoretically ideal effect of forcing clearer thinking about priorities and sensible economies in spending. The Indochinese governments look even less capable of that than most.

In none of these countries is there any serious long-term consideration of economic problems. They all have planning ministries but planning is impossible under the strained circumstances.

In fact, Vietnam and Cambodia are concerned with the immediate problems of survival, and things are

little better in Laos.

This makes the Nixon and Ford administrations' requests to Congress for "postwar reconstruction assistance" a sad joke. There is nothing post about the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia, nothing is being reconstructed while the destruction goes on and fighting deters any meaningful productive investment, and rather than assist the U.S. aid is primary sustenance.

Nonetheless, the administration has contended that a five-year program of declining aid for South Vietnam would enable this country to take off into economic self reliance. This was an early salespoint on this year's foreign aid program.

It was not thought up by U.S. economic experts in Saigon. When pressed on the idea that South Vietnam can become self-sufficient within any foreseeable future, they agree with the foreign observer who commented that the idea depended upon half a dozen or more favorable assumptions all coming true, but none of them looked very likely.

Only the glimmer of offshore oil holds much encouragement, and the Communists are trying their best to discourage foreign exploration for it off South Vietnam. Cambodia is involved in disputes over delineation of its offshore waters with Vietnam and Thailand, which between them want to reduce Phnom Penh's share to almost nothing, while Laos is left out in oil like almost everything else of economic value.

For years this correspondent has been hearing in these countries moans from U.S. officials about congressional cuts in aid appropriations. Each year there would be explanations how goods in the pipeline or some fortuitous circumstance had allowed the client government to survive the previous year's cuts, but this year the full amount was really needed if economic stability and the war effort was to be maintained.

The repetition of the year after year suggested considerable watering of aid requests to insure that the reduced appropriation would still be enough. But if there was water, officials contend, it has evaporated and Congress is now cutting into essentials that help these countries stay fed and armed. The contention is hard to evaluate, but the visible problems of declining living standards tend to support it.

"AN ECONOMY with less resiliency than ours would have collapsed by now," the minister of trade and industry, Nguyen Duc Cuong, said in a recent interview.

Cuong said the country faces a dilemma whether to put primary emphasis on fighting inflation, "only 50 percent this year if we are lucky," or on trying to spend out of the recession caused by U.S. troop withdrawals, imported inflation, the war and other problems. "We cannot expect the economy to do any better" if U.S. aid is cut, Cuong said, "we can only hope to manage

so the situation won't be too explosive."

President Nguyen Van Thieu vows that South Vietnam "will certainly be ready to fight until the last drop of blood, the last bullet and the last grain of rice," if the United States fails to provide enough aid. In a rather gloomy speech recently, one in which he only vaguely defended himself against corruption charges, Thieu said the U. S. government had promised him adequate aid at the time of the so-called cease-fire. Americans are now "encountering economic and financial difficulties," Thieu said. "Nevertheless, they cannot swallow their promises and shirk their obligation to one of their allies."

When the Paris agreement was signed 21 months ago to let the Americans out of the war, the U. S. government also promised, Thieu said, that it "would react vigorously to Communist violations of the cease-fire, their continued infiltration into the South and their lack of respect for the Paris agreement."

"What have we seen so far?" Thieu asked. "There has been no U. S. reaction to the Communist infiltration into the South and their grave violations of the cease-fire. This is because of the U. S. internal situation."

In an interview, Tran Van Lam, who as foreign minister signed the Paris agreement for South Vietnam, said that Henry A. Kissinger had given him assurances during the negotiations which have failed to work out. Now it does not make sense for the United States to cut its aid, Lam protested.

While such protests are heard from the government, old political opponents of Thieu have been reinvigorated by the signs of fading American backing for his regime.

THIEU HAS COME to represent American interests in Vietnam in the eyes of many people here, fairly or unfairly. He has been able to deliver aid. Now if he can no longer deliver, his usefulness is more likely to be questioned.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the ousted leader of Cambodia who now from Peking fronts for Communist effort to take over his country, said the other day that the territory controlled by the Lon Nol regime is "nothing but an economic corpse — a 'non-state' which has no economy of its own and is surviving with great difficulty on the constant and massive aid injections from its U. S. masters."

Early this year the U. S. embassy in Phnom Penh was saying that it had a virtual blank check from the Nixon administration to provide whatever military and economic aid was needed to sustain "the finest example of the Nixon Doctrine in action," as the former president once called it. Now the mood has changed.

Congress has been closing loopholes which made it possible to find extra money for Cambodia. At the same time the Communists have shut off the flow of rubber from their zone, bartered against U. S. aid goods, which provided the

Phnom Penh regime with its only significant foreign exchange earnings.

CORRUPTION is a problem in all three Indochinese countries but in none is it more of a drain on the war effort and homefront economic stability than in Cambodia.

"We copy the French in so many things" in this former French colonial area, one official in Phnom Penh commented, "its a shame we don't use their system of taxing visible wealth instead of official income." The visible wealth of generals and some civilian officials since U. S. aid began flowing into Cambodia has increased enormously while salaries have remained low.

But Marshal Lon Nol ignores the obvious corruption of top military and civilian officials, making it impossible to clean up a malignant situation. When the U. S. embassy insisted last spring that repayment be made for some stolen aviation gasoline provided by American aid, it was paid — but the payment originated ultimately from other U. S. funds.

The economic situation in Cambodia, where inflation is now running some 250 percent a year in the Phnom Penh enclave, is a major factor in political unrest. Subsidization of rice at such a low level that much was smuggled abroad while the United States shipped more in

has now been reduced. But that overdue measure of raising rice prices touched off demonstrations against the government.

In Laos U. S. aid is now supporting a government in which the Communist Pathet Lao holds half the places and has more than half the influence. A Pathet Lao spokesman explained that his side did not mind the continued aid so long as American intentions were good, meaning money but no influence.

In fact, the Communists apparently hope the United States will continue to help foot the bill for that primitive country with some expensive modern tastes which Americans helped develop. Aid promises have recently been collected from North Vietnam, North Korea, China and other Communist countries, but some Western nations have been put off by rather pre-emptory demands for free plane tickets and hotels for a Cambodian aid mission to go beg from them. Thailand has an independent economy, troubled like most others in today's world but standing without massive American backing. But while the U. S. Air Force continues to use Thai bases, American aid has been slashed and troop spending is off, raising questions in Bangkok of whether there should be some direct tie between bases and aid.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 October 1974

SEOUL REPORTERS DENOUNCE REGIME

Strike Wins Page 1 Display
of Attack on Press Curbs

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Friday, Oct. 25—Reporters for South Korea's largest newspaper called off an unusual 11-hour strike last night when their publisher acceded to a demand for publication of their statement denouncing Government press restrictions.

Dong-A-Ilbo, one of the most influential national newspapers, is being published this morning with an anti-Government resolution adopted by its news staff on its front page.

The agreement by Kim Sang

Man, the publisher to run the three-point resolution was interpreted as a major victory for the Korean press, which has been fighting off and on against restrictions by the Government.

About 180 reporters of Dong-A Ilbo and its affiliated radio station protested the arrests and questioning of the managing editor and his three deputies by intelligence agents. The editors have been under intermittent interrogation for allegedly having prominently reported recent student demonstrations here and stirrings in South Vietnam.

Oblique Criticism

Newspapers have paid extensive attention to developments in South Vietnam, apparently as an oblique criticism of their Government.

President Park declared an emergency two years ago to crack down on his political opponents. Since then more than

200 students, clergymen and intellectuals have been court-martialed and the press has been under tight control.

In the Dong-A Ilbo matter, the publisher withdrew a proposal that the resolution be printed on the back page when he realized that there would be no paper today if he did not give way. The half-century-old paper has a circulation in excess of 600,000.

Two weeks ago President Park told the owners of newspapers, news agencies and broadcasting companies that he would not tolerate challenges to the Constitution, he specifically asked for control of younger journalists who, he asserted, are fostering campus unrest.

Dong-A Ilbo has a long history of political suppression. It was closed numerous times under Japanese colonial rule and President Syngman Rhee

suspended it for a month in 1955 when it became too critical to his policies.

WASHINGTON STAR
21 October 1974

U.S. SAYS HANOI EXPLOITS DISSENT

CIA Role in Saigon Riots Denied

By George Esper
Associated Press

SAIGON — The United States Embassy today denied that the Central Intelligence Agency is involved in demonstrations against South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu and accused North Vietnam of a "crudely obvious attempt to exploit the dissent."

The U.S. Embassy statement was issued after anti-Thieu demonstrators in Saigon yesterday burned a police jeep and stoned the National Assembly building. Quieter anti-government rallies were held in Hue, Can Tho and other towns.

THE EMBASSY cited Viet Cong statements in the past two weeks charging that the CIA is giving support to dissident political groups in South Vietnam.

"The United States does not encourage, nor does it support in any way, any political faction in Vietnam," the American statements said. "These accusations are utterly groundless and totally false."

The statement also said that by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese destruction of roads, bridges and other important installations in military attacks, Hanoi is "seeking to increase the economic suffering

of the South Vietnamese people in the hope that it can exploit politically the resulting misery."

THE VIET CONG claimed Oct. 12 that the United States was trying to infiltrate agents into the dissident South Vietnamese political groups to "manipulate and turn" the dissent to its own benefit.

The Communists charge that the United States is conducting a "double-faced" policy: Pushing Thieu to make reforms to strengthen his position and the same time trying to develop a position of influence with the opposition in case Thieu is overthrown.

U.S. officials contend that the Viet Cong is conducting the "double-faced" policy: Assailing the United States for its support of Thieu and at the same time accusing the United States of preparing a fallback position should he be ousted.

SOME ANALYSTS say they believe the Viet Cong is laying the groundwork, should Thieu be forced out, to refuse to cooperate with his successor by claiming that the United States was behind the change. So far, however, there is no suggestion that the anti-Thieu

movement is strong enough to topple him.

The demonstration in Saigon yesterday began with a march by about 100 politicians, Buddhist monks and nuns and Roman Catholic priests through downtown Saigon.

They were joined by several hundred students and children who broke away from the older people, burned a police jeep smashed the ornate glass doors and porcelain flower pots at the National Assembly building, and burned portraits of Thieu.

At least two of the demonstrators were injured, and a government spokesman claimed 36 policemen were hurt.

In Inchon, South Korea, meanwhile, an American bishop, the Reg. William McNaughton of Boston, led 500 Roman Catholic priests, nuns and laymen yesterday in a demonstration that police tried to break up with tear gas.

The marchers shouted "Dictatorial regime go away" in the second antigovernment protest since August, when President Chung Hee Park lifted two government decrees banning political dissent.

BALTIMORE SUN
22 October 1974

Unrest in South Vietnam

South Vietnam seems to be heading into another of its convoluted political crises. As the war rumbles on and economic hardships increase, opponents of the Thieu regime are showing a surprising capacity to stage impressive protest demonstrations. Only two months ago, President Nguyen Van Thieu seemed still at the height of his police-state powers. The legislature was utterly under his thumb and political foes either were in jail, in hiding or ostentatiously inactive. While his regime was as unpopular as ever, no real protest was in evidence.

Why the change? Why the spectacle of crowds marching on the National Assembly building in Saigon with many a Thieu poster cross-hatched by a large black X? One reason is that Thieu has been duly warned by the American Embassy that any display of harsh strongarm methods would so outrage the U.S. Congress that economic and military aid would be slashed even more deeply. Another reason—a more pervasive one—is the growing intolerance of the Vietnamese people for the corruption that riddles their government from cop to general. When American money and arms were giving the Vietnamese economy a phony flush of prosperity, graft was tolerable to the masses—to those who were doing better than ever provided they were not being killed or maimed or uprooted. But now that inflation and joblessness are rampant in the wake of the U.S. troop withdrawals, the average citizen can ill-afford to feel the extra squeeze of the petty shakedown.

Perhaps the most striking thing about the current wave of protests is the part being played by conservative Catholic anti-corruption groups. As staunchly anti-Communist as ever, these Catholic dissidents feel Hanoi and the Viet Cong can be overcome only if the South Vietnamese population is more content with its government. The emergence of the Catholic opposition to Thieu has been accompanied by more resistance on the part of Buddhists who reflect the terrible war-weariness of the country and seek a vaguely defined "national reconciliation."

The real potency of current protests is questionable because no creditable civilian alternative to Thieu's military regime has emerged. The Catholics and the Buddhists are by no means unified, among themselves or with each other, and the oldline political figures are keeping their heads so low as to remain invisible. If Thieu should be overthrown, the current betting is that the coup would be engineered by another military clique. Then the old game of Saigon musical chairs could begin again.

As unrest crescendoes in South Vietnam, the United States as usual is lacking any definable, longrange policy. We are still playing it by ear, still regretting our involvement; still uncertain how best to withdraw. Once again, the folly of our entanglement in a conflict we have never understood is coming home to plague us—and the people we thought we were helping.

Thieu's Power Periled By Low Army Morale

By Philip A. McCombs
Washington Post Foreign Service
SAIGON, Oct. 12—Low army morale is threatening President Thieu's traditional military power base at a time when he is under mounting political pressure to enact democratic reforms, make peace, and end corruption.

Desertions during a recent period reached the staggering rate of between 4,000 and 5,000 a week, according to reliable sources.

At that rate, more than 20 per cent of the 1.1 million-man armed forces would desert during the year, although many of these might be repeaters. The rate is increasing.

Also, government soldiers are dying at a rate of 300 per week this year, a 50 per cent increase over last year.

Army pay continues to be low, and field commanders are reporting that lack of rice for soldiers and their families is becoming an even bigger morale problem than the aggressiveness of the Communists forces.

The Communists are taking advantage of Saigon's increasing morale problems by massing overwhelming forces to score dramatic psychological victories against small isolated outposts, isolated towns and even battalion-sized government units.

Government soldiers are still firing five times as many shells as the Communists, but this is less than half the firepower that was available to the government a year ago before severe congressional military aid cuts began.

The army is riddled with corruption, and reports from the field indicate that the common soldiers are increasingly unhappy with this as reports of anticorruption rallies in major cities spread through the ranks.

"There's no talk of a military coup right now, but there's more direct criticism of Thieu in the army than there ever has been before," said a well-placed Western observer.

A military librarian at the armed forces headquarters made the front pages here the other day in a public protest when he declared, "high-level army corruption has eroded the confidence and fighting spirit of the soldiers."

The soldier, Sgt. Dao Vu Dat, cited widespread "stealing of food, uniforms,

and military equipment intended for the fighting men." He said there is widespread embezzlement of pension funds intended for the families of dead soldiers.

President Thieu promised in his Oct. 1 speech to the nation to try to eliminate corruption in the armed forces by the end of the month, and as commander-in-chief he has issued orders to accomplish this.

But Thieu's problem, according to observers here, is that he cannot get rid of the numerous high-ranking corrupt generals under his command without destroying his power base and thus bringing about his own demise.

Thieu has retired or fired more than a dozen generals since the beginning of the year, but the changes were of little significance since many of the generals had long before already been placed in insignificant jobs because of old age, physical disabilities or alleged corruption.

Western diplomats and other sources picture Thieu as enmeshed in an intricate web of corruption and favoritism with many of his top commanders that makes it impossible for him to fire them.

His position is becoming increasingly delicate as the result of mounting pressure from his political opponents that he clean house.

Thieu, a lieutenant general at the time of his election in 1967 and a participant in the 1963 coup that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem, has skillfully played off the loyalties, aspirations and greed of his generals to keep himself firmly entrenched and immune from coup attempts.

Most of the generals who are considered non-corrupt and apolitical are serving far from Saigon in the northern part of South Vietnam where there is no possibility of their suddenly moving against Thieu in a coup.

These include the commander of the first military Region (the Hue-Danang area), Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong; 1st Division commander Brig. Gen. Nguyen Van Diem; 3rd Division commander Brig. Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh; Maj. Gen. Le Quang Luong, commander of the Airborne Division, and Brig. Gen. Bui

The Lan, commander of the Marine Division.

Gen. Cao Van Vien, commander of the joint general staff, is considered an apolitical general, but Thieu makes all the important military decisions himself and uses Vien only to implement them.

In the important southern areas of the country around Saigon, Thieu has installed mostly corrupt, politically loyal commanders, sources say.

Lt. Gen. Pham Quoc Thuan, commander of the Third Military Region around Saigon, has lost large numbers of soldiers in the crucial fighting in the Iron Triangle 20 miles north of Saigon.

He has failed to retake key positions lost to the Communists, and has gained a reputation among most Western observers here, including the U.S. Embassy, as a corrupt general completely beholden to Thieu.

The commander of the Mekong Delta south of Saigon, Gen. Nguyen Vinh Nghi, has developed a similar reputation, as have the commanders of the several divisions stationed near Saigon. All of these men have come under attack by the growing Catholic anticorruption movement.

Lt. Gen. Dang Van Quang, Thieu's right-hand military assistant in the presidential palace and an old colleague, is considered by many sources to be one of the worst examples of a corrupt officer in the country.

"Suffice it to say that he is a very nasty piece of work," summed up one observer.

Observers here think that if a military coup is to be prepared, it must originate among the regimental commanders—colonels and lieutenant colonels—who have been professional soldiers for a decade or more, and who are in close touch with their men and concerned with their welfare. So far there is no sign that this is happening.

Saigon Veterans Aid Anti-Thieu Forces

From News Dispatches

SAIGON, Oct. 12 — The leader of 200,000 South Vietnamese war veterans today threw his support behind growing anticorruption protests aimed at President Nguyen Van Thieu's govern-

THE TIMES (LONDON)
12 Oct 1974

Bugged pen set in Canberra was 'a disaster'

From Our Correspondent
Melbourne, Oct. 13

Mr Anthony Eggleston the former press secretary and confidant of Sir Robert Menzies, Mr Harold Holt and Mr John Gorton when they were Prime Minister, said today that he was responsible for putting a "bugging" device in the Prime Minister's office in Parliament House in Canberra.

He said: "I suggested a tape be installed to record press conferences and Harold Holt agreed. The commercial firm we called in during the middle of 1966 suggested the bugging device so that Harold would not have his desk cluttered up with a microphone. The device installed was a pen set with a "bug" inside it and two tape recorders on a shelf in the private secretary's office next door.

"But the bug proved a disaster. Harold never could get used to it. It was so realistic he kept ripping it out of its socket thinking it was a real pen. It was so much trouble having it fixed up all the time that eventually we had a plug-in microphone installed in its place."

Mr Eggleston had never been involved in using the device for anything but providing a transcript of press conferences. As far as he was concerned no one had been taped unless he was aware of it. Mr Eggleston is now a senior adviser to Mr Snedden, the Liberal Party leader.

Mr William McMahon today confirmed the existence of the bugging device but said that it had never been used while he was Prime Minister.

ment.

The chairman of the staunchly anti-Communist War Veterans' Association, Nguyen Dinh, told reporters President Thieu had failed to give direct answers to corruption charges.

"The government has to review its leadership before it is too late," he said.

In Phnom Penh, military sources said today that Communist rebel gunners shot down a Cambodian air force cargo plane near the provincial capital of Svay Rieng, killing two of 18 persons aboard.

The Pathet Lao today released its third batch of prisoners to the Vientiane government in Laos. In the ceremony, 24 Laotian soldiers were handed over under the supervision of the International Control Commission. The government side has already released all its Pathet Lao prisoners.

In Saigon, a Communist spokesman said the Vietcong will refuse to negotiate on peace or missing Americans until South Vietnamese President Thieu is overthrown.

NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1974

Americans Feel Ill Will In Laos City

By DAVID K. SHIPLER
Special to The New York Times

LUANG PRABANG, Laos, Oct. 29—In this tiny royal capital, where the Communist-led Pathet Lao has made its most pronounced impact since the coalition Government was formed last April, there is a slight air of anti-Americanism.

The Pathet Lao members who have entered into Luang Prabang's life more confidently and more fully than that in Vientiane, the administrative capital—have recently been showing propaganda films of the intensive American bombing that was directed against their territory during the Indochina war. The films were shown first to schoolchildren, later to the general public.

Some of the few Americans who live here are not convinced that the Pathet Lao is trying deliberately to generate anti-American feeling, but that seems to be the effect.

"Kids make funny noises at you when you walk by," one long-time American resident complained. "That never used to happen." Another, who speaks Laotian, says that children on the street now chant, "Foreigner! Foreigner!" when he passes.

Suspicion of C.I.A. Links

One civilian, not employed by the Government, is continually accused of being in the Central Intelligence Agency. "Maybe they had these feelings all along and now just feel free to express them," He speculated. "Or maybe I'm just paranoid."

Associating with Americans seems to carry a certain stigma for Laotians in Luang Prabang. A Laotian who drives a big American car for the United States aid mission here has asked for a more proletarian vehicle, one official reports.

"Friends hesitate to come to our house," another American said. "One came one night by making a feint toward Souphanouvong's house." He was referring to Prince Souphanouvong, who is the titular head of the Pathet Lao.

He said that another old friend, a rightist Government official, "hardly talks to us anymore."

The American went on to describe several instances in which Laotian acquaintances had demurred from keeping company with him in public. In one case, he recalled, when he suggested having a drink in a crowded hotel bar, his Laotian guest nervously chose a remote — and virtually deserted — place

NEW YORK TIMES
22 October 1974

Japanese Leftists Attack Ford's Visit

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

TOKYO, Oct. 21—Japanese leftists began a drive to stop President Ford's scheduled visit here next month with huge rallies all over Japan today.

The organizers, led by the Communist party, the Socialist party and the major labor unions, said that 2.2 million people had taken part in 456 demonstrations, including one that drew an estimated 70,000 flag-carrying and banner-waving people here in Tokyo.

Kakuo Honjo, chairman of the rally held in Meiji Park in central Tokyo tonight, said in a brief interview that "we're trying to create an atmosphere or mood among the Japanese people to stop Mr. Ford from coming here." He said he did not think there would be physical violence if the President came but that the leftist groups were trying to generate so much vocal opposition that Mr. Ford would cancel the trip himself.

The critical question is whether the leftists can build up a sustained outflow of anti-American sentiment strong enough to prevent the President's four-day visit, scheduled to begin Nov. 18. With the rather light-hearted, carnival atmosphere that prevailed tonight, it seemed doubtful that they had made much headway toward their objective.

The leftists, however, have the first real issue they have had since the end of the Vietnam war, which undoubtedly accounted for the largest turnout they have had at this annual "antiwar day" rite in

years. Leftist organizations, during the Vietnam war, designated Oct. 21 an annual "international antiwar day" for protest meetings and demonstrations.

The new issue is reports of the presence of American nuclear weapons here.

The conservatives, who have ruled Japan steadily for a quarter century, have followed a policy of not making and not acquiring nuclear weapons, and not allowing such weapons to come into this country.

But recent testimony in Washington before a Congressional committee by a retired United States Rear Admiral, Gene R. LaRocque, has made it appear that the Japanese Government has misled its people. Admiral LaRocque testified that American warships regularly called at Japanese ports with nuclear weapons aboard.

Premier Kakuei Tanaka's Government has vigorously denied that nuclear weapons, if they were brought in, were allowed in the Japanese permission. There is evidence, however, of the existence of a secret "transit agreement" that permits the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Japan temporarily.

The Government's denial seems not to have been very effective. Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's second largest circulating newspaper, said in an editorial: "Many people now believe that nuclear weapons are being secretly brought into Japan despite the three nonnuclear principles and that the Government has always been aware of this."

At the rally here tonight, speaker after speaker rose to denounce the United States and the Tanaka Government, then to demand the abrogation of Japan's security treaty with the United States and the closing of American military bases here. The nuclear issue was also stressed.

Moreover, the leftists pointedly recalled events in 1960, when swirling riots in the streets forced the Japanese Government to cancel President Dwight D. Eisenhower's scheduled visit at the last moment because the Government could not guarantee his safety.

Tonight, a Communist speaker said: "We must read this historical lesson and resort to a new action to stop Ford's visit. Let us have an even larger-scale movement to stop Ford." The response from the audience, munching on hot dogs, noodles and rice lunches and drinking Pepsi-Cola bought from portable stands that ringed the rally, was tepid.

After the rally, the leftists streamed out of the park for demonstrations through the city. One procession wound past the Parliament building and near the American Embassy. It was boisterous but peaceful, more full of sound than of fury.

Ultraleftist radical factions demonstrated in other parts of the capital but they seemed far more concerned about their rivalries with one another than with the nuclear issue or Mr. Ford's visit. In any case they were controlled by special riot policemen, who made 11 arrests.

the bank of the Mekong River.

One of the clearest indices of the state of Laotian-American amity is the Laotian-American Association, an organization funded by the United States Information Service and devoted to joint cultural and linguistic endeavors.

Attendance Delining

Peter Coombs the director of the organization's Luang Prabang branch, says that since the Pathet Lao moved into town, the number of Laotians attending association functions had dropped.

The enrollment in English language courses, for example, has fallen to 300 from 400. And although Mr. Coombs recalls having been able to invite about 20 Laotian friends to his house for movies at an earlier time, "I'm lucky now if four show up."

"People keep asking when the L.A.A. is going to close," he said.

Different Mood in Vientiane
The atmosphere is completely different in Vientiane.

whose population is generally regarded as less enthusiastic about the Pathet Lao. There the Pathet Lao contingent has not made its presence felt so acutely as in Luang Prabang.

There have been some demands from workers for the expulsion of foreigners from certain skilled jobs in Vientiane, but on balance American affluence and exclusivity are tolerated there.

American officials who have water tanks by their spacious houses in Vientiane get water delivered by United States Embassy trucks when city water pressure is low. When an American official moves into a house, the residence is wired to an embassy generator so he will not have to depend on the erratic Vientiane power system.

Even the ultimate in Americana still exists—Kilometer 6, an American-style suburb at the edge of Vientiane, complete with huge American automobiles in the driveways of ranch-type houses. According to intelligence reports, the Pathet Lao has not yet decided what to do about Kilometer 6.

BALTIMORE SUN
31 October 1974

Forced isolation takes toll on Park foe

By MATTHEW J. SEIDEN
Sun Staff Correspondent

Seoul—A year and three months of forced seclusion has begun to take its physical and emotional toll on Kim Dae Jung, the once-controversial South Korean opposition leader.

The former presidential candidate has been denied permission to leave Korea and kept under constant surveillance since his abduction from a Tokyo hotel room in August, 1973.

Harassed by threatening phone calls, disturbed by mysterious gunshots at night, constantly trailed, bugged and phone-tapped, the 49-year-old former politician is a virtual prisoner in his own house.

"With so many, many things to make me nervous, the most

difficult thing has been to control myself," Mr. Kim said. "I can well understand how political prisoners in Russia end up suffering from mental problems."

Mr. Kim is suffering from sciatica, and said his condition has deteriorated considerably during his confinement, with particularly strong pain in his legs. He walks stiffly, has trouble bending over, and said he cannot sleep well at night.

He said he frequently takes sleeping pills and sleeps during the day instead of at night. His face appears puffy and aged, and his mind wanders occasionally during a conversation.

While he was still anxious to talk about politics last spring, in a recent interview Mr. Kim appeared preoccupied with his own problems.

"My house is surrounded. They have surveillance stations in buildings on three sides of me. Wherever I go, two cars follow me. If I see friends, they are taken in for interrogation," he said.

"Basically, I am a politician. I know my people are out there, and still remember me, and support me," he said. "But I am completely cut off. My name can't be mentioned in the news media, and I can't go anywhere or see anyone, except foreign visitors."

Mr. Kim, who won 46 per cent of the vote in the nation's last free presidential election three years ago, now is also in the midst of an extended legal case based on alleged campaign-law violations stemming from that election.

Although the South Korean

Supreme Court recently asked the Appeals Court to review the Kim case, the favorable Supreme Court action has served to further drag out the already lengthy proceedings. Meanwhile, the government says Mr. Kim cannot leave the country as long as the court case is unresolved.

Mr. Kim said he wants to accept a teaching position at Harvard University. In addition, he said he wants to undergo medical treatment in the United States.

He said that, although he has been told he should be hospitalized, he is afraid to enter a South Korean hospital for fear of being drugged, poisoned or killed in the hospital.

Mr. Kim's situation has also made life difficult for other members of the Kim family. His second son, for example, has been unable to get a job, and Mr. Kim's wife and children must "be very careful" about whom they see.

Mr. Kim said he would like to see President Ford when he visits here at the end of November. However, he said he realizes, "it's almost impossible, for protocol reasons."

"I sincerely hope that President Ford and his aides will seek to hear more voices than just the government side here," Mr. Kim said.

"I hope he will have a chance to learn of the strong democratic will of the Korean people, and to see that we can't have security and stability in South Korea until we have democracy."

NEW YORK TIMES

19 October 1974

Anti-Red Priest Leads Foes of Thieu

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 18—The Roman Catholic priest at the head of the thinly disguised movement to oust President Nguyen van Thieu reckons that 3,000 South Vietnamese colonels and lieutenant colonels passed through his courses on anti-Communist psychological warfare.

"Among my students, I can count six generals," said the Rev. Tran Huu Thanh, chuckling. "It is because of this that Thieu is afraid of me."

Father Thanh no longer gives those courses, because he is busy trying to get President Thieu to resign. He sees no contradiction between the lifetime he has spent combating Vietnamese Communists and his current efforts to overturn their No. 1 enemy.

"It is a labor that I have prepared for over the past 30 years," the priest said, speaking French. Father Thanh, a calm man on the surface, chain-smokes even at demonstrations, flecking ashes over his black soutane.

About two months ago, the 59-year-old priest, a member of the Redemptorist order, entered a tentative opposition scene that was dominated by over-familiar names and faces, veterans of unsuccessful causes.

Tear-Gassed at Hue

He had begun his pastorate at Hue at the end of World War II, training young Catholics to counter the mounting influence of the Vietminh. And it was there that he began his campaign against Mr. Thieu.

In Hue last Sept. 8 Father Thanh and several thousand demonstrators were tear-gassed by South Vietnamese policemen. He had launched a de-

monstration, and his political career, with an audacious, six-point accusation that charged President Thieu and his family with gross acts of corruption.

Since then "Accusation No. 1," as it was called, promising others to come, has become the catalyst of a revived opposition. Mr. Thieu has been put on the defensive, at least for the moment, and Father Thanh is the Opposition's hottest political property.

'Tacit Approval' of Rome

The priest says that he has the "tacit approval" of the Vatican for his activities. That became apparent on the morning of Oct. 1, a day when President Thieu was to go on the air to defend himself, and when the cautious Archbishop of Saigon, the Most Rev. Nguyen Van Binh, endorsed the anti-corruption front.

"We are only demanding, at first changes in the Government, not a change of the Government," Father Thanh said, ticking off a familiar list of generals frequently accused of corruption. But he said that he "certainly" hoped that President Thieu would ultimately resign. "But softly, not by force," he was quick to add.

Mr. Thieu's resignation, he speculated, could be followed by elections for a constituent assembly in which the communists would be invited to participate "in a political party, like in France," as he put it. "We accept the Communists in the bosom of Vietnamese politics," he said.

Though he has spent his adult years trying to undo the political handiwork of the Vietminh and the Vietcong, he obviously retains an admiration for their skills at indoctrination: "They use logic," he said.

While he is generally pigeon-

holed as a "rightist Catholic," he says he endorses "the Communists' promises of social reform" while rejecting their authoritarian methods. "That is why, even today, my anti-Communism is different from that of this Government," he said.

The early work in Hue honed his anti-Communism. "Of 80 cadres I had, 40 were arrested and shot by the Vietminh," he said deferring to workers. In 1954, he was sent by Rome to northeastern Thailand to work among pro-Communist Vietnamese refugees and afterward to Hanoi, where he aided people seeking to flee the north in the wake of the Geneva agreements that created the two Vietnams.

"I left Hanoi by the last airplane," he said, and the next day Ho Chi Minh came into Hanoi. Father Thanh returned to Saigon and presented to them Premier Ngo Dinh Diem a plan for a network of anti-Communist agents along what was to become known as the Ho Chi Minh trail, in Laos and Cambodia. The plan was rejected but Father Thanh was offered the job of forming Republican Youth cadres under the direction of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the Premier's brother and the power figure of the regime.

Subsequently, the young priest was appointed head of the School of Personalism and set about writing textbooks on the foggy, eclectic doctrine to which the new government tried to anchor itself as an intellectual counterweight to Communism. This was a mixture of the Christian existentialism of Gabriel Marcel, Dominican ideas about the distribution of wealth and Mr. Nhu's personal philosophical insights.

Western Hemisphere

NEW YORK TIMES
24 October 1974

CHILE IS ACCUSED BY JURISTS GROUP

International Body Declares
Repression Is Widespread
and More Systematic

Special to The New York Times

GENEVA, Oct. 23—The International Commission of Jurists charged today that political repression in Chile was now "more ubiquitous and more systematic" than at any time since President Salvador Allende Gossens was overthrown by the military 13 months ago.

"For every detainee who has been released in recent months at last two new arrests have been made," the commission said.

The 40-member commission is a private organization based in Geneva that draws support from lawyers groups in national chapters in 50 countries. It describes itself as "strictly nonpolitical" and is recognized by the United Nations.

The commission gathers information for its reports from lawyers on the spot, observers sent to follow trials and special teams such as the three-man group that went to Chile last May to study the situation there.

Lawyers Supplied Data

Most of the information in today's report was obtained from Chilean defense lawyers, the commission's secretary general, Niall MacDermott, a British lawyer, said. "I cannot be more precise than that," he declared.

The commission said that from May to August there were 700 known arrests of political suspects in Chile. Most of the arrests, it said, were carried out without warrants by unidentified persons in plain clothes armed with machine guns.

Since Miguel Enríquez, leader of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, was killed on

Oct. 5 in a shootout with security forces there have been 600 further arrests, according to the report.

The commission said that the announcement last month by Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, the head of Chile's military junta, that the "state of war" was being ended and that all prisoners who were prepared to go abroad would be released was "designed for external consumption."

The legal system, it declared, "continues to contravene basic principles of justice accepted by civilized nations."

Besides individual arrests, there are mass arrests in the shantytowns, with the intention apparently being to intimidate the population, the commission said. Some 10,000 to 15,000 people have been arrested in this way in recent months, it reported, with most being released after seven to 10 days.

The effect of such measures, including the extension of military control over the schools, has been to "heighten the fear and tension among the working population," the commission said.

'The Great Injury'

Before the military coup d'état Chile was a "participatory democracy," the commission said, in which all sections of the population through trade unions, professional associations and other groups took an active part in the national life.

"All this has now been systematically suppressed," the commission said. "This is perhaps the greatest injury of all to have been inflicted on the people of Chile."

The present members of the commission include Edgar Faure, the former French Premier; Masatoshi Yokota, the former Chief Justice of Japan's Supreme Court; Sir Adetokunbo Ademola, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria, and Eli Whitney Debevoise, a New York lawyer, who is chairman of the five-man executive committee.

Another member is Sean MacBride, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and former Irish Foreign Minister. Mr. MacBride served for seven years as secretary general of the commission.

NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1974

Puerto Rican at U.N. Sees 'Genocide' by Imperialists

By PETER KIHSS

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Oct. 30—The United Nations heard charges today that "North American imperialists" were embarked on a "plan of genocide" in Puerto Rico that has led to sterilization of 200,000 women, or 35 per cent of those of child-bearing age.

Juan Mari Bras, Secretary-General of the Puerto Rican Socialist party, asserted in the 24-nation special committee on colonialism that the alleged plan also involved migration of one million more Puerto Ricans to the mainland in 10 years. He said two million had already come north "expelled from the territory by deplorable conditions of the colonial system."

Mr. Mari Bras called on the committee in a forthcoming 1975 session to condemn the alleged plans and "replacement of our country by foreigners." Another pro-independence advocate, Senator Ruben Berrios, president of the Puerto Rican Independence party, whose hearing was put over until Friday, endorsed this and other recommendations as jointly developed.

Both island leaders said the sterilization figures had come from the Commonwealth's family planning department. Last month, the Office of Puerto Rico in Washington estimated the island's population had increased 223,000 in three years, to 2,912,000 in mid-1973.

The 24-nation committee, headed by Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania, voted with General Assembly approval last year to collect political, economic, social and other data on Puerto Ricans' rights and "to keep the question under continuous review."

Right to Self-Determination

The United States contends the committee lacks competence to consider Puerto Rico on the ground that the General Assembly in 1953 voted that Puerto Ricans had exercised their right to self-determination in setting up the commonwealth status and should no longer be listed as non-self-governing.

Mr. Mari Bras had also been heard by the special committee with Senator Berrios last August. Today he criticized a committee rapporteur's report on

Puerto Rico's political developments for omitting what he said was abstention by more than 320,000 voters in the 1952 constitutional referendum boycotted by the former Nationalist party.

While his own party, which proclaims Marxism-Leninism, abstained in the last election in 1972, Mr. Mari Bras asserted it had gathered 72,000 signatures of former voters to make it eligible for inscription in the 1976 ballot. He said Senator Berrios' own election by 94,570 votes in 1972 represented almost 10 per cent of that year's vote.

On what by coincidence was the 24th anniversary of the bloody 1950 Nationalist revolt, Mr. Mari Bras contended Puerto Rico was subjected to United States control of trade, compulsory military service, superior Congressional Federal judicial power.

He declared the Commonwealth Government "without shame" advertised that such industries as textiles achieved 6 per cent profits on the island compared with 2.5 per cent on the mainland; metals, 18.9 per cent as against 3.9; electrical machinery, 31.6 per cent as against 3.9—much of which he attributed to low wages.

The Socialist party leader urged the committee at a 1975 session to call upon the United States for transfer of power to Puerto Rico without conditions and to send a visiting mission to the island to "sound out the people."

Senator Berrios had planned to describe worsening economic conditions in which he said Puerto Rico had a "negative growth" of 2 per cent in its economy last year for the first time in 20 years.

Consumer prices, he said, soared 23.7 per cent in the year ended last June, compared with 5.5 per cent the year before. Public debt, he went on, has risen to \$3.9-billion, an total including private, to 12.6-billion—which he reckoned at \$4,345 per capita.

In the year ended June 30, he asserted United States interests had taken \$895-million in direct earnings and interest from Puerto Rico, up from \$762-million the year before.

NEW YORK TIMES
22 October 1974

U. S. Policy and Soviet Subs

By Barry M. Blechman and
Stephanie E. Levinson

WASHINGTON—Today marks the twelfth anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis. At its conclusion, in 1962, the Soviet Union conceded that it would no longer deploy strategic offensive weapons in Cuba.

Eight years later, in September, 1970, after renewed tensions, this commitment was broadened to disallow the servicing of submarines from Cuban ports.

Let, last April, a Soviet Golf-class—this is an Atlantic alliance designation—diesel-powered strategic missile submarine visited Havana. No confrontation ensued this time. What happened to bring about this change? And what implications can be drawn from this incident for United States policy?

There is no question that in 1970 the Soviet Union built a facility for servicing submarines at the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. The construction work included barracks, recreational facilities, a water tower, rehabilitation of an existing pier, and the sinking of moorings for visiting submarines.

Also, two barges, associated exclusively with the disposal of effluents from nuclear-power plants, were brought to the port. All these facilities still remain. All that is necessary to make use of the base is the arrival of a submarine and a tender.

As a result of United States protests, Soviet plans to operate from the port were shelved, at least temporarily. An understanding was reached in 1970 defining what the Soviet Union would and would not do with respect to the basing of naval vessels in Cuba. But this agreement remains secret to all but a handful of officials. Furthermore, the official United States interpretation of the agreement seems to have narrowed.

Initially, United States concern over the Cienfuegos facilities was directed at preventing the Soviet Union from basing strategic missile submarines in the Western Hemisphere. In this sense,

the understanding was viewed as an extension of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement on nondeployment of strategic weapons in Cuba.

In the face of recent visits by the Golf-class submarine, the understanding is now interpreted to apply only to nuclear-powered vessels.

The Defense Department's current position is summarized in a statement by former President Nixon in January, 1971, that "in the event that nuclear subs were serviced in Cuba, or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding."

If, in fact, this was an accurate description of the agreement, it was violated in February, 1971. That month, a nuclear-powered November-class submarine with a tender visited Cienfuegos. Whether the submarine actually was serviced in the port remains a moot point, but there were no United States protests. Nor did the United States protest subsequent visits by Echo-class submarines—nuclear-powered vessels carrying tactical missiles.

It seems evident that the Soviet Union has been probing the margins of the 1970 understanding. It has done the following, in this order: put a nuclear-powered attack submarine into Cienfuegos with a tender, put a nuclear-powered tactical missile submarine into Cienfuegos with a tender, put a diesel-powered strategic missile submarine into a different Cuban port quietly, and put a diesel-powered strategic missile submarine into a different Cuban port publicly. This is just what may be learned from the public record.

The ramifications of this activity should not be overstated. The Soviet Union has not, as yet, challenged the understanding directly, by for example sending a Yankee-class nuclear-powered strategic submarine into Cienfuegos.

Nonetheless, it seems clear that the Soviet Union is gradually but deliberately encroaching upon the agreement.

Since the military advantages that would result from the establishment of a submarine base in Cuba are not commensurate with the risk of pro-

voing a strong political response by the United States, Soviet motives must be more complex.

In effect, the submarine visits provide a test of United States willingness to take risks in its broad relations with the Soviet Union in order to prevent a shift in the two sides' relative military capabilities.

If this indeed is the Russians' purpose, then the United States response to the visits—essentially an endorsement of the Russians' conduct—can only encourage similar future actions.

Thus, the series of submarine visits to Cuba poses a political challenge for United States foreign policy.

More important, if this Soviet tactic is successful over the long-term United States reluctance to insist on compliance with the accord could help bring into question its credibility in world affairs. The implication of this assessment is that the United States should adopt a firm attitude toward Soviet submarine activity in the Caribbean.

This does not mean that all operations should become a cause célèbre. It would be difficult to balk at those types of visits for which the Soviet Union has established precedents.

New steps, however, such as the servicing of a Golf-class sub in Cienfuegos, should stir a strong reaction. Only by demonstrating a willingness to make issues of single events that in isolation appear relatively insignificant can the United States cause the Soviet Union to understand that normalizing our relations requires mutual concessions.

Barry M. Blechman and Stephanie E. Levinson are staff members of the foreign policy studies program at the Brookings Institution.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 October 1974

A TIMES REPORTER IS BARRED BY CHILE

SANTIAGO, Chile, Oct. 14 (UPI) — The military Government announced today that a New York Times correspondent, Jonathan Kandell, had been permanently banned from the country. Mr. Kandell was turned back when he arrived at the airport.

Comdr. Enrique Montero, Under Secretary of the Interior,

said that Mr. Kandell, normally based in Buenos Aires, "would never be permitted to return" to Chile.

Although he gave no details on the ban, Government sources said it was because of objections to articles by Mr. Kandell.

Friends of the correspondent said that Mr. Kandell was barred from entering the country after he arrived at Padahuel International Airport outside Santiago on an Avianca Colombian airliner.